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ABSTRACT 
Does culture matter in decision-making? Existing literature largely assumes that the 
cognitive processes that inform decision-making are universally applicable, while only 
very few studies indicate that cultural norms and values shape cognitive processes. Using 
a survey based quasi-experiment, I examine cross-country differences in cultural traits 
and decision-making processes among undergraduate students in the U.S. and Ghana. A 
comparison between the groups shows the constraining impact of culture at three levels: 
individual, societal, and situated. At an individual level, those who are more collectivist 
are more dependent in their decision-making. At a societal level, students from a 
collectivist society (Ghana) are more likely to protect the interests of their inner social 
identity groups, and students from an individualist society (U.S.) are more likely to make 
group decisions based on perceived merit. At a situated level, a feeling of familiarity with 
the setting of the conflict situation tends to produce more cooperative decisions. The 
quasi-experimental survey is carried over into a third sample of Ghanaian peace 
professionals from a peacekeeping training center. While Ghanaian students demonstrate 
a more ethnocentric response and a reluctance to go outside of their social in-group for 
help, the more experienced Ghanaian peacekeepers consider problem solutions that 
would involve out-group members. This reflects a unique and less ethnocentric approach 
in the experienced peacekeeping community that overcomes cultural constraints and 
produces more effective conflict resolution practices. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 In August of 2012, Erick Barrondo became Guatemala’s first ever Olympic medal 
winner. After finishing second in the men’s twenty kilometer walk race, Barrondo said, 
“It’s well known that Guatemala has problems with guns and knives. I hope that this 
medal inspires the kids at home to put down guns and knives and pick up a pair of 
trainers instead” (Maidment, 2012). Even today, Guatemala feels the effects of its thirty-
six year civil war that ended in 1996 as individuals throughout the country make 
decisions regularly on whether to cooperate or fight and whether to pursue peaceful 
activities or use violence. The country’s history of armed conflict and polarized politics 
created a complex social environment prompting the presence of a United Nations (UN) 
peacekeeping operation, MINUGUA, for ten years ending in 2004. In its final report on 
the mission, the UN noted that “the most difficult challenge for MINUGUA was to 
operate in the multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and multilingual environment of Guatemala” 
(United Nations General Assembly, 2005, p. 2). This raises the question of how 
significant the impact of culture is on the decisions made not only by the deployed 
peacekeeping troops but by the individuals living in the society.  
Consider another UN peacekeeping mission that was challenged by issues of 
culture, namely the United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II). UNOSOM II 
was sent to Somalia to provide humanitarian relief in a protected environment in the mid 
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1990s following the Somali Civil War and has been widely criticized for its security 
predicaments and clashes with the local population. Throughout the phases of the UN 
mission in Somalia, cultural issues were evident. Local civilian support was essential to 
the peacekeeping operation, yet the Somali culture was largely misunderstood by the 
international forces stationed there. The importance of the clan system, the nomadic 
conception of time, the oral traditions, and the intolerance of outside intervention in 
group problems were all characteristics of the Somali culture that were ill-considered 
(Duffey, 2000). Director of UN Operations in Kismayo, Mark Walsh, expressed this lack 
of cultural understanding when he said, “If I could make a statement of bad experience in 
Somalia, the most dominant thing is how culturally unaware I was about everything” 
(Duffey, 2000, p. 157).  
A lack of understanding of these cultural factors on the decisions in Somalia made 
the stormy outcomes of the operation unexpected, whereas a clearer conception of the 
connection between culture and decision-making may have allowed for better mission 
planning and success. For example, the idea of collective responsibility is embedded in 
the Somali culture and requires clan members to support each other and their leader. The 
UNSOSOM II personnel, not understanding this collective identity, attempted to 
neutralize the power of the clan leader by singling him out for responsibility and offering 
US$25,000 for his capture (Duffey, 2000). This move actually strengthened the clan 
leader’s position as the rest of the clan rallied to support him in the face of “hostile” 
forces outside of the clan. In fact, the collective identity of the Somali culture was 
misunderstood by UN peacekeeping personnel from the beginning of the operation. 
Those with local knowledge had encouraged the UN not to send any troops, or at most a 
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few hundred troops, because without negotiated terms for the operation, the local 
population would not accept outside intervention and the fighting would likely get worse. 
Unfortunately, the UN did not understand the cultural barrier to out-group interference, 
and in a noble attempt to bring peace to the region they continued to send troops to 
Somalia until 30,000 troops had amassed (Duffey, 2000). As a result, the troops were not 
welcomed by the Somali people as they expected they would be. 
A Cross-Cultural Research Approach 
Decision-making as an activity is considered to be a universal practice in human 
behavior, as people of all cultures have problems and opportunities that require making 
choices from among alternatives. Some presume that the cognitive processing behind 
decision-making is also universal which has led negotiators and mediators from Europe 
and North America to apply Western traditions of reasoning in non-Western cultures 
(Duffey, 2000). The Western focus on rational choice and maximizing the benefit for 
oneself does not necessarily apply elsewhere in the world. Peacekeeping troops in 
Somalia assumed that individuals would want to maximize their own benefit by seeking 
the reward money, but the decision process for many locals involved the cultural value of 
collective identity that would remove such reward money as an option for consideration. 
On the other hand, the MINUGUA operation in Guatemala achieved more success with 
its more culturally sensitive approach. MINUGUA only deployed about 425 
peacekeeping personnel to Guatemala, and they made use of national indigenous staff 
and translators locally. The mission was still not welcomed by many in the Guatemalan 
government and some in the resistance movement. Peacekeepers had to deal with 
harassment, shootings, and kidnappings directed at MINUGA personnel. However, their 
4 
 
smaller presence and linkage with the local community allowed them to overcome many 
of those barriers and assist in the peace process (Jonas, 2000).  
Culture is an aspect of groups learned by watching others in the group who 
embody the group norms. Individuals internalize aspects of the group norms and behave 
in ways that model the group overall. The group norms may promote behavior focused on 
the group’s interest or may actually promote more singular behavior focused on the 
individual’s interest (Rubinstein, 2003). In the end it is the individual who makes the 
decision on how to behave in a given situation. How then does culture affect the 
individual-level decision-making process? What factors of culture in Guatemala 
contribute to a young person’s choice to arm himself or herself, and what factors of the 
Somali culture contribute to the choice of a local chief to cooperate or resist with 
international peacekeeping troops? Culture creates a foundation that people use to build 
their world views and structure their actions and alternatives. Culture affects one’s 
interpretation of events, one’s emotional reactions, and one’s ideas for problem-solving. 
The key is to understand how these cultural constraints ultimately impact the cognitive 
decision-making process and how those impacts may vary across different cultures. 
In this study, I explore the question:  how do cultural norms and values affect 
decision-making in conflict situations? This research question is explored with a 
comparative case study that examines cross-country and within-country differences in 
cultural traits and decision-making processes. The two countries selected for comparison, 
the U.S. and Ghana, were chosen based on significant differences across cultural 
dimensions with the largest difference in the individualist and collectivist natures of the 
two societies, as this difference seems to repeatedly affect the outcome of peacekeeping 
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efforts as the examples above illustrate. As an individualist society, people in the U.S. are 
prone to self-interested behavior with a focus on responsibility and achievement. As a 
collectivist society, the people of Ghana are prone to group-interested behavior with a 
focus on loyalty and harmony. Hofstede’s (1980) study of cultural traits in 40 countries 
showed that the U.S. had the highest score on the individualism scale, and Ghana had the 
second lowest score making it the second most collectivist culture. These differences are 
expected to make cultural impacts more readily apparent in cross-country analysis. 
Guatemala had the lowest individualism score and hence the most collectivist culture in 
Hofstede’s analysis, but was eliminated as a choice for this study because it is less active 
in peacekeeping than Ghana which has been consistently in the top ten contributors of 
troops to peacekeeping missions (The Ghanaian Times, 2012; Afele, 2000). The linkage 
between cultural differences and peacekeeping operations is a key aspect of this study. 
Peacekeepers can come from all types of societies ranging from highly individualist to 
highly collectivist, and they are dropped into cultures that can also vary greatly on a 
cultural scale, yet it is the peacekeepers job to be an instrument of peaceful resolution to 
conflict. Exploring the impact of culture on the decisions made by peacekeepers is an 
essential element of the conflict aspect of my research question. 
Comparing National Approaches to Peacekeeping 
Comparing the national approaches taken by the U.S. and Ghana in global 
peacekeeping reveals some differences that can be attributed to the individualist and 
collectivist nature of the societies respectively. The U.S. approach to peacekeeping has 
evolved in the time period since the Cold War. After the Cold War ended, the U.S. 
initially showed interest in multilateral participation in global peacekeeping efforts in 
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conjunction with the UN. However, enthusiasm from the U.S. decreased after the failure 
of the peacekeeping mission in Somalia in 1993 for which the U.S. had sent 25,000 
soldiers (Vuong, 2003). After the Somalia debacle, President Clinton revised U.S. policy 
regarding peacekeeping and called for a systematic reduction in U.S. peacekeeping 
involvement and particularly in U.S. troop participation. After the attacks of September 
11, 2001, President Bush further reduced U.S. participation in peace operations and 
focused instead on nation-building. The Obama administration has shown intermittent 
enthusiasm for global peacekeeping but has been accused of “selective engagement” 
based on U.S. interests (Council on Foreign Relations, 2010). Since the turn of the 
century, the U.S. policy on peacekeeping has consistently been one of self-interested 
multilateralism in which a multilateral framework is used to further the interests of the 
U.S. rather than the interests of the global collective (Vuong, 2003). The U.S. is 
recognized for its financial support of UN peacekeeping where it contributes 27% of the 
budget, the largest contribution by far of any country (UN Peacekeeping, 2012a). 
However, the lack of participation from a troop perspective also shows in the numbers. 
The U.S. is currently contributing only 128 members to the 94,000 strong UN 
peacekeeping forces (UN Peacekeeping, 2012b).  
In comparison with the U.S., Ghana is a large contributor of peacekeeping troops 
and personnel, providing 2,814 members of the current UN peacekeeping force, and 
consistently being in the top ten countries providing troops (UN Peacekeeping, 2012b). 
Since the end of the Cold War, African leaders have shown a growing determination to 
fix the security predicament across the continent and have become increasingly involved 
in international peacekeeping efforts. Western countries have come to depend on African 
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countries to supply much of personnel needed to staff peacekeeping missions. However, 
not all African states participate equally. Some of the more developed states are not prone 
to participate in peacekeeping missions including South Africa, Namibia, and Botswana, 
while a number of less developed states are dependably involved including Ghana, 
Ethiopia, Nigeria, Rwanda, and Uganda (Victor, 2010). Ghanaian troops have 
participated in peacekeeping missions outside of the African continent as well including 
those in Europe and Asia. A former minister of defense in Ghana noted that Ghana, 
despite its small size and difficult economic conditions, "is committed to the noble idea 
of [contributing] positively towards lasting peaceful co-existence and security in the 
world" (Afele, 2000). 
The peacekeeping approaches employed by the U.S. and Ghana align with the 
individualist and collectivist nature of each society on several points. The U.S. takes a 
more self-interested approach in making decisions of whether to participate in 
peacekeeping operations. The U.S. does contribute a very large portion of the UN 
peacekeeping funds reflecting its value of responsibility in the realm of global security 
but chooses to participate in this more distant manner rather than contributing personnel 
directly. Ghana on the other hand chooses to participate as part of a group that works 
together in the field in the pursuit of peace. Clearly both nations value global peace, but 
each approaches participation in a different manner. Foreign policy direction is one 
indicator of culturally-based decision making at the national level. However, this study 
will go far below the national level and look at decisions made at the individual level and 
consider how those individual decisions are influenced by culture and society. I expect to 
find that individuals who exhibit more collectivist traits or have lived extensively in a 
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collectivist society will make decisions based on group interests and group loyalties. 
Alternately, those who have individualist traits or have lived extensively in an 
individualist society will make decisions based on self-interest, merit, and achievement. 
Organization of the Study 
This study is organized into a series of chapters that present background and 
results on culture and decision-making in general, followed by chapters on the specific 
context of peacekeeping. Chapter 2 introduces the idea of culture, attempting to define 
this at times elusive concept and discussing ways to observe and measure it. The culture 
of Ghana is reviewed and discussed in comparison to the U.S. and in relation to the 
existing measures of culture in preparation for the overall comparative study between the 
two countries to come in later chapters. In chapter 3, I review the various theories on how 
human beings go about the process of making decisions including theories of rationality, 
emotion, and cognition. These theories form the foundation of the approach used in this 
study to observe the decision-making process, to classify those observations, and to 
develop a model that incorporates the results. Chapter 4 sets the theoretical framework 
for this research paper using social identity theory. The concepts of in-groups and out-
groups are discussed as the key constructs to be used in the development of hypotheses 
and interpretation of results. Concepts from previous chapters on culture and decision 
theory are brought together with the ideas of social identity to form a model of culturally 
constrained decision-making.  
Chapter 5 reviews the methodology of this research with a description of the over-
riding research question and specific hypotheses, the operationalization of concepts, 
sampling methods, and a discussion of how data is collected via a quasi-experimental 
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survey design. I also discuss some of the major challenges of cross-cultural research. In 
chapter 6, I analyze the results of the data collected from university student participants 
both quantitatively and qualitatively. I discuss the findings that show respondents with 
higher levels of collectivism tend to be more dependent and less likely to betray the 
interests of members of more central in-groups in favor of less central in-groups. 
Furthermore, the results indicate that in conflict settings that seem familiar, individuals 
are more likely to compromise in order to achieve peace.  
In chapter 7, I bring the context of peacekeeping into the study of culture and 
decision-making, reviewing current literature on the training and expectations of 
peacekeepers sent into the field to interact with local populations of different cultures. 
From the current theories in this area, I formulate hypotheses that anticipate experienced 
peacekeepers will focus on problem-solving and break through cultural constraints as 
needed in situations of conflicting in-group/out-group interests. In chapter 8, I analyze the 
results of the data collected from the population at a Ghanaian peacekeeping training 
center showing that Ghanaian peace professionals have a greater focus on problem-
solving then Ghanaian university students, and that the more field experience 
peacekeepers have, the more likely they are to go outside of the social in-group to seek 
problem solutions. In chapter 9, I bring together the theory and research findings in 
comparison with the defined model for culturally constrained decision-making. I discuss 
how this model can be applied and how it can be refined through further research.  
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CHAPTER 2 
CONCEPTUALIZING CULTURE 
The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that “everyone has the 
right to a nationality,” but what determines nationality? Is it culture? From a legal point 
of view, nationality is about reflecting an individual’s genuine link with a country based 
on objective factors such as place of birth, descent, and residency (Batchelor, 1998). On 
the other hand, culture, even though it is often associated with a country, is a more 
difficult construct to define and measure (Armstrong, 1996). One common definition of 
culture is based on the anthropological conception of a learned system of meanings 
rooted in symbols and language that allow people to adapt to their environment and 
interpret their experiences (Rubenstein, 2003). Hofstede (1980) defined culture as “the 
collective programming of the mind which distinguishes the members of one human 
group from another” (p. 25). In this study, variations across these human groups are 
expected to be revealed in how group members make decisions, particularly in the 
heightened volatility of conflict situations. 
In this chapter, I will explore the meaning of culture and discuss ways to define 
and measure the concept. Then I will provide an overview of elements of the culture of 
Ghana, which was chosen as a cultural group to be compared with the U.S. in this 
research. Ghana was selected as a target cultural group because it is so different from the 
U.S. in several aspects of culture, particularly on the individualism-collectivism 
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spectrum. Americans tend to be more individualist in their traits showing a focus on self-
interest and uniqueness, while Ghanaians are more collectivist with an emphasis on 
group-interest and harmony. Finally, I will give a more detailed comparison of the 
cultures of Ghana and the U.S. pointing out key similarities and differences that form the 
basis for this cross-cultural research. 
Value Studies 
In attempts to understand and categorize national cultures, a number of scholars 
have narrowed their focus to the study of values. Values are principles that give order and 
guidance to people in their thoughts and actions as they face common human problems 
and issues (Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck, 1961). By observing the principles that different 
social groups use in their thoughts and actions, researchers have been able to infer the 
shared values that various social groups have. Societies can then be categorized and 
compared based on their common shared values. Thomas (2008) reviewed the five major 
frameworks that have emerged out of these value studies, each allowing for the 
categorization and comparison of national cultures: the Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck 
framework, Hofstede’s model, the Schwartz Value Survey, Trompennars’s value 
dimensions, and the Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior Effectiveness 
(GLOBE) study. Each of these value studies will be discussed further, and Table 2.1 
provides an overall summary comparison of the studies. 
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Table 2.1 
Comparison of Cultural Value Studies 
Study Year Sample Cultural Dimensions 
Kluckhohn and 
Strodtbeck 
1961 100 people across 5 
cultural groups in the 
Southwest U.S. 
6 value orientations 
Hofstede 1980 117,000 employees of 
IBM across 40 countries 
4 dimensions 
Schwartz 1990s 22,000 people across 40 
countries 
10 value types 
Trompenaars 1993 15,000 managers in 28 
countries 
7 value dimensions 
GLOBE study 2004 17,000 managers in 951 
organizations across 62 
societies 
9 dimensions 
 
Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck’s framework. Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (1961) 
theorized that there are a limited number of human problems that a society has to face, 
and that the preferred solutions to these problems reflect the society’s values. They 
developed six value orientations, or dimensions, around the common human problems. 
First the relationship to nature addressed the question - is the relationship between 
humanity and its natural environment one of mastery, submission, or harmony? Second, 
belief about human nature addressed the question - is human nature good, evil, or a 
mixture? Third, the dimension on relationships between people asks - should we relate to 
each other hierarchically, as equals (collateral), or by individual merit (individualist)? 
Fourth, the behavior motivation dimension asks - should we live for the moment (being), 
strive for goals (achieving), or reflect (thinking)? Fifth, space orientation addresses the 
13 
 
question - should we consider our physical space private, public, or a mixture? Finally, 
time orientation addresses the question - should we focus on the past, the present, or the 
future? 
Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck tested their theory by interviewing twenty people from 
each of five different cultural groups in the Southwest U.S., including the Navaho, 
Mexican-Americans, Texan homesteaders, Mormon villagers, and Zuni pueblo dwellers. 
They developed value profiles on each group showing ways in which they were similar 
and different along four of the six dimensions. Two of the dimensions (space and nature) 
were not explored. Despite the demonstrated validity of four of the six dimensions, this 
framework has not been used in very many management studies perhaps due to the nature 
of the survey instrument used which was not designed with the workplace in mind 
(Thomas, 2008). 
Hofstede’s study. Hofstede (1980) conducted an attitude survey of work values 
on 117,000 employees of a U.S. based multinational corporation, IBM, in the years 1967 
to 1973. He surveyed employees in 72 countries and then reduced that to 40 countries 
based on those that had at least 50 responses. Based on country level factor analysis of 
the survey responses, Hofstede was able to extract four value dimensions that classified 
the 40 countries represented in the study. 
First, the individualism dimension measures the extent to which one’s self-
identity is tied to the individual versus the group. Individualists expect to take care of 
themselves and their immediate family, whereas those who are not individualists 
(collectivists) expect their in-group to take care of them in exchange for group loyalty. 
The individualism dimension is often reflected in the way people live in society: in 
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families, in extended families, or as a community. In individualistic societies, the self is 
promoted and people are taught to be self-reliant, competitive, and innovative. In 
collectivist societies, collaboration and cooperation are the ultimate tools of survival, and 
people are taught to follow closely the norms of the group that include obedience and 
harmony. 
Second, the power distance dimension measures how much society accepts the 
fact the power is distributed unequally between members of the society. In cultures with 
small power distance scores, there is an expectation that inequality should be minimized 
and that even the least powerful member should have a voice with social decision being 
reached democratically. In cultures with large power distance scores, inequality among 
members of society is expected and desired. Family members tend to fall into a strict 
hierarchy, usually with the father ruling at the top. At school and at work, teachers, 
supervisors, and elders are treated with respect and deference. Large power distance 
cultures see power based on one’s position within the hierarchy, whereas small power 
distance cultures see power as something to be earned based on hard work and 
achievement. 
Third, the uncertainty avoidance dimension indicates how uncomfortable a 
society is with uncertainty and ambiguity. In societies of low uncertainty avoidance, 
ambiguity is considered to be a normal part of daily life, and there is no inherent need to 
try to control the future. People enjoy open-ended discussions and do not feel compelled 
to follow a particular timetable with their activities. In societies of high uncertainty 
avoidance, uncertainty is a threatening thing that must be fought, and there is a general 
belief that what is different is dangerous. Members of such a society try to avoid 
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uncertainty and seek to bring order and structure to their home and work lives. Time 
constraints are important as are precision and punctuality. 
Fourth, the masculinity-femininity dimension is an indication of the dominant 
values of society. A society that values “masculine” norms will pursue achievement, 
reward, and material success. People are generally considered to be competitive. On the 
other hand, a society that values “feminine” norms is more cooperative than competitive. 
The traditionally female orientation toward nurturing and interpersonal harmony is 
emphasized. People will take a more modest approach, will care for the weak, and will 
pursue quality of life. 
Although Hofstede’s model has been used extensively, it is not without criticism 
(Shi & Wang, 2011). Some scholars find fault with his model because he developed it 
through world-wide sampling within only one multi-national corporation, IBM. Also 
critics point to limitations of the model because it does not capture changes to a culture 
over time, and it does not address within-country cultural differences (Kirkman, 2006). 
Nevertheless, Hofstede’s framework has been used in thousands of empirical studies over 
the past thirty years (Taras, Kirkman, & Steel, 2010). These studies have used Hofstede’s 
framework in various ways with culture as the main effect or as a moderator and at 
various levels of analysis including individual, group, and country levels.  
Schwartz’s value survey. The Schwartz Value Survey (SVS) is based on a series 
of studies conducted by Schwartz and his colleagues in the 1990s. They theorized 56 
values to reflect the way that a person satisfies his or her basic relationships toward 
nature, toward the group, and toward the preservation of society as a whole. Respondents 
from 20 countries were asked how relevant each principle was to their lives revealing ten 
16 
 
clusters of distinct values types that were hypothesized to be universal across cultures. In 
a subsequent study, the presence of the ten value types was examined in a broader 
population by using 88 samples of schoolteachers, university students, and other adult 
groups from 40 countries lending strong support to the cross-cultural structure of values 
(Schwartz & Sagiv, 1995). The ten value types can be used to describe the motivational 
priorities and uniqueness of any particular culture as well as compare qualities across 
cultures. The Schwartz framework does not indicate which value is the most important in 
each culture, but it does assert that all values are important in every culture and the 
definitions of the values are consistent across cultures. 
Schwartz’s ten value types were power (social status and prestige), achievement 
(personal success through competence), hedonism (pleasure for oneself), stimulation 
(excitement and challenge in one’s life), self-direction (independent thought and 
creativity), universalism (understanding and protection for the welfare of all), 
benevolence (caring for people with whom one has frequent contact), tradition 
(acceptance of customs and beliefs of culture or religion), conformity (restraint on actions 
that may violate social norms), and security (safety, stability, and harmony of 
relationships). These ten value types can be seen largely as an elaboration of Hofstede’s 
four cultural dimensions (Thomas, 2008). For example, tradition, security, and 
conformity all align with the collectivist side of Hofstede’s individualism-collectivism 
dimension, while achievement, self-direction, and hedonism align with the notion of an 
individualist. Also, Hofstede’s dimension of power distance is reflected in the Schwartz 
opposing values of power and universalism. Finally, the masculinity-femininity 
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dimension as defined by Hofstede can be seen in the opposing Schwartz values of 
achievement and benevolence. 
Trompenaars’s dimensions. Trompenaars (1993) conducted a study of cultural 
values as they pertain to the business world. It was not his goal to determine how people 
understood those of other nationalities as he felt this was an impossible task, but rather to 
aid business people in multi-national and international corporations in their job to 
conduct business across cultures. He administered a value questionnaire to more than 
15,000 managers across 28 countries to test seven value dimensions. The first five 
dimensions are about relationships between people and include universalism-
particularism (belief in a universal definition in good versus a circumstantial 
determination of good), individualism-collectivism (the extent to which people self-
identity as an individual or member of a group), neutral-affective (maintaining control 
over emotions versus expressing emotions freely), specific-diffuse (the separation of 
public and private parts of life), and achievement-ascription (whether status and power 
are determined by position or achievement). The last two dimensions concern orientation 
toward time and space: human-time relationship (past versus future orientation) and 
human-nature relationship (do people influence their own lives or is the environment a 
more powerful influence). 
Several of Trompenaars’s dimensions relate strongly to Hofstede’s dimensions. 
The individualism-collectivism dimension is virtually identical between the two models. 
Trompenaars’s achievement-ascription dimension is very similar to Hofstede’s measure 
of power distance as each defines the source of power, although Hofstede’s dimension 
goes further and includes the distinction of how much power distance is socially 
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accepted. The universalism-particularism dimension has some relation to Hofstede’s 
uncertainty avoidance with its measure of preference for well-defined rules. The last two 
dimensions about time and about the environment are similar to Kluckhohn and 
Strodtbeck’s (1961) categories regarding attitudes toward time and relationship to nature.  
The GLOBE study. The Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior 
Effectiveness (GLOBE) program conducted a large study on cross-cultural value 
dimensions involving 170 researchers (House et al., 2004). The GLOBE project collected 
data from 17,000 middle managers in 951 organizations across 62 countries in an attempt 
to replicate and expand on Hofstede’s work and test various hypotheses on leadership 
topics. The study resulted in the definition of nine dimensions of cultural variation. The 
first four dimensions are direct extensions of Hofstede’s work including institutional 
collectivism (how much societal institutions reward collective action), in-group 
collectivism (loyalty and cohesiveness in groups), power distance (how much groups 
members expect power to be distributed equally), and uncertainty avoidance (reliance on 
social norms to reduce unpredictability of the future). Hofstede’s masculinity-femininity 
dimension was expanded into four dimensions – gender egalitarianism (how equal are 
the genders considered in society), assertiveness (aggression in human relationships, 
typically considered a masculine trait), performance orientation (how the group rewards 
performance and achievement, also linked to the masculinity construct), and human 
orientation (how the group rewards fairness and kindness to others, typically considered 
a feminine trait). The final dimension of future orientation (focus on the future for 
planning and delayed gratification) aligns well with the time orientation dimension of 
Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (1961).  
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One of the main differences between the GLOBE study and Hofstede’s study is 
that the GLOBE study measured the dimensions in terms of both actual practices (how 
things are) and values (how things should be) (Thomas, 2008). Hofstede believed that 
values are what differentiate societies, and practices are more appropriate when looking 
at the organization level (Shi & Wang, 2011). The two studies can be considered 
complementary providing results at multiple levels of analysis - individual, 
organizational, and societal. 
Similarity of value studies. Each of these five studies categorized culture in 
terms of value measurements, deriving a set of four to nine dimensions depending on the 
framework. Despite the facts that the studies employed varying methodologies, used 
different sample populations, and took place at different times over the course of four 
decades, there is a large amount of similarity in their results. The consistency of the 
findings lends validity to the overall construct of value dimensions as a measure of 
cultural distinction. The dimensions that are most frequently and consistently occurring 
among the different value studies are the dimensions of individualism-collectivism and 
power distance. The only dimension to appear in all five values studies is the 
individualism-collectivism dimension which will be examined in more detail in the next 
section. 
Individualism-Collectivism 
Of the various cultural dimensions emerging from the value studies, the most 
frequently used in the study of social behaviors has been individualism-collectivism as 
evidenced by the large amount of research that has made use of the individualism-
collectivism dimension to predict behavioral patterns (Thomas, 2008; Taras, Kirkman, & 
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Steel, 2010; Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002). For example, in their meta-
analysis of studies on individualism-collectivism, Osyerman et al. (2002) gathered all 
English-language literature published from 1980 to 1999 that assessed the individualism-
collectivism construct either directly or indirectly ending up with 253 studies to review. 
They concluded that the individualism-collectivism construct does impact basic 
psychological processing, and cultural differences in the dimension “provide a powerful 
explanatory tool for understanding the variability in the behavior of individuals in 
different parts of the world” (Oyserman et al., 2002, p. 44). However, in order to take 
advantage of this powerful construct, individualism and collectivism must be clearly 
defined. This section will delve further into the definition of this dimension. 
The term individualism first appeared during the French revolution in the late 
1700s in order to describe the negative effects that individual rights had on the health of 
the overall commonwealth (Oyserman et al., 2002). Today, the term individualism is used 
to define the degree to which members of society define their self-images as individuals 
or part of a larger group. On the other hand, those who define themselves from the social 
and collective aspects of the self-concept are described with the term collectivism. 
Individualism and collectivism are sometimes seen as opposite ends of a single 
continuum, but it is more accurate to describe them as worldviews that make different 
aspects of the self-concept salient. They are clearly contrasting worldviews but better 
described as orthogonal rather than opposite. The core elements of individualism are 
independence and uniqueness, whereas the core elements of collectivism are duty to in-
group and maintaining harmony.  
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Triandis (1993) writes about the prototypical social relationships that describe 
each of these two constructs. For collectivism, the prototypical relationship is the family. 
The family cares for its members and cooperates together often acting as a single unit 
with common goals. Each member of the family has a well-defined role and status 
determined by position within the group. Family members have strong emotional ties to 
one another and are linked typically for life. For individualism, the prototypical 
relationship is the marketplace where an individual makes a payment and gets a good or 
service in return. The relationships are emotionally distant and although members of the 
market interact frequently, each member maintains their own distinct identity. The 
marketplace encourages competition, and status is usually determined by individual 
achievement and success and not by membership in a particular group. 
The individualism-collectivism construct is useful as a mechanism for 
systematically describing ways in which cultures differ. The construct is helpful for 
understanding how culture influences not only what people think but how they think. The 
individualism-collectivism construct has helped to create a growing awareness that the 
influences of culture should be considered when psychologists study how the mind 
works. Osyerman et al.’s (2002) meta-analysis of individualism-collectivism research 
concludes that Americans do differ in individualism-collectivism from other nationalities. 
More specifically, European Americans valued personal independence more and felt a 
duty to the in-group less than others. European Americans did not differ distinctly from 
African Americans or Latinos. As a result of their analysis, Oyserman et al. (2002) 
concluded that modern American psychological research is most appropriate to the 
Western individualist worldview only and may not be a good fit to a universal model of 
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human behavior. The study of individualism-collectivism on human behavior is therefore 
an essential tool for cross-cultural research. 
There are three main approaches which can be used when studying individualism-
collectivism effects. First, Hofstede’s (1980) country-level scores can be used as proxies 
for individualism-collectivism by applying the country score to each individual based on 
their nationality rather than assessing this dimension directly. The limitation to this 
approach is that it assumes country-level scores are stable over time and circumstance, 
and that they are relevant at the individual-level. There is a lack of empirical support for 
these assumptions which makes this approach open to criticism. Second, the researcher 
can measure individualism-collectivism at the individual level with Likert-type ratings of 
values and attitudes being the most prevalent measurement technique used. This approach 
avoids the vulnerabilities of the first approach but has its own limitations. The approach 
relies on self-reporting by participants and requires close attention to equivalence in the 
meaning of value descriptions across cultures. Third, priming studies may be used in 
which individualism-collectivism values are made salient through some experimental 
manipulation before assessing their effect on the dependent variable. This approach 
allows researchers to study culture as a dynamic construct and can avoid some of the 
pitfalls of measurement if subjects are observed directly. However, the approach is not 
prone to large-scale use making data sparse and comparative results less robust. In sum, 
each approach has its limitations and none dominates the field (Oyserman et al., 2002). 
Whichever method is chosen, researchers must be careful not to be too hasty in declaring 
cross-national differences to be due to culture, and therefore to individualism-
collectivism theory.  
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The Culture of Ghana 
Ghana is a coastal country in West Africa with a population of 25 million and an 
area about the size of Oregon. Oral tradition suggests that the people of modern-day 
Ghana migrated to the location from various locations across West Africa. In the early 
fifteenth century, Portuguese explorers set foot on the land that is now Ghana and named 
the place Mina (meaning mine) because of the relative abundance of gold found in the 
area. The name Gold Coast was later adopted by the English colonial rulers as a 
replacement for the Portuguese name. Various European powers battled to gain access to 
the resources in that area fighting amongst themselves and against the local people, 
primarily the Ashanti empire. By the late 1800s, Britain had defeated the opposition and 
made the Gold Coast into a British colony. The Gold Coast remained a British colony 
until it gained independence in 1957 and was renamed Ghana in honor of the most 
ancient of West African empires.  
Pan-Africanist Dr. Kwame Nkrumah was instrumental in efforts to bring about 
Ghana’s independence. Dr. Nkrumah was an activist for many years pursuing the issue of 
self-government and was elected to the office of prime minister of the Gold Coast while 
he was in prison for political activism and while the Gold Coast was under colonial rule. 
Under Dr. Nkrumah’s leadership, Ghana became the first sub-Saharan colony to gain 
independence leading the way for other African nations. Dr. Nkrumah remained president 
until 1966 when the country fell under military rule. A series of coups kept Ghana under 
military rule for the greater part of the late 1960s through the 1970s until Jerry Rawlings 
took power for the second time in 1981. Rawlings banned political parties for over a 
decade restoring a multi-party system in 1992 and winning two presidential elections 
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subsequently. Ghana has remained a democracy since that time with two elected 
presidents succeeding Rawlings, John Kufuor and John Atta Mills. In 2012 Mills died 
suddenly and a peaceful transition was made as the vice president, John Mahama, took 
over. Such a smooth transition would not be possible in all countries of Africa. Today, 
Ghana is considered to be one of the most democratic and stable countries in Africa with 
a score of eight on a scale with ten representing a fully institutionalized democracy 
(Center for Systemic Peace, 2012). 
The government of Ghana was originally founded as a parliamentary system 
based on that of the British, but today it is considered to be a constitutional democracy 
(CIA, 2012). Ghana’s 1992 constitution divides power among the executive (president, 
vice, and cabinet), legislature (parliament), and an independent judiciary. Members of 
parliament and the president are elected by universal suffrage. The constitution also 
provides for a Council of State (primary responsibility is to advise the president), protects 
the institutions of chieftaincy, and as part of the latter allows for the use of customary 
law, traditional councils, and the organization of chiefs into the National House of Chiefs 
(Salm & Falola, 2002). Ghana also maintains a strong presence in world politics as a 
member of international organizations such as the African Union and the United Nations 
(UN). Ghana is well-known and respected for its peacekeepers and is ranked among the 
top ten contributors of troops to UN peacekeeping missions (The Ghanaian Times, 2012; 
Afele, 2000). There has been minimal civil strife in Ghana in recent years, although in 
1994 the country did have an outbreak of ethnic violence in the northern region over land 
disputes causing 1000 deaths and 150,000 displaced people (BBC, 2012). 
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The economy is largely based in the agriculture sector with more than half of 
Ghanaians working in the farming and fishing industries (Salm & Falola, 2002). Ghana is 
the second largest cocoa producer in the world and the second largest gold miner in 
Africa. It has one of the fastest growing economies, and the recent discovery of off-shore 
oil in 2007 has raised expectations for economic growth even further (BBC, 2012).  
Different models have been used to categorize the ethnic composition of the 
people of Ghana leading to the identification of over one hundred ethnic groups with 
distinct languages and cultural differences. There is general agreement, however, that 
there are four dominant ethnic groups that make up over eighty percent of Ghana’s 
population. These are the Akan, Mole-Dagbane, Ewe, and Ga-Adangbe. The Akan are 
the largest ethnic population making up about forty-eight percent of Ghana, and they are 
located widely across Ghana, mostly in the middle and southern portions of the country. 
The Mole-Dagbane are the most populous group in the northernmost regions, and the 
Ewe are generally found in the southeast regions of the country, east of the Volta River. 
The Ga-Adangbe are believed to have originally come from areas of Nigeria, and they, 
along with other coastal dwellers such as the Fante (Akans), historically had much 
contact with the Europeans and settled in urban areas. Although Ghana has over sixty 
language groups in the country, English is the official language for government, business, 
and most media. Most Ghanaians are bi-lingual speaking both English and their native 
language, and many speak three or four languages. 
Overall, the Ghanaian nationality is a blend of rich historical tradition and the 
external influences of British colonization, Christianity, Islam, and Western ideas. The 
northern regions have the most history with Islamic influence, and the southern and 
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central regions have had more contact with Europeans and are more likely to be Christian 
and more formally educated (Salm & Falola, 2002). Christianity is the most prominent 
religion at about seventy percent, although traditional religions often coexist with both 
Christian and Islamic religions. Globalization has made an impact on Ghana, but it has 
not driven out the traditional elements found throughout art, music, religion, language, 
and even government. In general, globalization has been blended or integrated into local 
culture in Ghana. 
Ghanaians have a strong sense of community and maintain a closely knit kinship 
system. Many Ghanaians leave the village or town where they were born to pursue 
educational or career interests, but they almost always maintain ties to the village or town 
of their birth (Salm & Falola, 2002). These community ties are often strengthened with 
annual festivals held in local communities that draw people back for visits. In Ghana, the 
sense of kinship extends into the workplace where people give help and support to 
extended family members and expect the same support in return (Debrah, 2002). This 
family support system may not always be appreciated by Westerners trying to conduct 
business in Ghana, but it is part of the overall collectivist nature of the country. 
Ghanaians are generally accepting of external influences in business as well as foreign 
aid but nevertheless prefer to drive the country’s growth and development themselves 
from within the country (Salm & Falola, 2002). 
Comparing Cultures: Ghana Versus the U.S. 
Although Ghana and the U.S. are both former British colonies, their overall 
historical traditions are very different. The British colonization of Africa started over two 
centuries later than colonization in the U.S. began and met with very different results. In 
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Africa, the British interacted more with the local people, sometimes appointing them into 
positions of leadership or co-opting existing leadership structures in order to implement a 
system of “indirect rule” through the use of chiefs. There was also significant use of 
forced labor. The African response varied, from submitting to the British, allying with 
them, or confronting them either peacefully or violently (Boahen, 1987). Within a 
century of the start of colonization, every African country was able to secure 
independence from the European imperial powers. On the other hand, the U.S. was 
colonized by the British in a way that nearly eliminated the native tribes of the region, 
replacing any indigenous culture with the English language and traditions and leading to 
a declaration of independence by the colonists themselves.  
Even though the colonial histories between the U.S. and Ghana vary significantly, 
the British left a legacy in both countries that provides a foundation of similarity across 
several areas. Both countries model in some way the British traditions of democracy, 
language, and religion. Christianity is the predominant religion in both countries, at 
eighty percent in the U.S. and seventy percent in Ghana. The common use of English 
facilitates cooperation and business interaction between the two countries as well, and the 
institutions of democracy allow for a common understanding on issues of politics and 
human rights.  
From an empirical point of view, the cultures of Ghana and the U.S. show some 
significant cultural differences as evidenced by their scores on the cultural dimensions 
defined and measured by Hofstede (1980). Figure 2.1 below shows scores for the four 
original Hofstede dimensions for the U.S. and Ghana (Itim International, 2012). The 
largest difference occurs in the second dimension of individualism-collectivism, where 
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the U.S. has the highest score of all countries in Hofstede’s database at 91, and Ghana has 
one of the lowest scores at 15. This implies that Americans live in a highly individualist 
society where they have a tendency toward self-reliance, mobility, forwardness, and a 
belief in reward based on merit. Alternately, Ghanaians live in a highly collectivist 
society with a high value placed on loyalty and commitment to one’s group members, 
whether that be immediate family, extended family, or other extended relationships. This 
dramatic difference in the individualist-collectivist nature of the two cultures is expected 
to manifest itself in decision-making factors throughout this study based on the previous 
discussion of individualism-collectivism being a strong predictor of social behavior. 
 
Figure 2.1. Hofstede’s cultural dimensions for the U.S. and Ghana 
The power distance index also has a significant difference between the two 
countries, although not as dramatic. The power distance score in Ghana is twice that of 
the U.S. indicating that Ghanaians expect hierarchy in organizations to reflect inherent 
inequalities in society. This is less true in the U.S. where people expect equal rights for 
all with hierarchy being only a necessary structure to support efficiency in organizations. 
The masculinity dimension shows very little difference with both countries near the 
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midpoint, although the U.S. falls slightly more on the masculine side indicating a value of 
striving to win and “winner takes all” attitude. Ghana falls slightly on the feminine side 
where people strive for consensus and compromise. Finally, the uncertainty avoidance 
scores are again similar and hovering near the midpoint. Americans are slightly more 
uncertainty-accepting, which allows for new ideas and freedom of speech. Ghanaians 
have a preference to avoid uncertainty, resulting in relatively more rigid codes of beliefs 
and norms. The key conclusion from this comparison of Hofstede scores is that the 
societies in the U.S. and Ghana are significantly different in the major predictive 
dimension of individualism-collectivism, and this study will pursue evidence of this 
difference in the decision-making process. 
This chapter has shown how value orientations can provide insight into the 
behavioral patterns of different cultures from across the world and how the 
individualism-collectivism dimension in particular acts as a powerful tool in measuring 
and comparing results across cultures. Comparison of the cultures in the U.S. and Ghana 
has revealed distinctions in the priority of self and group, in the expectation of equality in 
relationships, in competitiveness, and in the value of rigid rules and norms. Of course, 
these distinctions are largely theoretical at this point, based on surveys done over three 
decades ago in a purely business environment. The rest of this study seeks to apply the 
concepts of culture to an updated comparison of the U.S. and Ghana with a view to 
understanding similarities and differences in the decision-making processes in each 
culture. Before taking the concepts of culture discussed here and building them into a 
framework for a comparative study, I will first discuss theories of decision-making to 
better position the role of culture in the overall framework. 
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CHAPTER 3 
DECISION-MAKING: LOGICAL OR INTUITIVE? 
How do people go about making a decision? In particular, how do people make 
decisions when faced with a situation of conflict? Kaempf et al. (1996) investigated 
decision-making during actual command-and control activities by the anti-air warfare 
(AAW) team on the U.S. Navy AEGIS cruiser. The main task of the AAW team was to 
detect airborne vehicles and respond to those vehicles according to their identity and 
intent. Team members had access to sensors for tracking vehicles and weapons which 
they could use to engage the airborne vehicles if necessary. Even in this highly 
procedural and time sensitive environment, members of the AAW team differed in the 
decision strategies they used. However, the vast majority (95%) made decisions based on 
a recognition strategy where they found familiarity of the situation to previous experience 
or would create their own story to link together pieces of information into a coherent tale 
before making a decision. Very few would weigh the pros and cons of different options in 
what is considered to be a rational or logical approach. What determines which strategy is 
invoked by someone in a particular situation? In my study, the goal is to better 
understand the decision-making process which informs efforts to manage conflict. In this 
chapter, I will briefly review four categories of decision theories:  theories of rationality, 
theories of emotion, theories of cognition, and theories that blend the others. Then I 
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discuss the approach that would be most appropriate for revealing the decision-making 
process individuals use in the midst of conflict situations. 
Theories of Rationality 
Rational choice theory was the dominant paradigm in decision making from 
World War II until the late twentieth century. Rational choice theory makes three broad 
assumptions:  actors know what they want, actors are able to order their wants, and actors 
will choose the best means to reach their desired ends (Riker, 1995). In the same realm of 
rationality, there is the expected utility theory that dates back to 1738 when Daniel 
Bernoulli attempted to explain why gamblers would pay only a small dollar amount for a 
game of infinite mathematical expectation (Schoemaker, 1982). In the expected utility 
theory, it is recognized that different people attribute different value to risk, so each seeks 
to maximize their own “expected utility” rather than maximizing an overall “expected 
value” that is mathematically calculated. In other words, people make a rational choice 
by analyzing the costs, benefits, and risks and seeking to optimize their outcome based on 
their own preference for risk aversion.  
One flaw in any rational approach is the assumption that people have perfect 
information and the perfect ability to calculate all the costs and benefits before making a 
decision (Franke, 2011). In order to accommodate the more imperfect real world, the 
satisficing theory was introduced to include shortcuts in the optimization process (Simon, 
1955). In the satisficing theory, individuals set a threshold and accept the first choice that 
crosses their threshold, leaving the rest of the alternatives without analysis.  
Some scholars believe that rationality provides the only scientific approach to 
social theory (Riker, 1995). Theories of rationality do simplify or generalize the problem 
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at hand, and generalization is seen to be of great value because it allows for prediction. 
However, there is a growing set of scholars who are strong critics of the rational choice 
approach. The main argument against rational choice theories is that those theories are 
inconsistent with observed human behavior (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Gowda, 1999; 
Berejikian, 2002; Kurtz & Snowden, 2003). It has been argued that a focus on rationality 
takes away from explanatory actions and the construction of models based on empirical 
evidence of how individuals make decisions (Berejikian, 2002). For example, automobile 
owners in the U.S. states of New Jersey and Pennsylvania were given the option to 
choose an insurance policy that had cheaper premiums but limitations on recovery of 
damages or one that had more expensive premiums but fewer limitations. There was a 
large difference in the cost and it was equally simple to choose either option. Yet 
overwhelmingly car owners in each state chose to stay with the default option, even 
though the cheaper policy was the default in New Jersey and the expensive policy was 
the default in Pennsylvania (Knetsch, 1995). In other words, an analysis of costs, gains, 
and risks did not appear to be in effect in this economic decision, and other factors 
outside of the traditional rational choice model must be considered. In this case, there 
appears to be a “status quo bias”, a robust tendency in which consumers choose to stick 
with what they have out of a stronger fear of errors of commission than errors of 
omission (Johnson et al., 1993). 
A number of behavioral studies have shown that some of the conventional 
assumptions used in economic analysis and policy setting can be systematically incorrect, 
such as the assumption that people act rationally to maximize their gains. In another 
example, a study showed that workers felt that cutting their wages was unfair, yet if their 
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annual bonuses were to be cut by the same amount, the workers felt it was fair and 
acceptable (Knetsch, 1995). The rational choice idea of people maximizing utility during 
decision-making does not always hold in examples such as these. Individuals can deviate 
from rational choice in ways that are significant and systematic, not easily dismissed as a 
random event or irrational behavior.  
Theories of Emotion 
Let us turn to a different category of decision theory that is based on human 
emotion. Although much of the theory opposing rational choice goes in the direction of 
cognitive theory (described in the next section), there are a few emotion-based points that 
are worth mentioning. The concept of affect in decision-making is one that arises when 
emotions such as fear are particularly strong. Affect enables a person to make decisions 
quickly in the face of danger but can also cloud judgment (Franke, 2011). In threatening 
situations, emotional reactions tend to dominate our decision process drowning out our 
rational reasoning. This can lead to incorrect or non-optimal decision choices. 
Gordon and Arian (2001) studied the relationship between feelings of threat and 
the policy making decision process from data on the Arab-Israeli conflict. They found 
that when people felt threatened, their policy-making decision process was dominated by 
emotion, not logic or rational considerations. Their findings showed that the stronger the 
level of threat, the more belligerent the policy choice; the lower the level of threat, the 
more pacific the policy choice. For example, in the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Jewish 
Israelis who felt the Arabs were out to conquer Israel and kill Jews were less willing to 
agree to the formation of a Palestinian state. The Jewish Israelis who felt the Arabs just 
wanted to get back some territories lost in the Six Days War were more willing to agree 
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to the formation of a Palestinian state. Although these results may seem to make policy 
choices clear, leaders often believe differently of their opposition and act under the notion 
that threats will lead to submission. Even though logic has a role in decision-making, 
much of the process in a threatening situation is driven by emotion.  
Theories of Cognition  
Observation has shown that people often make choices that are not rational, and 
many social scientists have pursued an explanation for this unpredictable behavior via a 
cognitive approach. The cognitive approach focuses on human processing of information 
including how individuals gather information and then use it to evaluate situations or 
make judgments (Miler, 2009). The cognitive approach led to the development of a 
model of human behavior broadly referred to as “behavioral decision theory” which 
shows that people use shortcuts and preferences when processing information and deviate 
predictably from rational choice or expected utility theories (Gowda, 1999).  
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) researched why people seem to exhibit 
inconsistent behavior when making decisions in risky situations and published their 
ground-breaking research on prospect theory in 1979. In prospect theory, the objects of 
choice are prospects with values assigned in terms of gains and losses rather than final 
outcomes. People react differently depending on how the situation is presented in terms 
of those gains and losses. If a situation is presented in terms of losses, then people 
become risk seeking. If a situation is presented in terms of potential gains, then people 
become risk averse. Here is one example of prospect theory in action. Imagine someone 
has to choose between two options. The first option has an 85% chance of losing $1,000 
along with a 15% chance of losing nothing. The second option has a 100% chance of 
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losing $800. Optimizing the choice according to probability theory, the person should 
choose the sure loss of $800, but most people do not. With the potential for loss, people 
suddenly become risk seekers and choose to gamble.  
There are a number of common real-world examples of human behavior that are 
anomalies for expected utility theory, but are readily explained with prospect theory. For 
example, consider the racetrack betting pattern in which betters tend to shift their bets 
toward long shots and away from favorites at the end of the racing day (Camerer, 1998). 
There is nothing inherent about the time of day that affects the probability of horses 
winning the race. However, most gamblers find themselves behind after a day of betting, 
and they hope to cover their losses with a higher payout of a long shot bet. This behavior 
is not rational in the sense of maximizing winnings based purely on probability, but the 
shift in preference toward risk is easily explained by loss aversion aspects of prospect 
theory. Another example of prospect theory in action is consumer behavior in state 
lotteries. Lotto is a special kind of lottery in which the jackpot is rolled over to the next 
week if no winner has emerged, so the jackpot continues to grow over time often to very 
large numbers in the hundreds of millions of dollars. Lotto becomes more popular as the 
jackpot grows in size, despite the correspondingly low probability of winning (Camerer, 
1998). This behavior is not rational or logical in the mathematical sense but is explained 
by the high visibility of a large jackpot and the insensitivity to very low probabilities as 
described in prospect theory. 
Underpinning the work on prospect theory are the concepts of heuristics and 
biases. Heuristics are essentially cognitive shortcuts which reduce complex tasks to 
simpler operations of judgment. Judgmental heuristics, however, can introduce error and 
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lead to suboptimal outcomes (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Kanwisher, 1989; Gowda, 
1999; Miler, 2009). These errors are usually referred to as biases which can vary 
depending on the heuristic being used. The concept can be demonstrated with one of the 
best known experiments done by Kahneman and Tversky referred to as “the Linda 
problem” (Kahneman, 2011). In this experiment, participants were told about a fictional 
woman named Linda who is outspoken about issues of discrimination and social justice, 
and then they were asked which was more probable: (a) Linda is a bank teller, or (b) 
Linda is a bank teller and active in the feminist movement. Participants overwhelmingly 
chose option (b) indicating that Linda was more likely to be a feminist bank teller than a 
bank teller. Clearly, this does not follow the laws of probability, because “feminist bank 
teller” is a subset of “bank teller” and therefore will have a lower probability. Even 
among students with extensive training in probability, 85 percent chose option (b) as 
more probable. In these cases a heuristic was applied in which participants sought a 
coherent narrative to the story rather than a logical response that considers the laws of 
probability, and an error, or bias, was the result. 
Three commonly discussed heuristics are: availability, representativeness, and 
adjustment and anchoring. The availability heuristic is based on information that is most 
accessible to a person or occurrences that can be most easily brought to mind. In the 
representativeness heuristic, others are grouped into types with assumed similarity of 
characteristics as in stereotypes. Using the adjustment and anchoring heuristic means 
starting from an initial value that is known and making adjustments from there based on 
the current situation to yield a final answer (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). There are 
many other heuristics that have been identified in political science and psychological 
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literature with more than fifty distinct heuristics named (McGraw, 2000). The danger of 
this seemingly endless proliferation of heuristics is that keeping track of them all and 
discovering how individuals coordinate these multiple judgment strategies becomes 
overwhelmingly complex. A more productive approach would be to focus on the 
cognitive processes behind the decisions rather than on the individual heuristics 
themselves. There are varied examples in the literature of how social scientists have 
applied aspects of cognitive theory to specific situations. The application of the cognitive 
approach to domestic politics and voting practices is the most prevalent (McGraw, 2000; 
Lau & Redlawsk, 2001). Other applications include understanding how heuristics are 
used by political elites (Miler, 2009) and security policy makers (Kanwisher, 1989). The 
application of heuristics to decision making in situations of conflict management is not 
prevalent and worthy of further research. 
Blended Theories 
One can imagine various ways to combine theories of rationality, emotion, and 
cognition, but there is one particular blended approach that has received the most 
attention in the literature - poliheuristic theory. Poliheuristic theory offers an alternative 
to the traditional rational actor model by integrating aspects of both the cognitive and 
rationalistic approaches to decision-making. Poliheuristic choice theory is conceptualized 
as a two-stage decision process. The first stage is a cognitive process which screens the 
possible alternatives and narrows the choices by eliminating options based on one or 
more heuristics. In the second stage, the remaining alternatives are then evaluated in a 
rational way in order to minimize risk and maximize benefit (Mintz, 2004; Stern, 2004). 
Figure 3.1 shows a diagram of the poliheuristic process. There are five key features of 
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poliheuristic theory that distinguish it from other theories such as rational choice theory 
or prospect theory. Poliheuristic theory is dimension-based, non-compensatory, non-
holistic, satisficing, and order sensitive (Stern, 2004; Goertz, 2004; Mintz, 2004). 
 
Figure 3.1. Diagram of the poliheuristic model 
First, poliheuristic theory is dimension-based with the attributes of a problem 
driving the search rather than alternatives. Dimensions or attributes are groups of criteria 
that are similar in nature. The criteria within each dimension is evaluated in a sequential 
manner and then combined to get an overall value. Availability of information can drive 
the order of evaluation of criteria directing attention initially to dimensions that have 
information easily accessible for evaluation. For example, in the realm of foreign policy-
making, a decision-maker who is concerned with the political consequences of his or her 
decision will consider criteria such as public opinion polls, the leader’s popularity, and 
domestic issues grouped into one dimension (Mintz, 1993). 
Second, the non-compensatory nature of poliheuristic theory comes from the fact 
that low values on one dimension cannot be substituted for high values on other 
dimensions. A minimum standard must be fulfilled for each salient dimension of an 
alternative, otherwise that alternative is discarded. Considering the foreign policy maker 
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described in the previous paragraph, if the minimum criteria are not met in the “political 
consequences” dimension, then a high score on another dimension such as military 
strategy cannot counteract it (Mintz & Geva, 1997). Decisions on matters of war and 
peace often demonstrate this principle, because political leaders in today’s democratic 
societies have to worry about their political popularity at home while in the midst of 
making decisions related to military situations overseas. Mintz (1993) performed a 
detailed review of President Bush’s 1991 decision to invade Iraq. Mintz was able to show 
that Mr. Bush considered both the dimension of domestic politics and the dimension of 
military strategy in making his decision. Given the three alternatives by his advisors of 
using force, exercising containment, or withdrawing, Mr. Bush eliminated the 
containment and withdrawal options based on the dimension of domestic politics. His 
performance ratings in public opinion polls were on the decline, and a use of force 
overseas was viewed as a way to boost popularity. Also, the American public was 
impatient with prolonged military deployments, so he felt there was not time to execute a 
containment strategy. The withdrawal option was also rejected from a military strategic 
point of view. For the containment option, regardless of how high the score may have 
been from the military strategic dimension, the lack of support on the domestic front was 
enough to eliminate it. 
Third, poliheuristic theory has the characteristic of being non-holistic where 
decisions derive not from a full comparison of all alternatives, but undesirable 
alternatives may be rejected based on only a few criteria. Due to the non-compensatory 
nature of the theory, the decision maker does not have to evaluate other dimensions if one 
dimension has already been evaluated and not met the minimum level. In the example 
40 
 
above when Mr. Bush made the decision to invade Iraq, he did not have to evaluate the 
military strategic value of the containment alternative, because he had already eliminated 
it as an option based on the domestic political consequences. Expected utility theory 
requires a holistic approach with all dimensions being evaluated in order to properly 
maximize gains or minimize losses. On the other hand, the poliheuristic theory simplifies 
the decision process by rejecting undesirable alternatives based on one or only a few 
criteria. 
Fourth, poliheuristic theory is satisficing as opposed to maximizing, because the 
search ends when an acceptable alternative passes the test on all key dimensions. This 
theory allows for the possibility that an “acceptable” decision is made as opposed to an 
“optimal” decision, because it is possible for some dimensions or alternatives to remain 
unevaluated. The strategy is to evaluate alternatives along selected dimensions comparing 
values to a predetermined minimum instead of comparing each alternative on each 
dimension. This kind of strategy becomes essential in the real world of decision making 
which is often uncertain, complex, and time-constrained (Mintz & Geva, 1997). In the 
case of the 1991 invasion of Iraq, once it was determined that the use of force met the 
domestic political dimension and was sufficient in the military strategic dimension, the 
choice was made. There was no need to further evaluate the containment option from a 
military perspective or seek other alternatives altogether. 
Finally, poliheuristic theory is order sensitive, because variations in the order that 
alternatives are presented may have profound effects on choices made. It is also possible 
that the order in which dimensions are evaluated can have an impact on the ultimate 
choice that is made. When Mr. Bush began his decision-making process on Iraq, the three 
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alternatives were identified. But were there other alternatives that could have been 
presented earlier? As Mintz (1993) asks, would President Bush’s choice to invade Iraq 
been different if he had met the Pope or Mother Teresa prior to his decision-making 
process, rather than having met with Margaret Thatcher who was believed to have 
encouraged Bush to be tough with Sadam Hussein? 
In sum, the poliheuristic model offers an alternative to expected utility theory by 
incorporating heuristics in addition to rational comparisons and reasoning. The process is 
dimensions-based, non-compensatory, non-holistic, satisficing, and order sensitive. 
Whereas expected utility theory is focused on the decision outcome, poliheuristic theory 
is concerned with the decision process as well as the outcome. Poliheuristic theory has 
made important contributions to understanding the decision making process in the realm 
of foreign policy makers, but is also applicable to many types of decisions made by 
individuals, by groups, in sequence, and in strategic settings (Mintz, 2004).  
In my study, the poliheuristic model will be applied to individuals from different 
cultures to try to understand and compare how they make decisions within the context of 
conflict situations. The process-focused nature of the model allows me to examine the 
impact of culture not only on the decision outcomes but also on the decision process. The 
dimension-based nature of the model provides a method for distinguishing the factors that 
people consider when making their decision. I expect to find that culture influences 
which dimensions people choose to apply, and that in some cases a culturally-based 
dimension will be applied in a non-compensatory and non-holistic way. For example, 
those from a collectivist culture exhibit a strong duty to their in-group, and that group 
focus will likely emerge as a dimension considered in the first stage of the decision-
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making process. The “duty to group” dimension may be so strong that any alternative 
considered to be a betrayal of the group will be summarily eliminated without evaluating 
other dimensions in a fashion similar to how President Bush eliminated options that 
would hurt his political position domestically.  
Have previous studies revealed the impact of a measured difference in culture on 
decision-making? Chen and Li (2005) explored cultural differences of decision-making 
between individualist and collectivist societies by looking at Chinese (collectivist) versus 
Australian (individualistic) cultures. They found that the Chinese were less cooperative 
with foreigners than with Chinese, whereas Australians were equally cooperative with 
members of both groups. However, such research studies into the cultural impacts on 
decision making are rare and there are many unresolved and unanswered questions in this 
area. Do individualist and collectivist cultures differ in the dimensions they apply to 
decisions made in the face of conflict? Do such differences enhance or aggravate 
peacekeeping efforts that are initiated in conflict prone zones? Can peacekeeping 
personnel be trained to manage cultural differences and achieve peace more efficiently? 
There is a need for further research to gain an improved understanding of how cultural 
differences manifest themselves in the decision making process. The broad difference in 
the individualism-collectivism dimension between the U.S. and Ghana will make for a 
good cross-country comparative study on culture and its impact on decision-making, and 
the poliheuristic model will provide a good framework for uncovering factors involved in 
the decision process. 
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CHAPTER 4 
A FRAMEWORK OF SOCIAL IDENTITY 
Identifying with other people is part of the process of defining our self-
conception, because it is through interactions with others that we come to understand our 
own characteristics and behaviors (Tajfel, 1981). The part of an individual’s self-concept 
that is derived from his or her membership in groups is considered to be that person’s 
“social identity”. A person’s social identity influences his or her decision-making through 
a three-step process: (1) define oneself as a member of a social group, (2) learn the norms 
of the group, and (3) when in a context where group membership becomes salient, use the 
group’s attributes for decision-making (Turner et al., 1987). The effect of group 
membership on individual decision-making is the topic of this chapter. First, I will 
discuss the extent to which in-groups and out-groups shape an individual’s sense of self. 
Then I describe two experiments and one real-world event that elaborate on the nature of 
intergroup conflict and individual choice. Finally, elements of culture and social identity 
are brought together in a socially contextualized model of cultural influence on 
behaviors. This model demonstrates how culture constrains the decision-making process 
at three distinct levels of analysis – individual, societal, and situated – and forms the 
framework for the hypotheses and analysis of this study in subsequent chapters. 
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In-groups and Out-groups 
The concepts of an in-group and an out-group were originally defined over a 
century ago as a group that maintains a relationship of peace and order within itself (the 
in-group) and one of hostility and war towards those outside of itself (the out-group) 
(Sumner, 1906). In other words, an in-group consists of a group of people who all use the 
term “we” with the same significance, whereas an out-group consists of those who are 
perceived as “alien” (Allport, 1954; Bizumic & Duckitt, 2012). Through the process of 
interaction and loyalty, the in-group forms norms, standards, and habits that influence the 
individual behavior of each of its members. Members of the in-group develop attitudes 
that are consistent with the group, and therefore, the group feels familiar to them. The in-
group is then preferred over the out-group, because “the familiar provides the 
indispensable basis of our existence” (Allport, 1954, p. 29). The out-group contains 
elements that are less familiar, less preferred, and at times may be considered the enemy.  
Even though an out-group is by definition dissimilar to the in-group and hence is 
considered a threat in some way (Triandis, 1990), it is not necessarily true that the in-
group feels hostility toward the out-group, and the in-group may at times appreciate the 
out-group members for their differences (Brewer, 1999; Bizumic & Duckitt, 2012). Stuart 
Hall (1991) defined identity as a relationship between oneself and the other. In other 
words, in order to have a sense of self, one has to know who one is not. Identity is the 
narrative of the self, and this narrative requires finding differences between the self and 
the other. Racism is the outcome when someone tries to symbolically eliminate or 
marginalize the other in their own self-identity narrative (Hall, 1991). Social dominance 
theory, a variant of social identity theory, states that society is inherently a group-based 
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hierarchy formed to ensure survival of humanity and oppression occurs to maintain that 
hierarchy (Sidanius, 1993). In this case, the in-group is perceived as dominant over some 
out-group which, consequently, serves as a negative reference point. Most of the time the 
in-group tends to form biases against the out-group that can be used to preserve or 
enhance the existence of the in-group, resulting in a set of “in-group virtues” and “out-
group vices” (Schaefer, 2004). These biases often appear in the form of partisanship or 
ethnocentrism which place the in-group in a place of superior standing, setting the 
standard by which other groups should be measured.  
What happens when we belong to multiple in-groups which overlap? Figure 4.1 
shows an example set of in-groups which would apply to most individuals. The 
concentric circles show multiple in-groups with the size of the group increasing as the 
circle grows larger. In general, as the size of the in-group grows larger, the potency of the 
sense of membership decreases, implying that world-loyalty is difficult, if not impossible, 
to achieve (Allport, 1954). However, there is no reason why the outermost circle in a 
grouping has to be the weakest. For example, an outer identity circle of race sometimes 
overrides inner circles of membership, such as multi-racial social or work groups. Often 
concentric loyalties need not clash at all with devotion to a larger circle being consistent 
with devotion to an inner circle. For example, it is easy to imagine someone who has 
strong patriotic devotion to their country living peacefully with their neighbors. Clashes 
more often occur among group memberships at the same level. Someone who is deeply 
loyal to two nations may be considered a traitor or may be internally torn over his or her 
decisions and actions, particularly if those two nations are at odds. 
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Figure 4.1. Multiple in-groups with increasing membership size 
As an individual’s attitudes form, how much can be attributed to the sway held by 
the person’s in-groups and how much can be attributed to the individual’s own 
characteristics and personality traits? One can take either a collective approach or an 
individual approach on the formation of attitudes, but these approaches do not necessarily 
have to be in opposition. One can hold to the individualistic theory while still recognizing 
the influence of the collective on the individual. People only reflect the attitudes of their 
in-groups if they have some personal trait or need that aligns with the group. Let us look 
further into the concept of ethnocentrism and the individual approach of judgment 
formation and decision-making by considering some specific case studies in the next few 
sections. 
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Ethnocentrism: The Robbers Cave Experiment 
In-group ethnocentrism and intergroup conflict can sometimes be invoked due to 
real issues over real assets, such as scarce resources. This principle is demonstrated by 
the classic Robbers Cave Experiment (Sherif et al., 1988). This experiment, conducted in 
1954, involved sending two groups of eleven boys each to a three-week summer camp in 
Robbers Cave, Oklahoma. During the first week the boys spent time in their own groups 
getting to know each other, forming friendships, and pursuing typical camp activities 
such as hiking and treasure hunting. At this stage, each group was unaware of the 
existence of the other group. In addition to forming their own group norms and daily 
routines, the groups gave themselves names, the Rattlers and the Eagles. During the 
second week, the groups were told about each other and informed that there would be a 
competition between the two teams. The winning team would receive a nice trophy, and 
each boy on the winning team would get a medal and a fancy pocket knife. Once the boys 
knew about the other team, they began to think negatively about them. As the 
competition proceeded and one group ultimately won the tournament, the negativity 
escalated into overly aggressive behavior between the groups, and the experiment had to 
be ended early. 
The psychologists conducting the experiment were able to observe the rapid 
formation of in-group structures and cultures as they naturally developed in each of the 
two groups. Each group developed a culture which created boundaries around the group, 
and it was these boundaries that allowed for intergroup conflict when an issue of scarce 
resources was presented (Fine, 2004). Also, the effect of in-group virtues and out-group 
vices was observed soon after the announcement of the existence of the other team and 
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the upcoming competition. Each group of boys considered members of their own team to 
be “brave” and “friendly”, whereas they quickly adopted stereotypes of boys on the other 
team as “crybabies” and “no-good cheats” (Sidanius, 1993).  
The Rattlers and the Eagles were also given challenges that could only be solved 
by working cooperatively, such as a broken truck that could not be pushed without the 
help of all the boys or a problem with the camp’s water supply that required efforts from 
both groups to resolve. These cooperative tasks were shown to reduce in-group bias due 
to the fact that both groups had a common objective. This could indicate the existence of 
a shared “super-identity” further out in the concentric circle model. Invoking such a 
shared identity might be able to serve as a conflict resolution measure, pushing people 
beyond the limits of their ethnocentrism and encouraging them to cooperate with out-
groups in their problem-solving efforts. 
Overall, the Robbers Cave Experiment demonstrated through qualitative and 
quantitative data that group formation and subsequent competition led to the expected 
outcome of group ethnocentrism as seen in: (1) each group’s preferences for its own 
members as friends, (2) stereotyping, and (3) over-rating of in-group products and under-
rating of out-group products (Sidanius, 1993). In this experiment, ethnocentrism can be 
largely attributed to the zero-sum nature of the competition over real assets (trophies and 
pocket knives) spurred on by the formation of intergroup competition. However, the 
effect of scarce resources is not a necessary condition for ethnocentric group behavior to 
occur, as we shall see in the next section. 
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Discrimination: The Minimal Groups Experiment 
Social identity theory goes beyond the idea that ethnocentrism derives solely from 
resource competition and suggests that ethnocentrism can arise simply due to the 
cognition of in-groups and out-groups, without the need for competition, and without the 
need for in-group interaction and norm forming. The negative attitudes that in-groups 
tend to form about out-groups are often referred to as prejudice, an attitude of favor or 
disfavor that is based on an over-generalized belief (Bizumic & Duckitt, 2012). Some 
people may form an attitude of prejudice but keep it to themselves. When the attitude 
turns into outward action or behavior, it becomes discrimination. The conditions required 
to develop a prejudice that turns into discrimination are minimal and have been 
demonstrated by the minimal groups experiment originally developed by Henri Tajfel in 
the 1970s (Tajfel, 1978). 
In the minimal groups experiment, participants are randomly assigned to one of 
two groups through some made-up task, such as estimating the number of dots on a 
screen. Participants are told they fit within a certain made-up group, but they do not 
actually meet other members of their group. The in-group is a purely cognitive creation 
existing only in the minds of the participants. Participants are then given the task of 
rewarding points to anonymous members of the in-group and out-group but are not 
allowed to give any points to themselves. Points must be rewarded using one of three 
strategies: maximizing in-group favoritism, maximizing out-group favoritism, or 
maximizing fairness between groups. Results of this experiment show that in-group 
favoritism is most often employed, suggesting that people are predisposed to discriminate 
against others in the context of intergroup behavior. These experiments were conducted 
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holding everything but an artificial and meaningless in-group identity constant, pointing 
to a fundamental need to discriminate that is free of situational context. Some researchers 
have suggested that people identify with groups and express strong in-group favoritism in 
order to reduce uncertainty (Abrams & Hogg, 1999). The minimal groups experiment sets 
up a novel situation and a task that is highly uncertain prompting individuals to gravitate 
to the artificial group definitions to give them a sense of certainty about themselves and 
how they should perform the task. This form of social categorization produces social 
identity and a natural in-group bias (Abrams & Hogg, 1999). 
This in-group bias has been found to hold true in minimal group tests run across a 
number of countries including Wales, Holland, Germany, the U.S., Switzerland, Hong 
Kong, and New Zealand, prompting the suggestion that the findings are universally 
applicable (Sidanius, 1993). However, the aforementioned list includes Western-style 
cultures almost exclusively, except for Hong Kong which is one of the more Westernized 
cities in Asia. In order to make a claim of universal applicability, further research needs 
to be conducted in countries in Africa, Latin America, Asia, and the Middle East. 
Internalization: Trouble With Cows 
The above experiments reveal some of the effects of social groups such as 
ethnocentrism, competitive behavior, and discrimination, but the question still remains as 
to how the group effects are internalized by a person going through his or her own 
individual decision-making process. Beth Roy (1994) explored this internalization 
process in her qualitative study of a riot in Bangladesh. As Roy put it, “in a remote 
village somewhere in South Asia, someone’s cow ate someone else’s crop. Within two 
days, tens of thousands of men were ranged against each other, armed, hostile, righteous” 
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(p. 1). As it turned out, the cow belonged to a Muslim, and the crop belonged to a Hindu, 
and this seemed to be the origin of the problem.  
Through a series of interviews, Roy uncovered first person accounts of the story 
that led to rioting. The cow and plants were seen as symbols, representative of a daily 
experience that remained unexpressed. Many of the villagers said that they were 
frightened and apprehensive and that although the society seemed peaceful on the 
surface, there was danger just beneath. They formed opinions about the other group that 
were often not true, such as the others beating their children or being unwilling to hire 
them. These false stereotypes did, however, have some basis in valid grievances. Changes 
had been occurring at the national level in Bangladesh, but no structures had been put in 
place to allow for improvement at the local level. Political parties were not well-formed 
and in some cases suppressed by the state. Local people who felt the need for change had 
very few options for enacting it. 
Roy concluded that the villagers made a choice to riot, and they were not caught 
up in strong currents of emotion. She saw the decision-making process of the villagers as 
rooted in an awareness of history acquired through personal experience. People had 
translated historic change into personal facts through a process of “internalization” which 
allowed for the integration of self and society. Internalization meant learning ideas and 
then forgetting them as ideas and thinking they are emotions and truths. In this way, 
feeling, thinking, and social structure came together into a reasoned process.  
A Model of Cultural Constraint in a Social Context 
So far this chapter has shown how individual membership in societal groups can 
influence behavior through the processes of ethnocentrism, discrimination, and 
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internalization. The question still remains as to how the effects of culture integrate with 
the effects of social identity in forming decisions and behaviors. Level of analysis is a 
key consideration at this point, as culture can be viewed at the individual level, group 
level, or societal level. Osyerman, Kemmelmeier, and Coon (2002) developed an 
integrated model of the different approaches to studying the effect of culture on behavior. 
Their model integrates four main approaches: individual, distal, proximal, and situated. I 
will discuss each of these approaches and show how they can be integrated with the 
poliheuristic decision-making model (from Chapter 3) to form a framework for this 
study. 
The individual-level approach to culture portrays culture as a set of internalized 
values, norms, and beliefs (Oyserman et al., 2002). These cultural norms may be derived 
from social or group level interaction, but the norms then become part of the individual 
level cognitive processing. The process of internalization as seen in the case of the riot 
over cows is a good example of the individual level approach. The internalization of 
values becomes apparent in behaviors when people avoid acting in ways that challenge 
an identity or value that has become part of their self-conception (Franke, 1999). The 
identity images that we carry with us at the individual level, such as race, gender, 
religion, occupation, or other characteristics, are structured into a hierarchy of salience so 
that when contradictions arise between identity images, the identity with the higher level 
of commitment tends to be invoked as part of the decision making process (Stryker, 
1968). 
Distal and proximal approaches to culture are both at the societal level. Distal 
approaches consider the historical and philosophical traditions of culture including 
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language and religion. These elements are assumed to be relatively stable and influence 
the nature of other institutions within society (Oyserman et al., 2002). Proximal 
approaches consider the more dynamic aspects of society that can change over the 
lifetime of any individual. These aspects include systems of parenting, education, law, 
and economics (Oyserman et al., 2002). The key point with both societal level 
approaches is that the culture exists within society prior to the existence of the individual 
who then lives among the cultural elements of their surroundings. 
The situated approach focuses on the context of specific social situations that may 
be encountered on a daily basis and highlights how those situations may differ in the 
individualist and collectivist features. Changes in situational context can cause shifts in 
individual cognitive processes, motivations, and ultimately decisions (Oyserman et al., 
2002). For example, Kitayama (2002) described a study of Japanese and American 
participants’ responses to various culturally relevant social situations. The Japanese 
participants found more situations to decrease their self-esteem, but all the situations that 
increased American self-esteem also increased Japanese self-esteem. In a similar study, 
Japanese participants were found to be self-critical when considering situations that had 
been created by other Japanese participants rather than by American participants, and 
Americans were self-enhancing when considering situations created by American 
participants rather than Japanese participants (Kitayama, 2002). In these cases, the 
features of the situation itself influenced how participants viewed themselves.  
Common to all of these approaches is the notion that culture requires subjective 
interpretation prior to decision-making and behavioral consequences. The construal of the 
problem at hand requires cognitive processing involving influences at individual, societal, 
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and situational levels. In this study, culture is modeled using the three approaches of 
individual, societal, and situated levels. These influences combine in the first-stage of the 
poliheuristic model where cognitive processing occurs. The first stage of the model 
represents the influence of cultural constraints on the filtering of priorities and 
alternatives prior to the second stage of logical or rational selection of action. Together 
these two stages form a socially contextualized model of the effects of culture on the 
decision making process as shown in Figure 4.2. 
 
Figure 4.2. Socially contextualized model of culture and decision-making 
In sum, our membership in various groups, our “social identity”, has a strong 
influence on how we behave, form judgments, and make decisions. We tend to have an 
overly positive view of people in our in-groups and an overly negative view of people in 
our out-groups, largely because it is a natural human trait to prefer that which is familiar. 
The in-group preference is so strong that it can lead to ethnocentrism, discrimination, and 
intergroup conflict. A key feature for my study on individual decision-making is the 
internalization process in which the influence of groups is captured in the cognitive 
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processing of a person who makes their own choices in behavior and action. By 
combining views of culture at the individual, societal, and situational level, the socially 
contextualized model derived here can be used to explore questions of cultural impacts 
on decision-making and how they vary across cultures. 
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CHAPTER 5 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Concepts and Variables 
 The main research question of this study asks how cultural norms and values 
impact decision-making, positioning “decision-making” as the dependent variable. The 
concept of decision-making is divided into three aspects for further study:  (1) how are 
decisions made - the decision-making style, (2) what are the actual decisions - the 
decision-making outcome, and (3) what justification factors are considered in the process 
– the decision-making priorities. I operationalize the concept of decision-making 
priorities through qualitative analysis and coding of participant descriptions of their 
justifications for their decisions. I operationalize the concept of a decision-making 
outcome in the actual choices an individual makes between a given set of decision 
alternatives based on a specific conflict scenario.  
In order to operationalize the decision-making style, I considered three existing 
scales that had been previously developed and validated. First, I considered the 
Information-Processing Questionnaire (IPQ) developed to measure a self-reported 
information processing style along a continuum between rational processing at one end 
and heuristic processing at the other end (Smerecnik et al., 2012). Although the IPQ is a 
valuable tool for understanding risk perception as people process written information on a 
particular topic rationally or heuristically, it has some limitations for my particular 
57 
 
application, because it does not focus on coming to an actual decision. Second, I 
considered the Melbourne Decision Making Questionnaire (DMQ), an instrument used to 
measure patterns for coping with decisional conflict (Mann et al., 1997). A key advantage 
of the Melbourne DMQ is that it has been used successfully in cross-cultural research 
between individualistic societies in the West and collectivist societies in Asia (Mann et 
al., 1998). However, rather than focusing on the rational and heuristic factors, the 
instrument focuses on coping mechanisms that are distinguished as vigilance, hyper-
vigilance, buck-passing, and procrastination. Finally, I considered the General Decision-
Making Scale (GDMS), which identifies a self-reported decision-making style falling 
into one of five categories: rational, intuitive, dependent, avoidant, or spontaneous (Scott 
& Bruce, 1995; Spicer & Adler-Smith, 2005). The GDMS offers the best distinction 
between types of cognitive processing in decision-making allowing for multiple 
dimensions to be present at once, so it was chosen as the instrument for operationalizing 
the decision-making process. 
The GDMS consists of 25 items scored on a five-point Likert-type scale 
identifying the five styles of decision-making. First, the rational style represents a logical 
and structured approach to decision making. As described in Chapter 3 on decision 
theory, rational choice is characterized by an analysis of the costs, benefits, and risks of a 
situation and an attempt to optimize the outcome. The rational decision maker makes a 
deliberate and logical choice. Second, an intuitive style relies upon hunches, feelings and 
impressions. Heuristics often come into play as the intuitive decision maker tends to 
make decisions quickly without the careful consideration of the rational decision maker. 
Third, a dependent style relies upon the direction and support of others. The dependent 
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decision-maker seeks the advice of others and is heavily influenced by the in-group. As 
described in Chapter 4, the influence of in-groups can be seen in the choices a person 
makes in behavior and action, and the dependent style is reflective of this influence. 
Fourth, an avoidant style tends to postpone or avoid making decisions. The avoidant 
decision-maker is less confident in his or her decision-making ability and/or prone to 
procrastination. Fifth, a spontaneous decision-maker is impulsive and prone to make spur 
of the moment decisions although not necessarily relying on hunches or feelings as the 
intuitive decision-maker does. These five decision-making styles are not considered to be 
mutually exclusive. Individuals do not rely on only one decision-making style, but they 
will use a combination of styles when making important decisions. Therefore, the GDMS 
instrument allows for the presence of each of the five styles to be detected separately. 
The independent variable in this study, “cultural norms and values”, is divided 
into three measurable aspects per the socially contextualized framework of culture 
defined in chapter 4:  (1) the cultural traits of the individual decision maker, (2) the 
society that the individual lives in, and (3) the culturally situated context of the conflict 
setting. For the first aspect of culture, the traits of the individual relative to the cognitive 
process of decision-making are represented in the construct of the individualism-
collectivism dimension measured at the individual level using self-reported responses to a 
questionnaire developed for the Auckland Individualism Collectivism Scale (AICS) 
(Shulruf, Hattie, & Dixon, 2007). The AICS consists of 26 items, of which 11 relate to 
collectivism and 15 relate to individualism. Responses were measured on a Likert-type 
scale and given response options of strongly disagree, disagree, agree, strongly agree, or 
don’t know. 
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The AICS defines individualists as those who exhibit traits of uniqueness, 
responsibility, and competitiveness. One of the most salient features of individualism is 
the valuing of personal independence which leads to an emphasis on personal 
achievement, self-knowledge, privacy, and a desire to be unique. Individualism is also 
related to personal responsibility and self-reliance with a direct communication style that 
uses “I” more than “we”. The competitive nature of individualists is normally 
demonstrated in their tendency to strive for personal goals over the goals of society. 
North Americans are often considered the models of individualism as they demonstrate 
many of these traits across the population. 
The AICS defines collectivists as those who seek advice and harmony. 
Collectivists have a sense of duty to the group and seek interdependence with group 
members. Collectivists have a sense of belonging to the group and are likely to 
internalize group goals as their own goals and give them a higher priority. The 
communication style of collectivists tends to be indirect and emphasizes harmony during 
group discussions and an awareness of saving face within the group. Hierarchy is 
important in collectivism, because it allows groups members to know their rank within 
the group as they seek to maintain their status. Individualists, on the other hand, use the 
knowledge of their rank to try to move higher than others in a competitive way. 
The AICS measures the individualism-collectivism dimension at the individual 
level without any presumption of nationality or the overall individualist-collectivist 
nature of a respondent’s country of origin. It is important to capture this individual-level 
measurement of culture, for it is very possible for a person living in an overall collectivist 
culture to be highly individualistic. Nationalistic traits may be internalized into individual 
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values and norms but may also be confounded by a large number of other, unknown 
individual differences. Consider Liu Xiaobo, the Chinese professor and human rights 
activist who won the Nobel Prize in 2010 while imprisoned in China for inciting 
subversion to state power. Born and raised in China, Xiaobo lived in a collectivist 
culture, yet his international experiences and perhaps other unknown factors sent him 
down a more individualistic path where he chose to stand out and promote individual 
human rights. As shown in Figure 4.2 of Chapter 4, the individual level imparts particular 
influence and constraint on the decision-making process distinct from the societal-level. 
The second aspect of culture, societal, is operationalized simply by the country 
location of the participant, either the U.S. or Ghana. As discussed in chapter 2, the 
cultural dimensions of these two countries vary across Hofstede’s measures with the most 
marked difference seen in the individualism-collectivism score. Hofstede’s scores are 
measured at the country level, implying there is a distribution of responses around a mean 
value. However, even if a person living in a country does not align well with Hofstede’s 
score for that country, as in the example of Liu Xiaobo above, I anticipate a societal 
impact on that person that, on average, would follow a particular cultural style 
represented in Hofstede’s scores. In other words, a highly individualist person may live in 
a highly collectivist country, and although his or her individualism impacts his or her 
judgments and decision-making, that person may also be influenced by societal-
belongingness, or nationality, in their decision-making. For example, amidst his pro-
Western, individualist activism, Liu Xiaobo describes part of his motivation as “fulfilling 
my social responsibility as a Chinese citizen” (Mackey, 2010, p. 1). Rather than debate 
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which is more influential, the individual-level or the societal-level, I choose to include 
both levels in the framework and operationalize each one separately. 
The third aspect, the situational context of the conflict, is operationalized in two 
different ways. First, the context is represented by the setting of a particular conflict 
scenario which is varied between two descriptions that differ distinctly in the 
individualist/collectivist nature of the groups involved. The conflict scenario is a short 
fictional vignette about a mining operation under protest. Participants are asked to take on 
a specific role within the vignette and make decisions that would potentially affect 
themselves and the various groups to which they belong. A more detailed discussion of 
the vignette is provided in the section below on the “Quasi-Experimental Design”. The 
two versions of the vignette are identical except for a variation in the description of the 
overall community and reference to friends and family. In order to observe whether the 
cultural context of the setting in the vignette had any influence on the participant’s view 
of the situation, the participants are asked if the setting felt familiar, providing a self-
reported measure as the second way of operationalizing the situational context. The 
familiarity trigger is expected to align with feelings of preference and influence the 
decision-making outcomes, as reflected in the hypotheses discussed in the next section. 
Hypotheses 
 I hypothesize that each of the three aspects of culture would impact decision 
making, either in style, outcome, or priorities. Table 5.1 provides a summary of the key 
variables in this study, how they are operationalized, and what hypotheses make use of 
those variables. 
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Table 5.1 
Operationalization of Dependent and Independent Variables 
Variable Type Concept Operationalization Hypotheses 
Dependent Decision-making style GDMS questionnaire H1, H2 
Dependent Decision-making priorities Coding of qualitative data H3 
Dependent Decision-making outcome Binary choices (yes/no) for 
given decisions 
H4 
Independent Individualism-collectivism 
(individual level) 
AICS questionnaire H1, H2 
Independent Location  
(societal level) 
Sample location (US or 
Ghana) 
H3 
Independent Familiarity of setting 
(situated level) 
1. Vignette version 
2. Self-reported familiarity 
H4 
 
First, the individualist-collectivist nature of individuals as reflected in their 
culturally-based self-perceptions is expected to affect their decision-making style. The 
desire for harmony and the inclination to seek advice from others are likely to result in a 
more dependent decision-making style for collectivists, while the desire for uniqueness 
and the competitive drive are likely to reflect a more rational decision-making style for 
individualists. I test the following hypotheses: 
H1:  People with more collectivist traits are more dependent in their decision-
making.  
H2:  People with more individualist traits are more rational in their decision-
making.  
With regard to the second cultural aspect, society, I hypothesize that people living 
in a more collectivist society (Ghana over the U.S.) would be more likely to prioritize the 
needs and interests of their more central in-groups, namely those identity groups that are 
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more salient at the inner layers. On the other hand, those living in a more individualist 
society (U.S. over Ghana) would be more likely to prioritize self-focused factors relating 
to responsibility, competitiveness, and achievement. 
H3:  People from a more individualist society will prioritize self-focused factors 
in their decisions, and those from a more collectivist society will prioritize group-
focused factors in their decisions. 
For the third cultural aspect at the situated level, I anticipate an effect of the 
cultural setting of the scenario such that when decision makers are presented with a 
scenario in a cultural setting that feels similar to their own social surroundings, their 
decisions will more often lean toward cooperation rather than continued protests. This 
type of effect can be considered to be a heuristic of “representativeness” where the 
opposition is judged to be more trustworthy, because they are more familiar. 
H4:  When the setting of the story feels more familiar, decision makers more often 
choose to cooperate and achieve peace, than resist and continue protesting. 
Note that there are numerous additional hypotheses that can be formed to test the 
relationship between each of the dependent and independent variables. Table 5.2 depicts 
a summary of how a complete test of variables would be formed. The hypotheses shown 
diagonally are the ones that have substantive expectations behind them based on the 
theoretical discussion presented, and these are the hypotheses that will be explored in 
detail in this study. The other cells in the grid are not expected to reveal substantive 
relationships, however each of those cases was tested fully and results are presented in 
Appendix E. Results did not indicate any additional significant and substantive 
relationships. 
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Table 5.2 
Full Set of Testable Hypotheses 
 Culture at 
Individual Level 
Culture at 
Societal Level 
Culture at 
Situated Level 
Decision-Making 
Style 
H1, H2 
How do decision 
styles vary 
between the U.S. 
and Ghana? 
How does 
scenario 
familiarity affect 
decision style? 
Decision-Making 
Priorities 
How do 
individualism & 
collectivism affect 
priorities used 
during decision-
making? 
H3 
How does 
scenario 
familiarity affect 
priorities used 
during decision-
making? 
Decision-Making 
Outcome 
How do 
individualism & 
collectivism affect 
choices made? 
How do choices 
vary between the 
U.S. and Ghana? 
H4 
 
Quasi-Experimental Design 
At the heart of this research design is a vignette or short story which participants 
read as part of a hypothetical decision-making process. The vignette contains a fictional, 
though realistic, conflict scenario depicting a mining operation under protest. The story is 
written without any specific indicators of location so that it could occur anywhere, and 
only one proper noun is used, the name of the president of the mining company. In the 
instrument to be used in Ghana, a common Ghanaian name is chosen for that character, 
whereas in the U.S. a common American name is chosen. The story is written in English, 
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the official language of both the U.S. and Ghana, so the text is identical in both countries, 
word for word, with only the one name changed. The vignette itself is designed to make 
salient different layers of social identity as shown in Figure 5.1. The participant is asked 
to take on the role of the leader of the protest group or “self” in Figure 5.1. The protest 
group consists of fifty miners who are making peaceful protests against the company for 
better pay and working conditions for all 1000 miners, the next layer out. The outermost 
layer represents the mining company itself including the president, the management team, 
and the more elite and well-paid engineers.  
 
Figure 5.1.  Layers of group identity in the vignette 
The participants are asked to make decisions that would potentially affect 
themselves and the various groups to which they belong. The first decision involves 
revealing the names of two fellow protesters who have secretly been sabotaging the mine. 
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Revealing their names could get the two people into trouble. However, not revealing their 
names would put all the miners in physical danger and would put the financial viability of 
the company at risk. There are many factors for participants to consider because the 
dilemma has no straightforward or obvious answer requiring them to weigh the interests 
of the various identity groups during the decision-making process.  
The second decision involves responding to an offer from the company 
management which meets part, but not all, of the protesting groups stated objectives. The 
leader (self) and the protest group would receive increased benefits, but the rest of the 
miners would not. This decision involves not only conflicting interests between the 
different in-groups but also holds the potential for achieving overall peace between the 
groups and possibly preventing further escalation of physical danger. 
The conflict scenario is varied randomly between two descriptions that differ in 
the individualist/collectivist nature of the groups involved. Both versions of the vignette 
follow the layered group model shown in Figure 5.1, but the versions differ in the 
description of the setting of the story as individualist versus collectivist via references to 
friends, family, and overall community feel. The description is enhanced with a 
photograph that shows either a single miner, in the case of the individualist setting, or a 
group of three miners sitting together, in the case of the collectivist setting. The 
photographs are necessarily different in the U.S. and Ghana to represent the racial/ethnic 
appearance of the local people, but the expressions and body language in the versions are 
virtually identical. Appendix A provides all 4 versions of the vignette: (1) individualist 
setting used in the U.S., (2) collectivist setting used in the U.S., (3) individualist setting 
used in Ghana, and (4) collectivist setting used in Ghana. 
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Prior to being presented with the vignette, participants are asked to complete the 
AICS instrument to determine their individualism-collectivism traits and the GDMS 
instrument to determine the general decision making style. After reading the vignette, 
participants are presented with the two decisions to make, each presented as a binary 
choice: (1) reveal the names of the saboteurs or not, and (2) accept the management deal 
or not. After making each decision, participants are prompted to answer the open-ended 
questions “why did you make that decision?” These two open-ended questions are meant 
to provide more detailed qualitative data for exploring the justifications and rationale 
behind the decision-making process. The flow of the experiment is shown in Figure 5.2. 
 
Figure 5.2.  Quasi-experimental design 
Pre-Test of Scales 
A pre-test was performed of the survey instrument with KSU students across three 
departments: Political Science, Economics, and Psychology. In the pre-test survey, there 
were 51 questions for the pre-validated scales for individualism-collectivism (AICS) and 
decision-making styles (GDMS). The survey had been started by 150 students in total, 
but only completed by 115 students – a 77% completion rate. I received written feedback 
on the survey from 18 students, and although most students enjoyed the vignette aspect of 
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the survey, 50% of them were negative about the repetitive nature of the questions from 
the AICS and GDMS scales. 
I wanted to improve the survey experience and increase the completion rate 
without causing a drastic reduction in reliability. I performed an analysis of Cronbach’s 
alpha measures on the original survey scores and on scores from a reduced number of 
items from the original survey responses. Results show that the number of items could be 
reduced across the individualism-collectivism categories and the decision making style 
categories and still maintain α of .62 or higher in all cases. The resulting reduced survey 
contains a total of 31 questions for the AICS and GDMS scales, versus the original 51 
questions, with the most repetitive of questions removed. This new survey was expected 
to be more positively received by participants. In fact, the completion rate of the final 
survey using the final samples was 93%, a significant improvement. Reliability analysis 
on the final samples shows α values similar to those from the reduced question sets in the 
pre-test. See Table 5.3 and Table 5.4 for details of the reliability analysis. 
Table 5.3 
Cronbach’s Alpha for Individualism-Collectivism Scores 
 Pre-Test 
Original Survey 
(26 items) 
Pre-Test 
Reduced Survey 
(14 items) 
Final Data 
Reduced Survey 
(14 items) 
Individualism α = 0.80 α = 0.69 α = 0.62 
Collectivism α = 0.70 α = 0.67 α = 0.70 
N 131 131 469 
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Table 5.4 
Cronbach’s Alpha for Decision-Making Style Scores 
 Pre-Test 
Original Survey 
(25 items) 
Pre-Test 
Reduced Survey 
(17 items) 
Final Data 
Reduced Survey 
(17 items) 
Rational α = 0.77 α = 0.70 α = 0.76 
Intuitive α = 0.82 α = 0.69 α = 0.68 
Dependent α = 0.75 α = 0.68 α = 0.70 
Avoidant α = 0.92 α = 0.89 α = 0.87 
Spontaneous α = 0.83 α = 0.64 α = 0.72 
N 122 122 469 
 
Based on the reliability analysis of the pre-test, the AICS was reduced from 26 
items to 14 items, 7 items each for individualism and collectivism. The GDMS was 
reduced from 25 items to 17 items, 4 items each for the rational and dependent styles and 
3 items each for the other styles. See Appendix B for the reduced version of the AICS, 
and Appendix C for the reduced version of the GDMS.  
Sampling and Data Collection 
Data was collected from 589 voluntary participants across three sample 
populations: 265 undergraduate students at a university in the U.S., 204 undergraduate 
students at a university in Ghana, and 120 peace professionals at a peacekeeping training 
center in Ghana. I will discuss the selection of each sample population as well as 
demographics of the samples and their representativeness of the populations. 
Kennesaw State University (KSU), located in Kennesaw, Georgia, was chosen as 
the U.S. university based on its longevity, size, diversity of programs, and convenient 
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access. KSU was originally established in 1963 as a junior college and became a four-
year institution in 1976. KSU is located about thirty miles northwest of Atlanta on a 328-
acre campus with approximately 22,000 undergraduate students currently enrolled. KSU 
is accredited by the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools, and it offers 
undergraduate degrees in education, health, business, the humanities, the arts, science and 
math. There were 265 KSU respondents who voluntarily participated in this research 
through an on-line survey system implemented in introductory psychology classes. The 
demographics of the survey respondents compared with the overall demographics of 
undergraduates at the university are shown in Table 5.5. Based on information provided 
by KSU, the comparison shows that the survey sample provides a good representation of 
the KSU undergraduate student population in terms of age, race, and country of origin 
(KSU Factbook, 2012). Student respondents come from a good mix of majors with a 
slight skew toward health majors and away from business majors. The gender of the 
sample was skewed significantly toward females, more so than the overall KSU 
undergraduate average which is already higher in females. The skew in gender and major 
is most likely due to the sampling method which made use of introductory psychology 
classes containing more students from the health and human services area which has 
more than twice as many women enrolled as men (KSU Factbook, 2012). 
The University of Cape Coast (UCC) located in Cape Coast, Ghana, was chosen 
as the Ghanaian university based on its longevity, size, and diversity of programs which 
parallel KSU in many respects. UCC was established in 1962 as a college and attained 
full university status in 1971. UCC is located about ninety miles southwest of Accra, the 
capital of Ghana, on a 30-acre campus with approximately 15,000 regular undergraduate  
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Table 5.5   
Representativeness of KSU Undergraduate Sample 
Measurement KSU Survey Respondents KSU Factbook 2011 
Gender   
     Male 19% 42% 
     Female 81% 58% 
Age   
     Average age 22 24 
     Under 35 years old 95% 91% 
Race/Ethnicity   
     White/Caucasian 63% 66% 
     Black/African American 22% 16% 
     Hispanic 4% 6% 
     Asian/Pacific Islander 4% 4% 
     Other 7% 8% 
Major   
     Social Sciences 20% 25% 
     Health & Human Service 36% 12% 
     Science & Mathematics 11% 11% 
     Business 6% 30% 
     Education 3% 18% 
     Arts 0% 2% 
     Other 15% 2% 
Country of Origin   
     U.S. 90% 94% 
     Other 10% 6% 
 
students. UCC is accredited by the National Accreditation Board of Ghana, and it offers 
undergraduate degrees in education, business, social sciences, the arts, science, 
agriculture, and medical sciences. There were 204 voluntary participants from UCC who 
responded to paper surveys which I later entered manually into the on-line system. UCC 
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participants came from three specific classes:  84 participants from an introductory level 
history class; 67 participants from a junior level sociology class; and 53 students from a 
senior level business class. The demographics of the survey respondents are compared 
with the overall demographics of the university in Table 5.6. Of particular note is the 
skew toward female participants. The university overall has about one-third female 
students, but more than half the student participants in this research were female. This is 
most likely due to the skew towards arts majors and social sciences majors and the lack 
of representation of the science and math majors as shown in the distribution of areas of 
study in Table 5.6. 
The resulting samples from KSU and UCC are compared on key descriptive 
statistics, such as gender, age, religion, ethnicity, major, and country of origin. The 
various statistics show that in general, the two samples provide similar demographic 
distributions suitable for comparison, including similar age, similar percent native born, 
similarly dominant religion, and a similar distribution of ethnicities with one dominant 
ethnicity and one secondary ethnicity. The majors vary based on the class types polled, 
but both samples have a good distribution with no one major representing more than 
36%. The largest demographic difference is in the gender split, where KSU has a larger 
participation of females. This is to be expected due to the differences in female 
enrollment between the universities. KSU’s 2011 enrollment includes 58% females, 
whereas UCC’s 2012 enrollment includes only 34% females. See Table 5.7 for further 
details on the comparison of demographics between the two university samples. 
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Table 5.6 
Representativeness of UCC Undergraduate Sample 
Measurement UCC Survey Respondents UCC Data 2012 
Gender   
     Male 47% 66% 
     Female 53% 34% 
Age   
     Average age 23 Not available 
     Under 35 years old 97% Not available 
Ethnicity   
     Akan 62% Not available 
     Ewe 13% Not available 
     Mole-Dagbane 3% Not available 
     Ga 8% Not available 
     Other 14% Not available 
Major   
     Social Sciences 31% 16% 
     Health & Human Service 1% 2% 
     Science & Mathematics 0% 24% 
     Business 26% 14% 
     Education 7% 32% 
     Arts 34% 9% 
     Other 2% 3% 
Country of Origin   
     U.S. 98% Not available 
     Other 2% Not available 
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Table 5.7 
Comparison of Respondent Demographics from KSU and UCC  
Measurement U.S. (KSU) Ghana (UCC) 
Gender   
     Male 19% 47% 
     Female 81% 53% 
Age   
     Average age 22 23 
     Under 35 years old 95% 97% 
Religion   
     Christian 77% 93% 
     Muslim 1% 5% 
     Buddhist 0% 1% 
     Traditional 0% 1% 
     Jewish 0% 0% 
     Hindu 0% 0% 
     No religion 16% 1% 
     Other 5% 1% 
Race/Ethnicity (U.S.)   
     White/Caucasian 63%  
     Black/African American 22%  
     Hispanic 4%  
     Asian/Pacific Islander 4%  
     Other 6%  
Race/Ethnicity (Ghana)   
     Akan  62% 
     Ewe  13% 
     Ga  8% 
     Mole-Dagbane  3% 
     Other  14% 
Major   
     Social Sciences 20% 31% 
     Health & Human Service 36% 1% 
     Science & Mathematics 11% 0% 
     Business 6% 26% 
     Education 3% 7% 
     Arts 0% 34% 
     Other 15% 1% 
Country of Origin   
     U.S. 90% 0% 
     Ghana 1% 98% 
     Other 9% 2% 
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The third sample consists of 120 participants from the Kofi Annan International 
Peacekeeping Training Center (KAIPTC) located in Accra, Ghana. KAIPTC was chosen 
as one of only two peacekeeping training centers located in Ghana that are members of 
the International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centers. The other center is the 
Legon Center for International Affairs (LECIA) at the University of Ghana. LECIA only 
provides training for civilian personnel, whereas KAIPTC provides training for civilian, 
military, and police personnel. Due to its broader range of trainees and potential future 
comparison with similar training centers in the U.S., KAIPTC was chosen as the 
peacekeeping sample population for this study.  
KAIPTC, founded in 2003, provides mission-oriented operational peace support 
training to African forces and conducts research into the various aspects of peace 
operations. KAIPTC’s stated mission is “to develop and deliver internationally 
recognized and professional training courses and related programs to equip personnel 
with selected skills and competencies required to meet Africa’s present and future 
complex peace and security challenges” (KAIPTC, 2013). KAIPTC conducts classes at 
their ten acre campus located in Accra, Ghana, and in their first eight years of existence, 
the staff at KAIPTC has conducted over 200 classes and trained over 8,000 individuals. 
The classes they provide include seminars for senior African leaders, symposiums on key 
issues of peace and security, training on conflict prevention and management, and pre-
deployment training for police. Recently, KAIPTC established itself as an accredited 
tertiary institution providing post-graduate classes for a master’s degree in conflict, 
peace, and security. 
76 
 
All the participants in the KAIPTC sample were associated with the Center as 
staff or students and involved in the study of peace operations in some way. There were 
29 participants from the research and training staff at the Center and 91 participants from 
students at the various classes held at the Center in September and October of 2012. The 
breakdown of students by class type is as follows: 20 students from the Masters in 
Conflict Peace and Security program; 28 students from peace and security courses 
targeted at African senior and middle level leaders from government and non-
governmental peace support institutions; and 43 students from the course designed for 
police officers about to be deployed on peacekeeping missions. Participants at KAIPTC 
filled out paper surveys that I entered manually into the system later, except for the 
Masters students who were not on-site at the time of my research, so they participated 
remotely via the on-line system.  
Seventy-one percent of the KAIPTC participants were born in Ghana, and another 
twenty-three percent were born in other African countries. Only six percent of the 
participants are from outside the continent of Africa. Many of the demographics are 
comparable with the Ghanaian student sample from UCC, including a high percentage of 
Christians, those of Akan ethnicity, and those from the Eastern and Volta regions. The 
UCC sample did have more representation from the Central region, where Cape Coast is 
located, and the Ashanti region which is just north of there. As one might anticipate, the 
age difference is significant. The UCC student sample has an average age of 23 with 97 
percent of the students under the age of 35, whereas the KAIPTC sample has an average 
age of 40 with only 34 percent of the participants under the age of 35. Table 5.8 contains 
more details on the demographics of the KAIPTC sample in comparison with the UCC 
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Table 5.8 
Comparison of Respondent Demographics from KAIPTC and UCC  
Measurement KAIPTC UCC 
Gender   
     Male 67% 47% 
     Female 33% 53% 
Age   
     Average age 40 23 
     Under 35 years old 34% 97% 
Country of Origin   
     Ghana 71% 98% 
     Other Africa 23% 2% 
     Other 6% 0% 
Religion   
     Christian 84% 93% 
     Muslim 10% 5% 
     Buddhist 1% 1% 
     Traditional 1% 1% 
     Jewish 0% 0% 
     Hindu 0% 0% 
     No religion 3% 1% 
     Other 1% 1% 
Region of Ghana   
     Eastern 18% 18% 
     Volta 17% 13% 
     Greater Accra 10% 10% 
     Central 8% 19% 
     Upper East 6% 4% 
     Ashanti 6% 17% 
     Northern 4% 3% 
     Brong-Ahafo 4% 4% 
     Western 3% 9% 
     Upper West 1% 2% 
     None of these 22% 2% 
Ethnicity   
     Akan 36% 62% 
     Ewe 16% 13% 
     Ga 9% 8% 
     Mole-Dagbane 5% 3% 
     Other 34% 14% 
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sample. The biggest caution in comparing responses from these two samples is the age 
difference, although it is hard to separate measures of age and experience as they tend to 
go hand in hand. Any differences in decision-making may not necessarily be attributed to 
involvement with peace operations but might be due to a general level of life experience 
due to age. 
Coding Process 
 Participant responses to the open-ended questions were coded to facilitate content 
analysis and comparison across samples. There were two open-ended questions asked, 
one for each decision to be made asking “why did you make that decision”.  I read 
through all the responses to both open-ended questions (over 1,000) and created a 
codebook of the most frequently occurring themes (about 10 themes per question). Due to 
the large number of items to be coded, I assigned separate coders to each open-ended 
question cutting the amount of work in half and keeping the context the same for coders. 
I recruited four university students (undergraduate and graduate level), two for each of 
the open-ended questions. I gave the coders the codebook to use as a guide.  
Results from the student coding were evaluated to determine intercoder reliability. 
I compared the codes from each pair of students getting an intercoder observed 
agreement value of 0.95 for question 1 and 0.96 for question 2.  In other words, the 
coders were in agreement 95% of the time for question 1 and 96% of the time for 
question 2. In order to determine how much better than chance the observed agreement 
was, I calculated Cohen’s kappa for each pair of students.  Kappa values were 0.72 and 
0.79 indicating that the 95% agreement that was observed for question1 is 72% better 
than expected by chance and the 96% agreement observed for question 2 is 79% better 
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than expected by chance. As a final step, I met with each pair of coders to discuss their 
impressions of the codebook, coding process, and where their interpretations may be 
different. Based on this discussion, I resolved the remaining discrepancies between 
coders (the 4% or 5% of items). 
Issues in Cross-Cultural Research 
The methods used in this study are designed with the some of the issues unique to 
cross-cultural research in mind. Cross-cultural research began over 100 years ago with 
research such as Rivers’ 1905 study that compared the effect of visual illusions on 
individuals from India and England. Over subsequent decades cross-cultural studies 
moved through three distinct methodological phases: (1) cross-cultural comparative 
studies typically through quasi-experimental design, (2) the development of dimensions 
of cultural variability to aid in interpretation of findings, and (3) the development of rich 
theoretical models that link culture to self (Matsumoto & Yoo, 2006). In general, cross-
cultural research has met with its own unique challenges due to the differing languages, 
norms, and practices that arise between groups that are being compared. Researchers face 
the temptation to lower rigors of methodological standards in cross-national surveys in 
their attempts to respect cultures or sometimes just out of practicality (Jowell, 1998). 
However, the evolution of cross-cultural research has provided for some techniques to 
address these challenges. In this section, I will discuss two main pitfalls of cross-cultural 
research: cultural attribution fallacy and the principle of equivalence. Then I will discuss 
approaches used in my study to mitigate these concerns and the limitations in reliability 
and validity that still remain. 
80 
 
One of the limitations of cross-cultural comparative studies is that there may not 
be empirical evidence to justify the interpretation that culture is the source of differences 
between the groups (Matsumoto & Yoo, 2006). This can lead to the cultural attribution 
fallacy – the incorrect conclusion that something cultural caused the difference between 
two country groups being compared, when really the cause is due to a non-cultural 
variable such as socioeconomic status, climate, education, or population density. Of 
course, it is also possible that these non-cultural variables were factors in the formation of 
culture in that country to begin with. Ideally, the samples being used to compare across 
countries would not differ in any of the non-cultural demographic variables of 
participants, although it may be impossible to fully achieve this goal. Many cross-cultural 
studies make use of university students who often provide a reasonably comparable 
sample across countries, even though there can still be demographic differences across 
university samples in age, work experience, religion, and personality (Matsumoto & Yoo, 
2006). It is important to collect demographic information for non-cultural factors in order 
to assess the comparability of samples being used in cross-cultural research, as is done in 
this research study. 
Heterogeneity in samples presents a major obstacle to cross-national quantitative 
surveys which rely on the principle of equivalence for their reliability. Jowell (1998) 
breaks down the principle of equivalence in multinational survey research into four main 
areas: (1) the probability of selection in a sample should be equal, (2) cooperation rates 
must not vary between subgroups, (3) questions should have broadly equivalent meaning 
to all respondents, and (4) coding should be consistent across coders. There are cultural 
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factors that challenge these four areas including differences in language, idiom, and 
preference for certain survey procedures.  
One technique used to overcome the issue of culturally-varied interpretation of 
survey questions is the use of vignettes. Vignettes are particularly useful in the empirical 
study of values, norms, and the ways that human behavior is shaped by cultural constraint 
(Finch, 1987). Vignettes are commonly based on the simulation of a real world event that 
puts the participant in a situation to comment on how that event makes them feel or what 
they might do in that situation (Spalding & Phillips, 2007). In survey research, vignettes 
can be followed by a fixed set of questions and responses which may restrict the 
participant’s ability to accurately express their beliefs. Vignettes may also be followed by 
open-ended questions, which have the limitation of less comparability between 
respondents. The common approach is a vignette followed by a fixed-choice response 
and an open-ended question (Finch, 1987). 
The research design in this study makes use of the vignette approach with both 
fixed-choice and open-ended responses in order to obtain comparable answers for 
quantitative analysis and more specific answers for qualitative exploration. Some of the 
factors needed for the principle of equivalence are well met by this research design, 
including the benefit of a common use of English as the official language in both 
countries under study. In order to further minimize colloquial interpretations, all survey 
questions and vignettes were reviewed by scholars local to the areas under study. In order 
to minimize concerns for cross coder variation, I made use of a well-defined codebook, 
discussed discrepancies with coders, and calculated intercoder reliability as described 
previously. Finally, demographics were collected from all participants and assessed for 
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the level of comparability of samples. There are, however, still some limitations to the 
validity of study, particularly due to the lack of randomness in the sampling method. 
There is also a limitation to the generalizability of using university students as 
participants, because they do not typify the public at large. However, the goal of this 
experiment is not to generalize to a specific population, but rather the goal is to compare 
two countries and test for the impact of culture on decision-making in a laboratory-like 
setting in order to verify the existence of such an impact (Mook, 1983).  
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CHAPTER 6 
COMPARISON OF DECISION-MAKING ACROSS CULTURES 
The four hypotheses established in the previous chapter are tested with 
quantitative and qualitative analysis on data collected from the university students in the 
U.S. and Ghana. The hypotheses investigate the effect of culture on decision-making by 
considering each level of cultural influence as shown in the socially contextualized 
framework in Figure 4.2 from Chapter 4. First, for the individual level, quantitative 
analysis is performed comparing the individualism-collectivism trait measured at the 
individual level and the general decision-making styles of rationality and dependence. 
Second, for the societal level, a qualitative analysis is performed on the open-ended 
questions asked after the vignette. The participant answers are compared between the 
U.S. and Ghana samples using content analysis and a coding scheme that tags responses 
in terms of justification factors. The comparison is hypothesized to reveal more self-
focused justification factors in the U.S. sample and more group-focused justification 
factors in the Ghana sample. Third, for the situated level, quantitative analysis is 
performed comparing the familiarity of the conflict setting with decision choices made 
after reading the vignette. The sections in this chapter will review the findings in further 
detail for the hypotheses at each level ending with a discussion and interpretation of these 
findings particularly within the context of peacekeeping. 
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Individual Level Effects 
The individual level of culture is represented in the first two hypotheses. H1 states 
that people with more collectivist traits are more dependent in their decision-making 
style. H2 states that people with more individualist traits are more rational in their 
decision-making style. In order to test these hypotheses, I build indexes for the traits of 
individualism and collectivism, as well as the decision-styles that are rational and 
dependent. Each of the questions in the reduced AICS and GDMS questionnaires were 
converted from a Likert-type scale to a binary value by setting responses of strongly-
agree and agree to a 1 and responses of strongly-disagree and disagree to a 0. If the 
majority of the items for a given index were a 1, then the overall value was set to a 1. 
Otherwise the overall value was set to a 0. For example, if at least 4 of the 7 questions on 
the individualism scale were answered with strongly-agree or agree, then the participant 
was considered to be individualistic. The consistency between groups of questions was 
verified with Cronbach's Alpha as shown in Tables 5.3 and 5.4 of Chapter 5. The validity 
of recoding Likert results into a binary format has been shown to meet standards that do 
not jeopardize the underlying meaning of the original format (Grassi et al., 2007).  
Analysis of H1 compares the collectivist trait with the dependent decision-making 
style. Results of a bivariate analysis of the GDMS dependent index and the AICS 
collectivism index are shown in Table 6.1. Interpreting across the dependent row, we see 
that 73% of collectivists use a dependent decision-making style compared to only 26% 
for non-collectivists. The likelihood of using a dependent style is much higher for 
collectivists – nearly three times higher, in fact. The odds of being dependent as a 
collectivist are 293:107 and not being a collectivist are 18:51 giving an odds ratio of 7.75. 
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Collectivists have 7.75 times the odds of being dependent thinkers compared to non-
collectivists.  The chi-square value of 58.6 gives statistical evidence to reject the null 
hypothesis of no difference between the two groups at the alpha=0.01 significance level.  
Table 6.1 
Dependent Decision-Making Style by Collectivism Trait 
Decision-Making Style Not Collectivist Collectivist Total 
Not Dependent 51 
(73.9%) 
107 
(26.8%) 
158 
Dependent 18 
(26.1%) 
293 
(73.3%) 
311 
Total 69 
(100%) 
400 
(100%) 
469 
X
2
 = 58.6 ; df = 1; p < .001 
Analysis of H2 compares the individualist trait with the rational decision-making 
style. Looking at the data values reveals that only two people in the sample of 469 are 
non-individualists. With 99% of the sample falling into the individualist category, it is 
difficult to get a conclusive comparative result. When there are fewer than five cases in 
any cross-tabs cell, chi-square can be distorted and results may be misleading. That raises 
the question as to why almost everyone fell into the individualist category in both the 
U.S. and Ghanaian university samples. Students tend to come from a higher 
socioeconomic status, and higher socioeconomic status is associated with higher levels of 
individualism (Oyserman et al. 2002). Also, it is possible that student individualism is 
higher because a university education provides more familiarity with Western cultures 
(Oyserman et al., 2002). It may be, however, that some participants are more individualist 
than others, so the category “highly individualist” is created which is calculated 
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differently. Rather than taking the majority of individualist items with a strongly-agree or 
agree response, the highly individualist category is for a set of responses of strongly-
agree or agree to all seven individualist items. This approach gives a more substantive 
split of the data with about half the sample falling into the highly individualist category. 
Results of a bivariate analysis of the GDMS rational index and the highly individualist 
index are shown in Table 6.2. Interpreting across the rational row, we see that 96% of 
high-individualists use a rational decision-making style compared to 92% for non-high-
individualists. The odds of being rational as a high-individualist are 245:12 and not being 
a high-individualist are 194:18 giving an odds ratio of 1.9. High-individualists have about 
twice the odds of being rational thinkers compared to non-individualists. The chi-square 
value of 2.8 gives statistical evidence to reject the null hypothesis of no difference 
between the two groups only at the alpha=0.1 significance level. This result points to a 
general trend, but significance does not reach the desired .05 level. The individualist trait 
is worthy of exploring in future research with non-student samples to determine further 
implications. 
Table 6.2 
Rational Decision-Making Style by Individualism Trait 
Decision Style Not Highly Individualist Highly Individualist Total 
Not Rational 18 
(8.5%) 
12 
(4.7%) 
30 
 
Rational 194 
(91.5%) 
245 
(95.3%) 
439 
 
Total 212 
(100%) 
257 
(100%) 
469 
X
2
 = 2.8 ; df = 1; p = .09 
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Societal Level Effects 
The societal level effect of culture is captured in the third hypothesis, H3, which 
anticipates that in a more individualist society (U.S.) people will prioritize self-focused 
factors in their decision-making, whereas in a collectivist society (Ghana) people will 
prioritize group-focused factors in their decision-making. This hypothesis is tested by 
examining the responses that participants made to the open-ended questions of “why did 
you make that decision” asked after each of the two decisions made about the vignette 
and comparing the responses between the U.S. and Ghana samples. I expect to see factors 
of self-reliance, self-interest, and achievement more often in the U.S. sample and factors 
of group harmony and in-group influence in the Ghanaian sample. 
Rationale for the first decision to tell or not. After reading the vignette, the first 
decision participants have to make is whether or not to reveal the names of the two 
colleagues who were sabotaging the mine. The decision to reveal the names and “tattle” 
was made 36% of the time at UCC in Ghana and 44% of the time at KSU in the U.S. 
Although the choice to tattle was made less frequently in the Ghana sample, the 
difference cannot necessarily be attributed to cultural variables. In order to more fully 
understand the process people went through in coming to their decision, I look at the 
rationale behind the decision. What factors did people consider during their decision 
making process and were any of those factors culturally bound? Participants were asked 
an open-ended question of “why” did they make that decision, and I look in those 
responses to seek patterns of justification. After reading through all the responses in 
open-coding mode, I created a codebook to describe any frequently occurring 
justification factors. There are ten frequently occurring factors shown in Table 6.3. 
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Table 6.3 
Frequency Distribution of Justification Factors for Telling or Not 
Factor Codebook Description U.S. 
(N=255) 
Ghana 
(N=179) 
X
2  
(p-value) 
Miner Safety Concern for safety of other miners. 26% 13% 11.0 
(0.001)*** 
Saboteurs 
May Lose 
Jobs 
Concern that saboteurs would lose 
their jobs or otherwise get into 
trouble. 
19% 18% 0.1 
(0.802) 
Moral 
Reasons 
Because it's the "right" or "fair" 
thing to do.  Mentions personal 
values, ethics, morals, or not lying. 
13% 7% 3.2 
(0.075) 
Sabotage 
Was Justified 
The sabotage was understandable 
based on the saboteurs’ desperate 
position.  Or the sabotage was 
effective in getting the deal. In 
other words, it worked. 
11% 5% 4.8 
(0.029)** 
President 
Responsible 
Considers company President 
responsible for the situation and/or 
responsible to investigate the 
sabotage himself.  Or doesn't trust 
the President. 
9% 15% 3.7 
(0.054)* 
Not My 
Business 
Not my place or not my business to 
tell. 
7% 2% 6.0 
(0.015)** 
Solve In 
Group 
Wants to convince the saboteurs to 
stop himself/herself or within the 
group of protesting miners. 
8% 6% 0.6 
(0.444) 
Betrays 
Group 
Considers telling a betrayal of the 
group. 
6% 14% 8.2 
(0.004)*** 
For Company 
Benefit 
Has best interest of 
company/management at heart.  
Loyalty to company/management. 
6% 8% 0.6 
(0.426) 
Protect Self Concern for their own position or 
family. 
5% 3% 1.0 
(0.312) 
Other Other stated reason. 4% 3%  
 ***=significant at .01; **=significant at .05; *=significant at .1 
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Using the established codebook, independent coders tagged all the responses as 
described in the coding section of Chapter 5. The resulting frequency distribution of 
justification factors is shown in Table 6.3. Note that the percentages add up to more than 
100% because some participants mentioned more than one factor in their response. The 
most frequently occurring factor at 26% in the KSU sample (U.S.) is concern for safety 
of all the miners. For the UCC sample (Ghana), the most frequently occurring factor at 
18% is concern for the two saboteurs who might lose their jobs and income if their names 
are revealed. Other significant differences between the two samples are concerns for 
betrayal in the Ghana sample, the idea that the sabotage was justified in the U.S., and the 
notion that it’s just “not my business” in the U.S. sample.  
 Further exploration of the three most significant differences in factors of safety, 
betrayal, and ownership (“not my business”) reveal detail that is consistent with different 
frames of group identity and priority. First, when participants considered the safety 
factor, they almost always made the decision to reveal the names of the miners, more 
than 93% of the time. In a few cases, safety concerns were considered along with other 
factors, and then the decision was made not to reveal the names, but in general those who 
thought of the safety factor made that the highest priority. In some cases, participants 
were concerned about their own safety, but largely they cited concern for safety of their 
fellow workers as the main priority. In the U.S. sample, participants expressed a 
sentiment that compared material benefits and life-or-death, as seen in the following 
exemplary quotes: 
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 “I would tell him because this sabotage could be deadly for some of the 
miners. It could end up being a life or death situation. I would rather people be 
poor, than dead.” 
 “I would tell him because the safety of myself and my fellow employees isn't 
worth a pay raise.” 
In the Ghana sample, the safety rationale was straightforward about not endangering 
others’ lives. Some Ghanaians referenced previous industrial experience and several 
talked about accidents in the workplace. Here are two representative quotes from Ghana: 
  “Because they cannot endanger the lives of the miners because of the selfish 
interests.” 
  “Because I had my industrial attachment with one mining company and 
safety is one of their priority so Mr. Owusu has the right to know the people in 
order to safe other miners life.” 
 Secondly, the betrayal factor is significantly more frequent in the Ghanaian 
sample. Ghanaians who considered this factor usually mentioned betrayal in a simple 
statement without elaboration, as if the choice were clear. In fact, every person who cited 
the betrayal factor chose not to reveal the names of the saboteurs, even if they considered 
other factors as well, such as moral values. For example, one person in Ghana wrote: 
 “Because it would be a betrayal. Though, what some of the members are 
doing is bad, I cannot tell.” 
In the U.S. sample, the actual word betrayal occurs only once, versus the fourteen times it 
occurs in the Ghanaian sample. However, there are other sentiments of betrayal expressed 
in the U.S. sample that are less formal or severe, such as “snitch”, “rat”, “tattle”, or 
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“throw under the bus.” In the U.S., the betrayal justification is often elaborated on with 
practical reasons such as avoiding fissures in the working group or other awkwardness 
among the workers. In a few cases, there is an element of personal responsibility 
involved, as in this example quote from the U.S.: 
 “It was my idea to create the BFAs, therefore I am partly responsible for the 
sabotaging. In addition, I would not throw my group members under the bus. I 
am their leader, and they count on me.” 
The third factor with a significant difference is the notion that revealing the 
saboteurs names is just “not my business”. This lack of ownership for any part of the 
problem is more prevalent in the U.S. sample where it is mentioned by seventeen 
participants, whereas only three people in Ghana mention this factor. Those in the U.S. 
that considered it use phrases such as “not my place”, “not my business”, “not my duty”, 
or “not my job.” Here is a U.S. quote that sums up the lack of ownership expressed by 
participants in this category: 
 “Because it is not my place to tell other people's mistakes. It is the worker's 
duty to take responsibility and own up to wrong behavior. Those two workers 
are in control of their own destiny and may decide whether they want to lie, or 
come out with the truth. Their own punishment and their own reward will be 
in their own hands.” 
In sum, the most frequent rationale given by Ghanaians contemplating the 
decision to “tattle” is a concern for the welfare of the two saboteurs that were part of their 
inner group of protestors. This priority often overrides moral concerns as well as the 
safety of the larger group. In comparison with the U.S. sample, Ghanaians more often 
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consider revealing the names of the saboteurs as a form of betrayal, another indicator of 
strong group identity with an inner group. Those in the U.S. more often prioritize the 
needs of the larger social group, namely all of the miners in the company due to safety 
concerns, or just simply remove themselves from identification with all the groups by 
indicating that it is “not my business”. Both of these trends are consistent with the 
definitions of individualist and collectivist societies and the notion that self-conceptions 
around social group identity develop differently in different cultures. 
Rationale for second decision to take the deal or not. The second decision 
participants have to make is whether or not to accept an offer made by the company that 
would provide requested benefits to the fifty members of the protest group in exchange 
for an end to protests. The decision to accept the offer and “cooperate” was made 30% of 
the time at UCC in Ghana, and 35% of the time at KSU in the U.S. This is a very similar 
response pattern, and again, in order to determine if there are any cultural differences in 
the process people went through in coming to their decision, I consider the rationale that 
participants gave to the open-ended question of “why”. After reading through all the 
responses in open-coding mode, I created another codebook with justification factors that 
occurred frequently in the responses. There are nine frequently occurring factors with 
definitions as shown in Table 6.4. 
The 430 responses to this question were coded by independent coders with any of 
the nine factors that appeared. The resulting frequency distribution of justification factors 
is shown in Table 6.4, with the percentages adding up to more than 100% because some 
participants mentioned more than one factor in their response. The most frequently 
occurring factor in both samples is the desire to focus on benefits for the entire miner 
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population rather than just for the fifty miners who were part of the protest group. This 
factor appears in more than half the responses in each sample. The frequency of factors is 
reflective of a prioritization process going on between the four main identity groups in 
the scenario: self, protest group, miners, company. The first four entries in Table 6.4 
show these factors, and given their dominance in the frequency distribution overall, I 
explore those factors in more detail. 
Table 6.4 
Frequency Distribution of Justification Factors for Taking Deal or Not 
Factor Codebook Description U.S. 
(N=255) 
Ghana 
(N=175) 
X
2  
(p-value) 
Self Benefit Wants the promotion and/or pay 
increase for self or family. 
14% 9% 3.1 
(0.081)* 
Protest Group 
Benefit 
Wants the promotion and/or pay 
increase for member of the BFA. 
16% 9% 4.7 
(0.030)** 
Miner Benefit Wants improved benefits for ALL 
miners. 
56% 51% 0.8 
(0.384) 
Company 
Benefit 
Wants to sustain the organization 
and help the company to survive. 
0% 2% N/R 
Achieve Peace Wants to reduce conflict, bring 
about peace, or stop the sabotage. 
7% 8% 0.1 
(0.715) 
Follow 
Principles 
Wants to do the "right" thing.  
Mentions ethics or morals. 
4% 4% 0.1 
(0.873) 
View of 
President 
Does not trust/like/respect the 
president/management. 
3% 5% 1.1 
(0.294) 
Keep Protest 
Rights 
Does not want to give up the right 
to protest as specified in the offer. 
2% 1% N/R 
Avoid 
Confusion 
Wants to avoid the 
chaos/disorder/confusion that 
would be caused by the changes in 
the offer. 
0% 1% N/R 
Other Other specific reason given. 5% 9%  
***=significant at .01; **=significant at .05; *=significant at .1 
N/R:Not reported because Chi-squared may be distorted due to less than 5 cases in a cell 
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The justification factors for the four identity groups (self, protesters, miners, 
company) appear in 342 responses, and those responses are examined separately, by 
country sample, and by choice to cooperate or resist. The results are shown in Figure 6.1, 
revealing a very similar decision profile between the U.S. and Ghana samples. The 
majority of the participants focused on the miner group priority, and most of those that 
did decided to decline the offer. The rest of the respondents, who largely chose to 
cooperate and accept the offer, are spread between the other three identity groups. The 
Ghana sample had a few responses concerned with company benefit , but otherwise the 
frequency distributions are very similar. This similarity is not surprising, because the 
scenario indicates that the main objective of the protest group is to gain better benefits for 
all miners, and in fact, the protest group is named “Benefit for All” or BFA for short. The 
key question is what caused some people to abandon this given objective and seek the 
interests of only the protest group, or perhaps just themselves, and in a small number 
cases the company as a whole? 
 
 
Figure 6.1. Identity group affinity with decision to cooperate or resist shown 
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 I examine more closely the two larger alternative sub-groupings: protester benefit 
and self benefit. First, those that emphasized the need of the protesters as a priority in 
their decision-making most often mentioned one of two sub-factors behind that choice, as 
shown in Table 6.5: compromise or merit.  
Table 6.5  
Frequency Distribution of Sub-Factors for Those Prioritizing Protesters 
Sub-Factor Description U.S. 
(N=40) 
Ghana 
(N=15) 
X
2  
(p-value) 
Compromise Thought the offer met at least some 
objectives, or it would help end the 
sabotage. 
45% 33% 0.6 
(0.435) 
Merit Thought that those who fought for the 
benefits (protesters) earned them and 
the others did not. 
45% 0% N/R 
Other Other stated reason. 18% 67%  
***=significant at .01; **=significant at .05; *=significant at .1 
N/R:Not reported because Chi-squared may be distorted due to less than 5 cases in a cell 
In some cases, participants felt that the offer given met at least some of the objectives set 
out by the BFA protest group, if not all, seeing it as a compromise. Here is a 
representative quote from a Ghanaian student: 
 “Because half a loan is better than none. This means that I take the offer and 
the leaders get their promotion or I refuse and the sabotages continue.” 
Others thought the protesters that were part of the BFA had earned the benefits, and the 
other miners that had not joined the BFA did not deserve to get them anyway. 
Interestingly, this distinction between the deserving and the undeserving, or an emphasis 
on merit, appears only in the U.S. sample. Forty-five percent of the U.S. students who 
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focused on the protesting group mentioned merit as a key factor, as represented in this 
quote from a U.S. student: 
 “I think it would benefit those who decided to stand up for their rights, I mean 
I could take the other miners into account, but they didn't do anything so why 
should they benefit.” 
Secondly, in the groups that prioritized self in the decision-making process, the 
same idea of merit occurs but again in only the U.S. sample. Table 6.6 shows the three 
most frequently occurring sub-factors for those that emphasized self in their decision 
process.  
Table 6.6  
Frequency Distribution of Sub-Factors for Those Prioritizing Self 
Sub-Factor Description U.S. 
(N=36) 
Ghana 
(N=15) 
X
2  
(p-value) 
Merit I earned it through hard work, 
protesting, or just making an 
intelligent move. 
22% 0% N/R 
Want I want to improve my situation. No 
mention of merit, achievement, or 
earning it. 
53% 73% 1.8 
(0.174) 
Need I need it to support my family. 19% 27% 0.3 
(0.568) 
Other Other stated reason. 11% 13%  
***=significant at .01; **=significant at .05; *=significant at .1 
N/R:Not reported because Chi-squared may be distorted due to less than 5 cases in a cell 
Most emphasized the desire to improve their position in life, while others focused either 
on the need to support family, or in the case of the U.S., merit. Twenty-two percent of the 
U.S. sample that focused on self in the decision felt that they had earned the benefits 
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offered in the company’s deal because of their hard work, their protest efforts, or even 
their intelligence in working the situation. One student in the U.S. wrote: 
 “I need money and deserve it, others can prove they deserve a raise and they 
may receive it. I already earned mine though.” 
Another U.S. student wrote: 
 “I worked hard to protest, and some benefit came out of it. The others will 
have to formulate a plan just as I did.” 
In sum, the vast majority of participants (65% or more) chose to decline the offer 
that was made in an attempt to resist the management’s proposed compromise. This is 
true of both cultural groups and is presumed to be based on the influence of the objective 
established in the vignette that was further emphasized by labeling the group as the BFA, 
or “Benefit For All”. Most participants followed along with this premise, and in both 
samples, more than half the participants expressed a prioritization of “all” the miners as 
the basis for the decision-making. However, other participants chose to emphasize the 
priority of other social identity groups, either self, the protester group, or the company as 
a whole. These participants generally choose to accept the company’s offer which would 
benefit themselves and the protest group, at the expense of the larger social group – all 
the miners. The justification behind this decision to cooperate differed distinctly between 
the U.S. and Ghanaian samples. The U.S. participants tended to emphasize merit as a 
reason for taking the offer, citing the fact that they and the other protesters had earned the 
benefits and the other miners had not. 
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Situated Level Effects 
The situated level of culture is reflected in the fourth hypotheses, H4, which states 
that those in a familiar setting are more likely to cooperate than those in an unfamiliar 
setting. This hypothesis is tested with quantitative analysis of the decision to compromise 
with the company management and take an offer that meets part, but not all, of the 
protesting group’s stated objectives. The independent variable of “familiarity of setting” 
is first operationalized with the vignette version which varied between an individualist 
and collectivist description of the mining community. Table 6.7 shows a cross-tabulation 
of familiarity versus the choice to take the deal. Whether the vignette setting aligned with 
the country culture or not, participants chose to decline the deal about two-thirds of the 
time and accept the deal one-third of the time. It is possible that the varying descriptions 
in the vignette of the community did not provide enough distinction or could have been 
interpreted differently by each participant. 
Table 6.7 
Decision to Take the Deal in Unfamiliar Vignette Setting 
Decision Unfamiliar Setting 
(Collectivist setting in 
U.S. or Individualist 
setting in Ghana) 
Familiar Setting 
(Individualist setting 
in U.S. or Collectivist 
setting in Ghana) 
Total 
Decline Deal 158 
(68.4%) 
137 
(64.9%) 
295 
Take Deal 73 
(31.6%) 
74 
(35.1%) 
147 
Total 231 
(100%) 
211 
(100%) 
442 
X
2
 = 0.6 ; df = 1; p =0.439  
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Because of the subtlety of the vignette differences, H4 was tested again with a 
different operationalization of the independent variable, self-reported familiarity. At the 
end of the survey, participants were asked if the setting of the vignette was similar to 
where they lived, and they answered on a Likert-type scale. The response was changed to 
a binary value with those saying strongly-agree or agree having a score of 1, and those 
saying strongly-disagree or disagree having a score of 0. Cross-tabulation analysis shows 
that the familiarity of the cultural context does have the hypothesized effect. See Table 
6.8 for a summary of the results. Interpreting across the “take deal” row, we see that 44% 
of those that thought the setting was familiar chose to take the deal compared to only 
31% for those who did not feel the setting was familiar. The likelihood of cooperating is 
higher in cases of familiarity – about one and a half times as high. The odds of taking the 
deal when familiar with the setting are 30:38 and when not familiar with the setting are 
113:251 giving an odds ratio of 1.75. Those familiar with the setting have 1.75 times the 
odds of taking the deal compared to those not familiar with the setting. The chi-square 
value of 4.4 gives statistical evidence to reject the null hypothesis of no difference 
between the two groups at the alpha=0.05 significance level. 
Table 6.8 
Decision to Take the Deal by Self-Reported Familiarity of Vignette Setting 
Decision Not Familiar Familiar Total 
Decline Deal 251 
(69.0%) 
38 
(55.9%) 
289 
Take Deal 113 
(31.0%) 
30 
(44.1%) 
143 
Total 364 
(100%) 
68 
(100%) 
432 
X
2
 = 4.4 ; df = 1; p = 0.035 
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Discussion of Findings 
 Analysis of the data collected in the U.S. and Ghana indicates that culture does 
indeed have an impact on decision making showing indications of cultural impact across 
individual traits, societal traits, and situational context. First, the individual level was 
explored with hypotheses on individualism-collectivism. The first hypothesis regarding 
personal traits was well-supported by the data, indicating that cultural traits such as 
collectivism can have an effect on the general decision making style of individuals. Those 
who are more collectivist tend to be more dependent in their decision making. Results for 
the second hypothesis regarding individualism were non-conclusive and require further 
research with nonstudent samples. The finding on decision-making styles for collectivists 
is important for those who work in mediation and conflict resolution. When attempting to 
bring parties together to form an agreement, one ought to understand the cultural traits of 
the parties involved and tailor one’s approach accordingly. My findings lead me to 
conclude that we ought not to expect collectivists to make long lasting decisions without 
the involvement of others in their group. 
Secondly, the nature of the society one lives in informs the decision making 
process. This study shows support for the third hypothesis that those from a collectivist 
society (Ghana) are more likely to prioritize interests of members of more central social 
identity groups, and those from an individualist society (U.S.) are more likely to prioritize 
interests based on responsibility and achievement. The decision to conceal or reveal the 
names of saboteurs brought out a strong sense of in-group loyalty or betrayal in the 
Ghanaian sample. Ghanaians more often showed concern for the welfare of their closer 
in-group members overriding factors of safety for the larger groups, stability of the 
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company, or even personal morals. Americans more often showed their value of merit 
where an individual gets what they deserve by standing up and taking action on their own 
behalf. Each of these findings is consistent with the Hofstede view of the U.S. and Ghana 
as individualist and collectivist societies respectively.  
These societal level findings have particular relevance to peacekeeping 
operations. Preparation and training for peacekeeping missions should be built on an 
awareness of the cultural traits of the target society and particularly on the central group 
identities for the parties in conflict. My research suggests a tendency for collectivist 
societies to want to solve group problems within the most central and salient in-groups 
and a general reluctance to go to outer circles to find a solution. This potentially makes 
collectivist societies less prone to accepting external intervention. The cognitive 
heuristics invoked in collectivist societies differ from individualist societies and could 
serve as predictors for things that go well in the interactions of peacekeepers with the 
local population, whereas other salient images may undermine peacekeeping efforts. As 
an example, Miller and Moskos (1995) studied the experience of U.S. army soldiers sent 
on the humanitarian mission to Somalia in the 1990s. The soldiers, many of whom had 
recently participated in relief work in Florida following Hurricane Andrew, were 
expecting a warm and grateful welcome by the Somali people much as they received 
when they were in Florida. Instead they felt abused by the local population who resented 
their presence and would throw rocks at them, refuse their aid, and insult them.  
Thirdly, my analysis indicates that the cultural setting of a situation can alter 
decision-making processes. The fourth hypothesis is supported, showing an effect of the 
feeling of familiarity to a conflict setting creating a tendency toward cooperation. This 
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may be an indication that it is advisable to deploy peacekeepers from collectivist societies 
to conflict settings in collectivist societies because their familiarity will aid their 
effectiveness. The importance of aligning cultural traits of peacekeepers with the target 
conflict resolution environment is also supported by the study of U.S. soldiers on the 
humanitarian mission to Somalia. When U.S. soldiers were confronted with negative and 
resentful feelings from the local population, they responded in one of two ways. Some 
chose to categorize the locals as hostile and respond accordingly, while others chose to 
seek explanations for local behavior and distinguished between the militants and the 
needy (Miller & Moskos, 1995). The response chosen was affected by such 
characteristics as race, gender, and combat status with most women soldiers and most 
black men choosing to avoid the negative stereotypes and hostile approaches.  
Why did women soldiers and black men respond differently to the resentful 
behavior of the locals? Miller and Moskos (1995) concluded that women and black men 
were more able to relate to the locals because of their social location in American society, 
invoking anti-discriminatory narratives similar to the civil rights movement in the U.S. 
These soldiers were also more likely to volunteer at local orphanages, schools, and 
refugee camps while in Somalia further increasing their cultural awareness. Some of 
these soldiers suggested that future missions could be improved by providing further 
intelligence information prior to the mission that would improve soldiers’ understanding 
of the culture of local populations (Miller & Moskos, 1995). The effect of peacekeeper 
training and preparation as well as the effect of actual field experience will be explored 
more fully in the next two chapters. 
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CHAPTER 7 
APPLICATION TO PEACEKEEPING 
Findings in this research indicate that culture makes a difference in the decision-
making process of the individual. People from collectivist societies are more dependent 
in the decision-making style and are more likely to consider in-group loyalties as a high 
priority. People from individualist societies are more likely to consider merit-based 
criteria as a high priority. In both types of societies, familiarity with the setting of the 
conflict situation brings with it a tendency toward peaceful solutions. The application of 
these results to the peacekeeping community is critical, because peacekeepers may find 
themselves in either individualist or collectivist societies and are likely to be in settings 
that are not familiar, yet their job is to be an instrument of peaceful solutions. How then 
does culture impact the peacekeeper? Or more importantly, how does the peacekeeper 
break through the cultural constraints of their mission when necessary? The peacekeeper, 
as an individual, enters a conflict situation with his or her own personality traits, 
decision-making style, and societal expectations. Peacekeepers may receive training or 
other exposure to peace studies prior to their deployment which could enable them to 
break through some of their own cultural constraints as needed to bring problem 
resolution to situations of conflict.  
In this chapter, I review the literature on the cultural element of conflict 
resolution, and I discuss a model profile of the peacekeeper. I hypothesize that decision-
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making trends around choices made from the vignette will vary between the Ghanaian 
peace professionals population and the Ghanaian university student population 
representing non-peace professionals. I propose that those with exposure to the study of 
peace, training on peacekeeping operations, or experience on peacekeeping missions are 
more likely to be problem-solvers in situations of conflict and are more likely to reach 
beyond in-groups to seek solutions. Training familiarizes potential peacekeepers with the 
context of the situation activating a more appropriate set of criteria in the “situated level” 
of culture that constrains decision-making as shown in the first stage of the model 
developed in Chapter 4 (see figure 4.2). 
Culture and Conflict Resolution 
Conflict resolution emerged as a field of study in the 1950s and 1960s when a 
group of scholars found value in studying conflict as general phenomena with similar 
properties that could be practically addressed by developing specific approaches and 
techniques. The field evolved and matured over subsequent decades facing critiques and 
challenges along the way. One of the major issues to be addressed in the field has been 
one of the cultural generalizability of conflict resolution (Fisher, 1997). It was the 
involvement of anthropologists such as Avruch and Black in the 1980s that brought 
increased awareness to the culture question challenging some of the assumptions being 
made about the universality of human nature. The question of how much impact cultural 
variation has on theories of conflict resolution can be answered at three different levels of 
response:  (1) cultural variation as not a factor, (2) cultural variation as moderately 
important, and (3) cultural variation as fundamentally significant (Ramsbsotham, 
Woodhouse, & Miall, 2011).  
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The first category assumes that culture is not a factor in conflict resolution. The 
founders and early theorists in the field of conflict resolution took this generic approach 
and did not find cultural variation as particularly relevant. For example, Burton and 
Sandole (1986) characterized conflict resolution approaches as generic based on universal 
behaviors that transcend cultural differences. The root of conflict was seen not through 
the power of social institutions and cultural values but rather through the drive to satisfy 
basic human needs. Individuals use their identity groups as a means for pursuing their 
basic needs, and the role of culture in conflict is therefore minimized. The later 
introduction of anthropological ideas to the field challenged these generic assumptions 
and focused more on cultural variation.  
The second category of response recognizes culture as important but as just one of 
many variables to be considered in studying conflict resolution. Many of the responses in 
this category come from the literature on cross-cultural negotiations. There is cultural 
variation across key aspects of the negotiation process including building relationships, 
communicating, setting goals, and reaching agreements (Moore & Woodrow, 2010). 
Cohen (1991) considered negotiations to be a special case of communications with all the 
inherent traps of misunderstandings and misinterpretations. In international negotiations, 
the potential for miscommunication is characteristic of intercultural interaction in 
general, for in order to have true communication, the parties must have a common base of 
semantic assumptions. People that have no shared experience or common history have no 
guarantee that the intended meaning of one is decoded correctly by the other. In this 
sense, culture becomes an important variable when people of different cultures come 
together to interact. 
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Finally, the third category of response positions culture as the fundamental factor 
in conflict resolution, whether the interaction is between cultures or within one culture. 
Avruch and Black (1991) introduced the notion of ethnoconflict theory which precedes 
discussion of interests, needs, and values in the analysis of conflict and focuses on the 
implicit knowledge contained within a culture that is often taken for granted and may 
rarely be verbalized. They referred to this knowledge as “local common sense”, and it 
should provide the foundation for understanding the cultural constraints underlying any 
situation of conflict. This importance of cultural relevance to conflict resolution theory 
emerged partly as a result of specific case studies (Lederach & Wehr, 1991; Rubenstein, 
1992). These case studies demonstrated the ineffectiveness of taking North American-
based conflict resolution techniques and trying to transfer them to other parts of the world 
without accounting for local common sense, or ethnoconflict theory. Lederach (1997) 
renounced this non-adaptive transfer technique, and promoted instead an elicitive 
approach that drew on the unique cultural aspects of the conflict setting in defining 
models of conflict to be used. 
In sum, although there are differences of opinion on the relevance of culture to 
conflict resolution, the field has evolved to a point where culture is considered a factor in 
most situations of conflict resolution. Cultural variation is often applied to instances of 
cross-cultural interaction such as international negotiations, mediation in interactive 
conflict resolution, and cross-cultural peacekeeping operations. Yet ethnoconflict theory 
and the elicitive approach should apply to within-culture situations of conflict as well, as 
in-groups and out-groups can form within a single society as we saw in the Robbers Cave 
experiments and the Minimal Group experiments discussed in chapter 4. The response to 
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in-groups and out-groups may vary by culture, but the formation of such groups through 
ethnocentrism can theoretically occur anywhere. Peacekeepers may be deployed to 
environments where in-groups and out-groups are already at odds, or they may be 
entering a situation where they represent the out-group themselves (Miller & Moskos, 
1995). 
Culture in Peacekeeping Operations 
The peacekeeping process itself is in many ways a large problem-solving effort, 
and in this context, culture is extremely important, because it is the mechanism that 
people use to determine their options and structure their actions (Rubinstein, Keller, & 
Scherger, 2008). Culture can predispose people to act in a certain manner or constrain 
them from choosing certain options, all in a way that may be outside of conscious 
thought. Culture becomes part of the foundation upon which people organize their 
options, create solutions, and take action. In this way, culture guides individual actions 
but is not the only determinant of them. Variation in these cultural foundations can make 
the decisions of one party appear unpredictable, irrational, or counterproductive to other 
parties. In order to successfully coordinate the work between the culturally diverse set of 
actors involved in peace operations, sensitivity to cultural issues is important. As 
Rubinstein (2003) said, “There is no ‘right’ formula for minimizing these cultural 
differences. But an awareness of their existence and analytic tools for understanding them 
are essential elements for meeting the challenges they pose” (p. 48). 
All parties involved in a peacekeeping operation have cultural contexts that they 
bring to the situation. This would include multi-national peacekeeping troops, civil and 
military organizations, and the local population. Rubinstein et al. (2008) distinguish 
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between the horizontal and vertical interoperability of the various parties involved. 
Horizontal interoperability refers to the interaction between the international actors 
involved in a peacekeeping mission, such as troops, humanitarian organizations, and UN 
agencies. There can be points of tension among these actors during complex missions, 
and some of the difficulties can be due to cultural differences among these heterogeneous 
groups. The differing points of view of the various organizations can lead to an impasse 
despite the efforts of both parties to treat each other with respect. Rubinstein et al. (2008) 
describe the common exchange they heard during the field research of peacekeeping 
missions. Organizations will state that they respect each other and want to work together 
as partners, but when the practical matters are discussed, clashes of opinion occur. Parties 
will restate their intent for respect and cooperation, yet continue to clash. Generally, the 
parties would fail to come to an agreement or would come to a false consensus. This type 
of interaction may be well-intended but only addresses cultural differences at the surface 
level, leaving differences unresolved. 
Vertical interoperability refers to the interaction between international 
peacekeeping staff and the local population, and the same issues of surface level 
cooperation can occur. In the case of vertical interoperability with the local population, 
surface cultural understanding often comes in the form of “travelers’ advice”. Tips about 
how to shake hands, how to eat, and how to avoid showing the bottom of your shoe may 
be good for the surface elements of culture and the outward expression of respect, but 
these actions are insufficient if they are not linked to a deep culture level (Rubinstein et 
al., 2008). As peacekeepers interact with the local population, they are bound to 
encounter divisions with and within the society in addition to the cultural divisions that 
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exist between international troops and locals. Ethnocentrism in the local community can 
be seen when there is a sense of in-group superiority and out-group inferiority. The risk 
of violence between combatants during a peacekeeping mission is increased when 
cultural differences are emphasized between the in-groups and out-groups (Kimmel, 
1998).  
Peacekeepers need cultural awareness training to avoid becoming part of the 
ethnocentric problems found in cross-cultural conflict situations. It is essential that this 
training addresses the deeper cultural differences, identifies local community divisions, 
and helps the peacekeeper learn to deal with in-group/out-group formations in the 
community as well as techniques for overcoming their own status as an out-group 
member. The question is how does one create such a deep cultural awareness training 
program, one that goes beyond “traveler’s advice”? Culturally-relevant decision guides 
can come in the form of formal control or informal control. Formal control refers to legal 
regulations that indicate what is permitted and what is prohibited which may differ for 
armed forces, civilian forces, or contractors operating in a peacekeeping environment. 
Formal control encompasses international law, home country law (such as the U.S.), and 
domestic law of the host country. Legalities can vary distinctly between countries, and 
peacekeepers should be aware of such distinctions prior to their deployment (Franke, in 
press). 
Formal control mechanisms operate in parallel with informal control mechanisms 
which refer to the norms and values that the individual has internalized as part of his or 
her own self-identity (Franke, in press). Informal control provides a means of self-
monitoring and self-regulation based on social interactions and a shared system of values. 
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By creating a system of shared values, social interactions can shape individual behavior 
even in the absence of formal rules. Ideally, informal regulation should be consistent with 
formal regulation so that each reinforces the other. An example of an informal control 
mechanism is the code of conduct developed by International Stability Operations 
Association , an umbrella organization representing the industry that supports peace and 
stability operations by contract (ISOA, 2011). This code of conduct has been signed by 
all of their member companies and provides a description of ethical behavior in conflict 
and post-conflict environments (Franke, in press).  
Peacekeepers need the same form of informal control based on training on 
culturally-relevant codes of conduct that are internalized and shared among peacekeeping 
team members. The United Nations has developed a peacekeeper’s code of conduct that 
is incorporated into the peacekeeping training courses and is institutionalized for all 
peacekeepers deployed on missions. Since 1998, uniformed personnel on UN 
peacekeeping missions have been given pocket cards containing the ten rules of the 
“Code of Personal Conduct for Blue Helmets” (UN CDU, 2013). Some of the rules are 
about acting responsibly and with integrity, while other rules are concerned particularly 
with cross-cultural interaction. For example, the second rule states that the peacekeeper 
must respect local culture, customs, and traditions, and the third rule states that 
inhabitants of the host country must be treated with respect. See Appendix F for a listing 
of the ten rules. By incorporating the code of conduct into pre-deployment training and 
providing cards to be carried in the field, the UN has attempted to create an informal 
control mechanism with a shared expectation of behaviors to be reinforced among 
peacekeepers. 
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Cultural Profile of the Peacekeeper 
Peacekeeping troops are often given tasks that bring them into direct contact with 
the local population and other third parties in the area, and the nature of the relationship 
formed between the peacekeeping troops and the local population is the decisive element 
determining the success or failure of the mission (Duffey, 2000). What characteristics 
make for a good peacekeeper? If one maintains, as Duffey does in her 2000 article on 
peacekeeping, that a prerequisite for a successful peacekeeping mission is strong 
relationships with the local community, then an effective peacekeeper is one who 
understands the local population and respects its cultural traditions. Cultural awareness 
training has been recommended for all participants of peacekeeping missions and can 
cover a variety of cultural topics including surface level symbols and traditions as well as 
the deeper level meanings, motives, expectations, dealing with in-groups and out-groups, 
and power differences (Duffey, 2000; Rubinstein, 2003; Kimmel, 1998). 
Classroom training can give peacekeepers a substantial head start in 
understanding the cultural challenges they will face, because learning concepts in a 
classroom setting can form a heuristic understanding that is more easily recalled in the 
field. However nothing is as effective as field experience especially when dealing with 
culture. Culture itself is a learned system that is often dynamic and full of implied 
symbols and meaning. “Culture is learned through practice – by doing” (Rubinstein, 
2003, p. 31). So the most effective peacekeepers are likely to be those with the most 
experience in the field. With practice comes the ability to observe other cultures, pinpoint 
areas of meaning, and adapt one’s own behavior as needed.  
112 
 
The differences in culture and mission expectations encountered by peacekeepers 
in the field can lead to contradictions in ideas of self-conception. For example, when 
military personnel are sent on peacekeeping missions, they may discover identity tensions 
between the soldier in them that has been trained to norms of obeying orders and entering 
combat, and the humanitarian in them that has been sent to provide aid and promote 
peace (Franke, 1999). In his classic article, Abelson (1959) describes such a situation as a 
“belief dilemma” in which cognitive processing encounters a contradiction in belief 
structures. In these instances, an object may simultaneously incur both positive and 
negative cognitive responses, such as the man on a diet who also likes rich foods. 
Abelson describes the cognitive response to such contradictions as falling into one of four 
categories – denial, bolstering, differentiation, or transcendence. In denial, one or both of 
the contradictory images is denied, as in the man on a diet saying he never liked rich 
foods anyway. Bolstering occurs when the person relates one of the contradictory images 
to other values to increase that image’s value and reduce the imbalance which can be 
represented by the man rationalizing that rich foods make him happier, and happiness is 
after all healthy. Differentiation involves splitting one of the images and identifying with 
a piece of it, such as the man saying his diet only requires avoiding rich desserts, but rich 
entrees are okay. Finally, transcendence involves combining or integrating the opposing 
images into one larger image to resolve the dilemma, as in the man deciding that a 
healthy diet and the tastiness of rich foods are both valued and can be balanced.  
Each of these responses can be adapted to the peacekeeping context to address the 
belief dilemma that arises between a person’s peacekeeper and warrior identities. In the 
first case of denial, the soldier on a peacekeeping mission who employs a warrior strategy 
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has denied their peacekeeper identity. For the second response of bolstering, soldiers may 
justify strategies that involve using force with the idea that such actions are in the interest 
of a greater good, such as restoring peace or ending civilian suffering. Thirdly, the 
differentiation response may involve soldiers relating the peacekeeper role to one that 
requires a soldier’s characteristics of obedience and discipline. Finally, the fourth 
response of transcendence becomes evident in soldiers that view both fighting and 
peacekeeping as equally important strategies in their job and personal interests (Franke, 
1999). 
From the perspective of culture, peacekeepers’ belief dilemmas involve 
potentially conflicting identity images of the self in the home country culture and the self 
in the host country culture. The peacekeeper response to such cultural belief dilemmas is 
well-represented in the spectrum of intercultural sensitivity shown in Figure 7.1 (Bennett, 
1993). Bennett’s model explains how people discriminate and experience cultural 
differences along a continuum which parallels Abelson’s four response modes expanding 
the denial and transcendence responses into two orientations each. In this model, there is 
a spectrum of cultural sensitivity that people move through based on the assumption that 
as one’s experience of cultural difference becomes deeper, one’s competence in 
intercultural relations increases (Hammer, Bennett, & Wiseman, 2003). The spectrum 
moves through six orientations, with the three lower orientations conceptualized as 
ethnocentric, and the three upper orientations conceptualized as ethnorelative. 
 
Figure 7.1. Spectrum of intercultural sensitivity 
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The first three orientations on the spectrum are denial, defense, and minimization, 
each in the ethnocentric section, meaning that one’s own culture is the primary 
determinant of reality (Hammer et al., 2003). In denial, one’ own culture is viewed as the 
only real one, and other cultures are generally not discriminated. People in cultural denial 
are not interested in understanding cultural difference and will react strongly to eliminate 
such difference if it is brought to their attention. In the extreme case, those in cultural 
denial view those of other cultures as somehow less than human and not deserving of 
equal human rights. In the defense stage, people do discriminate the differences between 
cultures but defend their own culture as the only viable one in an “us” versus “them” 
mode. The other culture is viewed in stereotypes with no real depth of understanding. 
People in cultural defense mode feel threatened by the other culture and must position 
their culture as the superior one. Both the denial and defense stages align with Abelson’s 
original denial mode where one of the contradictory images is eliminated. In 
minimization, cultural differences are minimized with the idea that one’s own cultural 
worldview is really universal. Cultural differences are obscured in the quest to find 
similarities such as the biological nature of the human being, basic needs, or common 
motivations. This approach tends to trivialize other cultures and perhaps even obscure the 
fact that the individual belongs to a specific culture himself or herself. The feeling of 
universality of their own cultural beliefs causes them to often correct others behaviors to 
try to align them with their own. The minimization approach is similar to Abelson’s 
bolstering response where one’s own culture is raised in importance and scope. 
The next three orientations on the spectrum are acceptance, adaptation, and 
integration, each in the ethnorelative section, meaning that one’s own culture is 
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understood in the context of other cultures (Hammer et al., 2003). In the acceptance 
orientation, people see their own culture as just one of many cultural worldviews. They 
are able to differentiate the aspects of their own culture and other cultures, and they can 
experience other cultures as valid. Acceptance does not mean agreement, and in fact 
other cultures may sometimes be viewed negatively, but acceptance does mean that those 
from other cultures are accepted as equally human. The acceptance stage aligns with 
Abelson’s differentiation response where aspects of the image of other cultures can be 
broken down into pieces, some of which will be in agreement with one’s own culture and 
some of which will not. In the adaptation stage, people expand their worldview and are 
able to shift cultural frames and behave in ways appropriate to another culture. People at 
this stage may consider themselves bicultural or multicultural with the ability to take on 
the perspective of a different culture depending on the situation. Finally, in the 
integration stage, a person’s self-concept includes movement in and out of different 
cultural worldviews with self-identity tied to more than one culture. Both the adaptation 
and integration stage are part of Abelson’s transcendence response where cultural images 
are integrated into one larger identity. 
In the Bennett model, the ethnocentric orientations can be described as ways of 
avoiding cultural difference, and the ethnorelative orientations are ways of seeking 
cultural difference. Those that have moved into the ethnorelative areas of the spectrum 
are seen as having more potential to exercise intercultural competence. A peace 
professional with an academic background in peace studies or cultural awareness training 
and a self-regulating internal control mechanism such as the code of conduct for blue 
helmets is more likely to be accepting of other cultural worldviews. The peacekeeper 
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with field experience under this code of conduct is more likely to be able to adapt and 
integrate cultural views effectively between in-groups and out-groups. It is this notion of 
cultural competence in the trained and experienced peacekeeper that will be developed 
into testable hypotheses in the next section. 
Hypotheses for Peacekeeper Decision-Making 
Based on Bennett’s model of intercultural sensitivity, I expect that the participants 
from the sample of peace professionals in this study will be farther along on the 
ethnocentric-ethnorelative spectrum than the undergraduate student participants. The 
training, course work, and exposure to peace studies will impact peoples’ decision-
making approaches to overcome cultural constraints. A comparison will be made between 
the Ghanaian student (at UCC) and the Ghanaian peace professional (at KAIPTC) to 
observe how their approaches differ, and a comparison will also be made within the 
peace professionals sample to determine the effect of the amount of field experience on 
the decision making process. Although the vignette does not call out different cultures, it 
does specify different in-groups and out-groups in the form of the protesters, miners, and 
company management. The cross-cultural (or in-group/out-group) problem is whether or 
not to reveal the names of the protesters who are sabotaging the mine in an attempt to get 
better benefits from the company management. How would the peace professional and 
the experienced peacekeeper approach this intergroup conflict? I hypothesize that peace 
professionals will be less dependent in their style and take a more problem-solving 
approach than students. Also, I expect to find that experienced peacekeepers will be more 
likely to cross in-group/out-group boundaries in order to solve the problem. The 
hypotheses tested in this context are:  
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H5: Peace professionals are less dependent in their decision-making style than 
university students. 
H6: Peace professionals are more likely to focus on problem solving in their 
response to the saboteur problem than university students. 
H7: Peacekeepers with more field experience are more likely to go outside of the 
in-group for aid in solving the saboteur problem. 
 The dependent variable for H5 is decision-making style which is operationalized 
with the GDMS scale as previously defined. The dependent variable for H6 is “focus on 
problem solving” which is operationalized qualitatively through the coding of answers to 
the open-ended question which provides rationale for the decision. For both H5 and H6, 
the independent variable is peace professional status versus university student status, and 
the KAIPTC versus UCC samples are used in those analyses. The dependent variable for 
H7 is “going outside of in-group for aid” which is also operationalized through the 
coding of open-ended responses. The independent variable for H7 is peacekeeping field 
experience which is taken from KAIPTC data sample and the demographic of how many 
peacekeeping missions the participant has been on. The next chapter will take a closer 
look at the KAIPTC data sample and test these hypotheses regarding peace professionals 
and their propensity toward ethnorelative problem-solving. 
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CHAPTER 8 
DECISION-MAKING OF PEACEKEEPRS 
The three hypotheses established in the previous chapter will be tested with 
quantitative and qualitative analyses on data collected from the university students in 
Ghana and personnel at the Kofi Annan Center in Ghana. The results are expected to 
show that the Ghanaian peace professionals are less dependent in their decision-making 
style and more focused on problem-solving than the Ghanaian student population. Also, 
Ghanaian peacekeepers with more experience on peacekeeping missions are expected to 
be more likely to go outside of the defined in-group to solve the problem. This is an 
indication that the peacekeeping community, ostensibly by virtue of their training and 
experience, are further along on the intercultural sensitivity spectrum and make decisions 
in a more ethnorelative way.  
Defining the Samples of Peace Professionals 
The data sample of peace personnel used in this chapter consists of 120 
participants from the Kofi Annan Peacekeeping Training Center (KAIPTC) located in 
Accra, Ghana. The personnel include research and training staff at the Center, students 
from the Masters in Conflict Peace and Security program, students from peace and 
security courses, and students from the course designed for police officers about to be 
deployed to peacekeeping missions. All KAIPTC participants are part of the sample of 
“peace professionals” that will be compared with the sample from UCC which consists of 
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204 undergraduate students as described in Chapter 5. Figure 8.1 shows how the two 
samples will be compared when testing hypotheses H5 and H6 which distinguishes 
between those with background in peace studies and those without.   
 
Figure 8.1 Sample populations used for comparison in hypotheses H5 and H6 
KAIPTC respondents were then separated into two categories based on their field 
experience. Personnel who had no experience on peacekeeping missions were put into the 
category of “non-peacekeepers”, and those who had been on one or more peacekeeping 
missions were put into the category of experienced “peacekeepers”.  Figure 8.2 shows a 
summary of the sources of the respondents and how they were mapped to the two 
categories. The “non-peacekeepers” represent those with an academic background in 
peace studies or participation in peacekeeping courses but no field experience. The 
“peacekeepers” represent those with field experience on peacekeeping missions and 
therefore with exposure to the blue helmet code of conduct. The “non-peacekeepers” and 
“peacekeepers” are compared when testing hypothesis H7. 
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Figure 8.2.Samples from KAIPTC used for comparison in hypothesis H7 
Decision-Making Style of Peacekeepers 
 H5 anticipates that peace professionals are less dependent in their decision-
making style than university students. In order to test this hypothesis, I examine the 
attributes of decision-making style as shown in Table 8.1, in addition to the individualist-
collectivist attributes for context. It can be seen that the peace professionals are slightly 
less collectivist, 1.2 times as much, but significantly less dependent in their decision 
making. University students are twice as likely to be dependent in their decision-making, 
at the alpha=.01 significance level. There is little difference shown in the rational 
decision style or level of individualism. Both samples come from the same collectivist 
society, Ghana, pointing to other aspects as the explanation for the difference in style 
which likely comes from broader life experience due to age and exposure to other 
cultures and cross-cultural issues through the study of peace and peacekeeping. 
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Table 8.1 
KAIPTC Versus UCC Style Attributes 
Attribute KAIPTC 
(N=120) 
UCC 
(N=204) 
X
2  
(p-value) 
High Individualism 54% 64% 2.9 
(0.09)* 
Collectivism 73% 87% 10.2 
(0.001)*** 
Rational Decision Making Style 92% 97% 4.7 
(0.03)** 
Dependent Decision Making Style 38% 73% 36.8 
(0.001)*** 
***=significant at .01; **=significant at .05; *=significant at .1 
Problem-Solving Evidence 
 H6 anticipates that peace professionals are more likely to focus on problem 
solving in their response to the saboteur problem than students. In order to test this 
hypothesis, I examine the responses to the first problem posed in the vignette. At first, it 
appears that the responses of peace professionals and students are the same, because in 
both samples participants chose to reveal the names of the saboteurs to the company’s 
management about thirty percent of the time (27% for KAIPTC and 36% for UCC). For 
the majority of participants who chose to keep the names of the saboteurs quiet, what was 
their motivation? A comparison of the justification factors shown in Table 8.2 reveals a 
difference in the frequency of the “solve in group” factor. For KAIPTC participants, this 
factor was cited 20% of the time, more than three times as often as for UCC participants. 
Undergraduate students from UCC who chose to keep the names quiet did so out of a 
desire to protect the saboteurs’ livelihood and generally avoid betrayal. These participants 
wrote most often about loyalty to their colleagues, mistrust of the company president, and 
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protecting jobs. In only 3% of the responses is the notion of leadership expressed in an 
effort to solve the problem. On the other hand, the responses from the KAIPTC 
participants frequently point out the responsibility of leadership for their in-group (the 
protesters), and as the leader, how they would attempt to resolve the problem of the 
saboteurs by speaking with them directly and not involving outsiders. The notion of 
leadership effecting the decision occurs three times more often in the KAIPTC responses 
than the UCC responses. Here are some example responses from the peacekeepers that 
chose not to reveal the names of the saboteurs, because they wanted to solve the problem 
within the group as the leader: 
 “This is something I personally have to handle at my level as a leader. I do not 
have to betray the cause of my following even though I do not agree with their 
modus operandi.” 
 “Because, as a leader, my duties are to protect the members. I will continue to 
talk to them but never tell it to Mr. Owusu.” 
 “As the leader of the BFA, I am ultimately responsible for the actions of my 
team. I need to control the actions of members of my team or dissolve their 
membership as not representing the ideals and vision of the team.” 
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Table 8.2 
KAIPTC Frequency Distribution of Justification Factors for Telling or Not 
Factor Codebook Description KAIPTC 
(N=99) 
UCC 
(N=179) 
X
2  
(p-value) 
Miner Safety Concern for safety of other miners. 12% 13% 0.03 
(0.861) 
Saboteurs May 
Lose Jobs 
Concern that saboteurs would lose 
their jobs or otherwise get into 
trouble. 
15% 18% 0.3 
(0.562) 
Moral Reasons Because it's the "right" or "fair" 
thing to do.  Mentions personal 
values, ethics, morals, or not lying. 
5% 7% 0.5 
(0.473) 
Sabotage Was 
Justified 
The sabotage was understandable 
based on the saboteurs’ desperate 
position.  Or the sabotage was 
effective in getting the deal. In 
other words, it worked. 
4% 5% N/R 
President 
Responsible 
Considers company President 
responsible for the situation and/or 
responsible to investigate the 
sabotage himself.  Or doesn't trust 
the President. 
8% 15% 2.5 
(0.116) 
Not My 
Business 
Not my place or not my business 
to tell. 
0% 2% N/R 
Solve In Group Wants to convince the saboteurs to 
stop himself/herself or within the 
group of protesting miners. 
20% 6% 14.1 
(0.001)*** 
Betrays Group Considers telling a betrayal of the 
group. 
18% 14% 0.9 
(0.352) 
For Company 
Benefit 
Has best interest of 
company/management at heart.  
Loyalty to company/management. 
7% 8% 0.1 
(0.821) 
Protect Self Concern for their own position or 
family. 
5% 3% N/R 
Other Other stated reason. 5% 3%  
***=significant at .01; **=significant at .05; *=significant at .1 
N/R:Not reported because Chi-squared may be distorted due to less than 5 cases in a cell 
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 Additionally, twenty percent of the “solve in group” responses from KAIPTC 
participants add a condition that would cause them to eventually take the issue outside of 
the in-group in order to bring resolution. This could be to company management or the 
police, as shown in these examples written by KAIPTC participants: 
 “[I] would warn them to stop the sabotage. After the third time I would tell on 
them.” 
 “I will engage them on the disadvantages of their actions and let them know I 
will tell the police if they refuse to stop sabotaging the mines.” 
 “Not at this moment until these miners understand that sabotage is not the best 
option but continue negotiating with them. If they still refuse and go on 
sabotaging I will tell them my decision to report them.” 
This conditional revealing of the names is indicative of a group of responses in-
between the “tell” and “do not tell” decision, even though this is not offered as an option 
on the survey. Summing up the responses including this condition would change the 
overall results of the peacekeepers decisions to 68% “do not tell”, 27% “tell”, and 5% 
“conditional tell”. The notion of a conditional revealing of the names only appeared once 
in all of the UCC student responses, less than one percent of the time. This raises the 
question: what factors within the peacekeeper community pushed people into the last two 
categories, both of which involve some consideration for involving parties outside of the 
in-group? Hypothesis H7 assumes that peacekeeper field experience is the explanatory 
factor, and this will be discussed in the next section. 
 
 
125 
 
Involving Parties Outside of the In-Group 
In order to test hypothesis H7 that anticipates peacekeepers with more field 
experience are more likely to go outside of the in-group for aid in solving the saboteur 
problem, I start with a quantitative analysis. The dependent variable of going outside the 
in-group is represented by the decision to reveal the names of the saboteurs. The 
independent variable, peacekeeping field experience, is represented by the number of 
peacekeeping missions the peacekeeper has been on. Results of the bivariate analysis of 
the decision to reveal and peacekeeping experience are shown in Table 8.3.  
Table 8.3 
Decision to Reveal Names of Saboteurs by Peacekeeping Experience 
Decision to Reveal No Peacekeeping 
Missions 
1 or More 
Peacekeeping 
Missions 
Total 
Don’t Reveal Name 56 
(84.8%) 
18 
(54.5%) 
74 
Reveal Names 10 
(15.2%) 
15 
(45.5%) 
25 
Total 66 
(100%) 
33 
(100%) 
99 
X
2
 = 10.7 ; df = 1; p= .001 
Interpreting across the dependent row, we see that 46% of peacekeepers with field 
experience chose to reveal saboteur names compared to only 15% for peacekeepers 
without field experience. The likelihood of revealing the names of the saboteurs is much 
higher for experienced peacekeepers – about three times higher, in fact. The odds of 
revealing the names for experienced peacekeepers are 15:18 and for peacekeepers 
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without experience are 10:56 giving an odds ratio of 4.7. Peacekeepers with mission 
experience have 4.7 times the odds of revealing the names compared to those without 
mission experience. The chi-square value of 10.7 gives statistical evidence to reject the 
null hypothesis of no difference between the two groups at the alpha=0.01 significance 
level. 
 The peacekeepers who chose to reveal the saboteurs’ names justified their 
responses with concerns for the broader community including those outside of the in-
group of miners. They wrote about concern for the safety of all company workers, about 
concern for collapse of the company, and the impact of the development of the entire 
town if the company were to fail. For example, peacekeepers wrote the following: 
 “It will avert any future calamity which may claim lives and cause more 
financial loss to the company.” 
 “Because the mine is the only source of income for the community and the 
more damage to it will affect all.” 
 “If I don’t own who is sabotaging the mine, the entire village stand a chance of 
losing their job and also stop development in the village.” 
The consideration of the social group that extends beyond the company, namely 
the development of the entire town, is not expressed in any of the UCC student responses 
and is only expressed in peacekeeper responses. 
Discussion of Findings 
 In sum, responses to the saboteur problem presented in the vignette reveal that the 
peacekeepers at KAIPTC are more prone to problem solving and out-group inclusion in 
situations of conflict. The first hypothesis on use of a problem-solving approach involves 
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a comparison between the peace professionals from KAIPTC and students without 
background in peace studies from UCC. Although the choice to reveal names or not is 
about the same between the two samples, the justification factors are quite different based 
on content analysis of the open-ended responses. When choosing not to reveal the 
saboteur names, the KAIPTC peace professionals are more likely to attempt to resolve 
the sabotage within the in-group of protesters and are more likely to add the condition 
that if their in-group attempt failed, they would reach out to out-groups for assistance. 
The responsibility of leadership is also more prevalent in the peace professional group 
than the student group. Although these responses do lend support to the hypothesis that 
peace professionals are more focused on problem-solving, these results should be treated 
with caution because the two samples are not directly comparable due to the age 
difference. The focus on problem-solving could come with age, rather than with peace 
and security background. Future research could help to resolve this dilemma; however, it 
may be difficult to find comparable age groups between peacekeepers and non-
peacekeepers that are also comparable on all other demographics. 
 The second hypothesis that more experienced peacekeepers would be more likely 
to involve out-groups in problem-solving was tested within the KAIPTC sample only. 
Analysis shows that those with field experience on peacekeeping missions are three times 
more likely to reveal the names of saboteurs than those with no field experience, thereby 
involving out-groups in the problem resolution. Considerations of the company as a 
whole and the development of the entire town are taken into account in the justification 
factors in these cases, and there is openness to involving company management as well as 
the police. In terms of Bennett’s model of intercultural sensitivity (discussed in Chapter 
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8), peacekeeping experience moves a person further along the spectrum toward more 
ethnorelative traits with the use of adaptive and integrative approaches. 
Combining the results of both hypotheses reveals a general progression in 
intercultural sensitivity as peacekeeping training and experience occurs. As responses are 
compared across non-peacekeepers (students), peace professionals, and experienced 
peacekeepers the results show a trend of problem avoidance, ethnocentric problem-
solving, and ethnorelative problem solving respectively. At one end of the spectrum, 
denial and defense are dominant among UCC students as respondents chose not to reveal 
the saboteurs’ names simply due to a desire to maintain jobs and keep people out of 
trouble. Toward the middle of the spectrum, minimization and adaptation occur, as more 
experienced respondents attempt to solve the problem at hand within the in-group or 
conditionally going outside of the in-group. Finally, the most experienced respondents 
are at the far end of the spectrum where acceptance and integration enable their choice to 
involve out-groups in the problem resolution.  
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CHAPTER 9 
CONCLUSIONS 
The main conclusion drawn from the analysis in this study is that cultural norms 
and values do indeed impact the decision-making process in situations of conflict. A 
quasi-experimental decision-making survey was administered to undergraduate students 
in two countries that differ significantly in measures of individualism and collectivism: 
the U.S. and Ghana. A comparison between the responses of the two sample groups 
shows an impact of culture from each of the three approaches: individual, societal, and 
situated. At an individual level, evidence indicates that those who are more collectivist in 
their traits tend to be more dependent in their decision-making. At a societal level, 
comparison between countries reveals that Ghanaian students are more likely to protect 
the interests of their inner social identity groups, and American students are more likely 
to make decisions based on perceived merit. At a situated level, data supports the 
hypothesis that a feeling of familiarity with the setting of the situation tends to produce 
more cooperative decisions with a focus on peace. 
The quasi-experimental survey was carried over into a third sample of peace 
professionals in Ghana. Ghanaian peace professionals are generally more focused on 
problem-solving in their approaches to the vignette in the survey, possibly due to  
professional experience in peace operations or due to the general professional experience 
(age) of the individual. This area could be further explored in future research with sample 
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populations that are more comparable in age, life, and professional experiences to see if 
peace experience particularly correlates to problem-solving focus. What is clear from this 
analysis is that the more field experience peacekeepers have, the more likely they are to 
go outside of the inner social group in search of solutions to the problem. Ghanaian 
peacekeepers are further along on the spectrum of intercultural sensitivity than Ghanian 
university students, and they show more ethnorelative responses as a result (Bennett, 
1993). The ethnorelative responses are more likely to be successful in the operational 
tasks of peacekeeping, because those tasks require functioning in a multi-cultural and 
multi-ethnic environment where all problem-solving alternatives should be fully 
considered without the constraints of the peacekeeper’s own cultural background. 
Some of the common limitations of cross-cultural studies such as cultural 
attribution fallacy and lack of equivalence were overcome in this study through the use of 
vignettes and the careful comparison of sample demographics. Some limitations to the 
validity of this study do, however, remain. The lack of randomness in the sampling 
method limits the ability to generalize results to a large population. Generalizability is 
also limited due to the use of university students as participants, because they do not 
represent the general public. However, it is common to use university students in cross-
cultural studies, because they provide reasonably comparable samples across countries 
with few demographic differences outside of culture (Matsumoto & Yoo, 2006). Also, 
there is value in considering the responses of university students, because they represent 
the future elite and are more likely to be in decision-making positions later in life. 
The strong support for many of the hypotheses in this study has broad 
implications for the fields of decision theory and peacekeeping. In this conclusion 
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section, I will discuss the theoretical, practical, and methodological implications of this 
research. First, I discuss the enhancements to decision theory that can be made with a 
focus on improving the poliheuristic model with cultural relevance. Then, I discuss the 
practical implications by applying results to the fields of international negotiations and 
peacekeeping.  Finally, I discuss methodological implications of the vignette approach 
used in this study and how it can be expanded in future research. 
A Culturally-Constrained Decision Model 
The cross-cultural differences in responses of participants at the individual, 
societal, and situated levels of culture lend strong support to the impact of cultural 
constraints on the decision-making process as shown in the framework in Figure 4.2. The 
culturally varied responses of participants do not however mean that there is an absence 
of logical thought during the decision-making process. The poliheuristic model provides 
a foundation for combining cultural constraints with rational thought through the two-
stage process model. In the first stage of the poliheuristic model, cultural norms and 
values constrain decisions by setting priorities to be used in the second stage and in some 
cases by eliminating certain choices completely. In the second stage, a logical process is 
used to sort through any remaining alternatives based on the priorities that have been set. 
For example, an American student may believe that each individual should look out for 
himself or herself and that merit is the ultimate priority in making choices, and therefore, 
he or she looks at the mining protest situation from a merit based point of view and 
logically decides that the protesters have shown the most initiative and have earned the 
benefits offered in the deal. A Ghanaian student may believe that loyalty to the social in-
group is the ultimate priority, so betraying the broader mining population is eliminated as 
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an option. From there the logical choice, in fact the only choice, is to decline the deal. A 
Ghanaian peacekeeper may value in-group loyalty but ultimately prioritizes peaceful 
problem resolution, so the logical decision is to attempt to resolve the problem within the 
social in-group but be willing to go outside that in-group if necessary to bring peace. 
Clearly not all people in each category respond in exactly the same way, for each 
person experiences culture uniquely. This study organized the aspects of cultural norms 
and values into three distinct areas: (1) individual traits, (2) societal influence, and (3) 
situated context. Empirical results from the U.S./Ghana comparison reveal distinct effects 
in each of these three categories leading to a cultural configuration for the first stage of 
the poliheuristic decision model. This enhanced two-stage model provided a framework 
for exploring, measuring, and comparing the different cultural constraints across the 
cultures of the U.S. and Ghana and can provide a framework for exploring additional 
countries and cultures in the future. 
The cultural differences in the process of decision-making discovered in this 
study support the need to reassess approaches that assume universal applicability such as 
conflict resolution techniques steeped in Western tradition, the rational choice model for 
decision-making, and elements of behavioral decision theory that presume universal 
behaviors.  Although the poliheuristic model makes room for non-universal factors in the 
first-stage of cognitive processing where various heuristics may be applied, culture is not 
directly called out in the model. My study creates a culturally specific expansion of the 
poliheuristic model by explicitly adding in the constraints of culture in the cognitive 
processing stage. In this model culture is represented in a way that expands on Hofstede’s 
values based approach, which is only at the societal level. By adding in the individual 
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level and the situated level, culture is more representative of the uniqueness of 
individuals and the situations in which they find themselves. 
Implications for Cross-Cultural Negotiations 
 The cultural constraints on decision-making discovered in this study have broad 
implications for the understanding of how culture influences the interactions of people 
particularly in the context of international negotiations. First, the finding on dependent 
decision-making styles for collectivists is important for those who work in cross-cultural 
negotiations and mediation. When bringing parties together to form an agreement, one 
has to consider the cultural characteristics of the individuals at the table. Based on the 
results of this study, mediators should not anticipate that collectivists will make 
significant decisions without the involvement of others in their group. In such cases, it 
will be important to consider group priorities and avoid pinning down collectivist 
participants for independent decisions. Collectivists have a dependent decision-making 
style, which means they will naturally seek the advice of others in their in-group and will 
be heavily influenced by them. However, involving a large group in support of the 
collectivist decision-maker is not likely to yield the optimal decision, because the effect 
of groupthink may ensue. The theory of groupthink states that in-group cohesion and 
loyalties will influence people to make decisions in order to prioritize consensus within 
the identity group leading to low quality or incorrect decisions (Esser, 1998; Schafer & 
Crichlow, 2010). What is a negotiator or mediator to do when faced with a strong 
collectivist at the table? The best path would be to recognize the dependent style of the 
participant and find ways to address that participant’s group concerns without actually 
bringing in a large group. This could be done by emphasizing precedent of previous 
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decisions made by other group members or providing a mechanism for the participant to 
seek advice from a limited number of people in their group. 
Secondly, the nature of the society one lives in informs the decision making 
process with a strong sense of loyalty to the in-group emerging from those from a 
collectivist society and a focus on individual merit arising in an individualist society. This 
result suggests that collectivist societies are less prone to accepting external intervention 
and are not motivated by individual achievement or reward. The humanitarian mission to 
Somalia in the 1990s is a prime example of this tendency and how it can cause 
significantly disruptive outcomes. The U.S soldiers on Somalia mission had a very 
different experience than the soldiers who went on the hurricane relief mission to Florida. 
The individualist society in Florida in the U.S. had no problem accepting assistance and 
welcomed the soldiers warmly. However, members of the collectivist society in Somalia 
resented the outside intervention, particularly from a society so far removed from their 
own. The Somali people did not welcome the U.S. soldiers but instead refused their aid 
and often lashed out against them.  
For mediators, it becomes crucial that they not be seen as outsiders when working 
in collectivist societies. When possible, mediators should have some connection with all 
parties at the table, particularly when any are from collectivist societies. Ideally the 
connection will not favor any individual party but will be part of a “super-identity”, an 
identity group that all parties feel a part of. It is always possible to find some super-
identity, as shown in the concentric circles of overlapping identity in Figure 4.1.  
However, if the only common ground is too far out in the circle diagram, such as at the 
“humanity” level, then the potency of the identity group affiliation may be too weak to 
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make any difference. Intervention in Somalia, for example, may require a lead mediator 
that identifies as Somali equally with other parties and factions without showing any 
loyalty to a particular faction. Intervention in the civil war in Syria, another collectivist 
society (Hofstede, 1980), may also require a collectivist-sensitive approach. As an 
example, compare the efforts of leading diplomat and peacemaker Kofi Annan in Syria 
versus his efforts in the Bakassi peninsula territory dispute between Nigeria and 
Cameroon. Mr. Annan was highly successful in the Nigeria/Cameroon case where he, a 
Ghanaian, and the leaders of both Nigeria and Cameroon all lived in regional proximity 
in the western part of Africa.  On the other hand, Mr. Annan had no strong identity 
connection with the conflicting parties in the case of Syria, and his attempts at conflict 
resolution there were frustrated and unsuccessful. Although there were many factors at 
play in each of these conflict resolution cases, the identity of the lead mediator as an 
insider or outsider likely played a significant part in the decision-making of local parties. 
Thirdly, my analysis indicates that the familiarity of the cultural setting can 
influence decision-making processes with more familiarity leading to a tendency to 
cooperate. Applying this result to the field of negotiations implies that mediators and 
negotiators should attempt to create an aura of cultural familiarity for parties in order to 
elicit the most cooperative responses from them. This notion may contradict the 
traditional idea of the “home field advantage” in negotiations. Just as any sports team 
prefers to play at home in comfortable and familiar surroundings with support from local 
fans, many negotiators prefer to negotiate at home. Being in familiar surroundings has the 
advantage of avoiding discomforts of foreign territory and the distractions that 
accompany them. Traditionally, the last place negotiators want to negotiate is on the 
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other party’s home field. Yet, if one is negotiating with people from collectivist societies, 
the findings of this study indicate that the best place to negotiate is actually on the home 
field of the collectivist party in order to induce more cooperative behavior from them. 
Implications for Peacekeeping Operations 
Results supported that peacekeepers with more field experience are more likely to 
go outside of the in-group for aid in problem-solving, showing a higher level of 
intercultural sensitivity that allowed them to break through some of the cultural 
constraints of decision-making. This is an indicator of the overall effectiveness of the 
culturally sensitive approach to peacekeeping. While Ghanaian students demonstrate a 
more ethnocentric response and a reluctance to go outside of their social in-group for 
help, Ghanaian peacekeepers in this sample demonstrate a more ethnorelative response 
with the ability to break through this limitation and consider problem solutions that 
would involve out-group members. The peacekeepers’ ability to break from cultural 
constraints on decision-making may be due in part to the awareness training they have 
received including exposure to the UN peacekeeper’s code of conduct as a mechanism of 
informal control. This code of conduct is part of the training at KAIPTC, and all 
uniformed peacekeepers who have gone on UN missions have gone through that training 
and received the pocket card of ten rules of conduct.  
Future research may explore in more detail the effect of informal control 
mechanisms on different cultures. Do tangible methods of informal control, such as 
written guidelines or cue cards, break through the cultural constraints on decision-
making? More importantly, do different types of informal control work better in different 
cultural environments? For example, based on the research done here, the group-focused 
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nature of collectivist cultures would more likely be influenced by mechanisms built 
around collective identity, such as the “blue helmet” identifier and the common code of 
conduct adopted by that group. Are individualist cultures equally influenced by such 
mechanisms? Individualist cultures are probably more influenced by a self-focused 
approach such as regular self-evaluation of defined measures of superior conduct along 
with individual recognition for good performance. 
In addition to the training aspects of peacekeeping, the results in this study have 
implications for the formation of peacekeeping teams. The finding that familiarity of 
setting induces more cooperation implies that it is best to deploy peacekeepers from 
collectivist societies to conflict settings in collectivist societies because their familiarity 
will aid their effectiveness. Likewise, individualists are best deployed to conflict setting 
in individualist societies. The MINUGUA peacekeeping mission to Guatemala showed 
the value of aligning cultural traits by populating much of their staff with national 
indigenous people. The indigenous staff was able to take testimony from local people 
who felt comfortable to freely express themselves with those who spoke their native 
language and understood their culture particularly in rural settings (Jonas, 2000). While 
many Guatemalans welcomed the presence of the MINUGUA team, there were resisters 
within the Guatemalan government who openly criticized the MINUGUA efforts and 
continuously tried to restrict the mission’s mandate. The mission was at times viewed as 
clearly tied to the UN in New York and an unwanted outside intervention (Jonas, 2000). 
The mission was ultimately successful in implementing peace accords despite these 
occasional setbacks with resisters, which could possibly have been avoided with a 
different team composition. 
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Methodological Implications 
The field of international conflict theory has recognized the value of considering 
cultural variation in applications of conflict management such as cross-cultural 
negotiations and interactive conflict resolution, yet little research has been done to date to 
understand the implications of cultural variation on individual decision making processes. 
The results of this research lead to the conclusion that there are cultural constraints that 
have an effect on the decision making process. The research in this study can be 
expanded in future work along two main paths: varying the sample populations and 
building on the vignette methodology. I will discuss each of these two expansions 
separately. 
First, the survey instrument developed for this research can be used with other 
sample populations from different locations and with different demographics. Further 
research is warranted in other locations of the world, as this study was limited to just the 
U.S. and Ghana in an initial cross-country comparison. Incorporating other countries that 
have similarities and differences in key cultural dimensions would allow for further 
comparisons and refinement of the conceptual model. In addition, conducting follow-up 
research on non-student populations within the same country would allow for an 
informative within-country comparison to highlight different cultural constraints between 
populations aside from the country location factor. This study included a sample 
population of peacekeepers in Ghana to compare with Ghanaian students. It would be 
useful to conduct the same survey on peacekeepers at a U.S. peacekeeping training 
facility for a comparison with U.S. students to determine if a similar increase in 
intercultural sensitivity occurs. It would then also be possible to compare the U.S. 
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peacekeeper sample with the Ghanaian peacekeeper sample to determine if the 
differences seen between U.S. and Ghanaian students are evident in the peacekeeper. It 
would also be essential to compare the training approaches used in the U.S. and Ghana to 
see how different the approaches may be and how those differences impact the decision-
making process.  
Second, the vignette-based approach used in this study provided an effective tool 
for quantitatively capturing decisions and qualitatively exploring the cognitive process 
behind those decisions. Vignettes are a useful tool for overcoming the issue of culturally-
varied interpretation of survey questions and are particularly useful in the study of values, 
norms, and culture. The vignette used in this research was unique in the way that it 
captured the layers of social identity groups within the story line and made them salient 
with the decision choices presented. As a consequence, the responses to the open-ended 
questions were rich in information to describe and understand the cognitive decision 
processing of the comparative groups. The responses were almost exclusively written in 
the first person and indicated how clearly the participants were able to identify with the 
character and the situation. In fact, the responses appeared to be so internalized that the 
independent coders were initially confused as to whether the respondents were speaking 
of their own real-life situation or the fictional story. The power of this particular vignette 
came from its realism so that the participants could relate to it, its brevity so that they did 
not tire of reading it, and its built-in dilemmas that intrigued and impassioned them.  
The success of the vignette model in the study of cultural constraints can be 
expanded further into the realm of games. A vignette is essentially a simulation of a real 
world event that puts the participants in a situation to comment on how the event affects 
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them. In essence, the participant is playing a role that is given to them. The role-playing 
nature of the vignette requires a certain “suspension of disbelief” in order for the 
participant to immerse himself or herself into the scenario and reveal information about 
the experience (Perla & McGrady, 2011). The vignette approach, which is one of simple 
interaction between the participant and the story, can be expanded to add the element of 
interaction between participants in order to enhance the experience and reveal further 
information about groups, societies, and culture. By adding the element of human 
interaction to the role-playing vignette technique, the methodology becomes one of game 
play. 
The term “game” brings various ideas to mind ranging from the child’s board 
game of Candyland, to card games such as poker, to the wildly popular world of video 
games. At the heart of any game is the notion of “play” which was defined by Huizinga 
in 1938 with the notion of the magic circle (Huizinga, 1950). The magic circle is a 
socially constructed barrier around games. Within the circle, certain norms and rules are 
voluntarily accepted as absolute and set the game play apart from every-day life. For 
example, within a boxing ring, it is acceptable to knock another person unconscious 
whereas in every-day life this could get a person arrested. In a less physical game such as 
chess, a boss and an employee can play as equals without one having to take direction 
from the other. The magic circle provides a forum for socialization and learning but also 
a safe place for trying out new behaviors (Sutton-Smith, 1998). The magic circle of game 
play also provides a mechanism for observing human interaction and has great potential 
for revealing new knowledge on culture and decision-making.   
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Game play can be used as a data collection tool much like the vignette method 
allowing for collection of both quantitative and qualitative data. By observing the game 
play and the moves made by players, the researcher can gather information on actual 
decisions made. Qualitative data can be collected through surveys, interviews, or focus 
groups conducted with participants to understand their thought processes throughout the 
game. The additional element that game play brings over vignettes is the human 
interaction. Rather than just interacting with the story in a vignette, the participant 
interacts with other players, and more social aspects of the process are likely to be 
revealed. In order to investigate the cultural constraints on decision-making in future 
research, the game scenario and roles would be similar to the vignette scenario and roles 
with the introduction of rules for conducting negotiations, announcing decisions (moves), 
and allowing subsequent decisions (countermoves). The game could be played with 
participants of a single culture and also with cross-cultural participants to observe 
differences. 
The data collected from such game-play sessions can be used to further enhance 
the socially contextualized framework of culture and decision-making developed in this 
study. Computer-based modeling programs then become useful tools for representing the 
interactions between players and the constraints of culture on the movement (i.e. 
decisions) of the players based on a significant volume of data collected during the 
games. In order to obtain a large N from group game play, a large number of group game 
sessions would have to be run which does become costly and time-consuming. However, 
the use of custom on-line role-play games provides a nice alternative where players can 
still interact and decisions can be easily tracked by the computer. The face-to-face 
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interaction may be lost, but interaction still exists and it is easier to collect larger 
quantities of data for analysis.  
In sum, there are significant opportunities to build on the vignette-based approach 
in this study by taking the existing instrument to other countries and sample populations 
and to expand the vignette instrument into a game-based instrument to introduce 
interaction between participants and deepen our understanding of culture as a social 
phenomenon. Within the field of conflict management, future research should investigate 
decision theory specifically in the context of conflict resolution practices, peacekeeping 
strategy development, and pre-deployment troop training to assess the extent to which 
individuals with different demographic, professional or identity backgrounds make 
decisions on whether to fight or to cooperate. Central to any such analysis is the need to 
gain a thorough understanding of the deeper effects of culture on cognitive processing 
and decision-making. Only through such studies will we be able to help in heeding Erick 
Barronodo’s call to the youth of Guatemala, and understand why some youth choose to 
pick up guns and knives and others do not. Only through a culturally-informed model of 
decision theory will we be able to address the challenges raised by peacekeeping troops 
such as those in Guatemala, Somalia, and elsewhere as they pursue peace in highly multi-
cultural environments. 
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APPENDIX A 
FOUR VERSIONS OF THE CONFLICT VIGNETTE 
 
1. Individualist setting in the U.S. 
This section gives you a fictional scenario with a character that faces a decision.  Please read the 
story and the offer that has been made to the character, then answer the four questions. 
 
 
You are a miner who lives in a small town of about 4,000 people.   You don’t know many of your 
neighbors and you don’t have any family nearby, but you enjoy living in this quiet rural town 
where people keep mostly to themselves.  Polymetal Mining, Inc. has been the primary 
employer in the town for years, and you along with many of the townspeople work as miners for 
the company.  Life as a miner is hard, with long hours, very low pay, and numerous health risks, 
but it is the only option you have for making a living around here. 
 
Mr. Jones is the local president of Polymetal Mining, Inc., and is by far the most influential man 
in town.  Mr. Jones and the mine engineers are the local elite, living in large mansions and 
reaping in all the material benefits of their position and pay.  You have watched as Mr. Jones has 
grown the company to triple its size, providing a sound base for employment in the area.  While 
you appreciate the value the company’s success brings to the town, you don’t understand why 
you have seen no benefits personally.  You struggle to provide for your basic needs just as much 
as you did when you first started working here at the mines.   
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You and about 50 other miners have formed a protest group dedicated to gaining better pay and 
benefits for all 1000 miners who work at the company.  You call yourselves the BFA (Benefits for 
All), and you are the leader of the group.  The BFA’s primary objectives are to gain better pay, 
better working conditions, and job opportunities for miners to gain promotions. 
 
Peaceful demonstrations, petitions, and attempts at negotiating by the BFA have all failed to 
capture any attention from Mr. Jones and the management team.  The protesting miners are 
frustrated and angry.  Recently, a series of “accidents” have occurred in the mine, which appear 
to be some form of sabotage.  At first, one of the mine shaft elevators broke down.  Then the 
blower stopped working.  And now it has been determined that the support beams on the third 
level are insecure making that level inaccessible for safety reasons.   
 
Although nobody has been able to prove that these break-downs are being caused on purpose, 
you know that they are, because you have seen a couple of the BFA members going into the 
mine at odd hours.  When you confronted these two people, they admitted that they have been 
sabotaging the mine, because the other efforts of the BFA have not been working.  These two 
miners are in a more desperate situation than most, because one is in debt due to his sick 
mother and the other has huge medical bills to pay for his daughter.  You have spoken to them 
privately at length trying to convince them to stop the sabotage because they could end up 
endangering the lives of the other miners, but they refuse to listen. 
 
Mr. Jones is concerned about the series of break-downs and suspects sabotage, but rather than 
pursue an investigation, he has decided to negotiate with the BFA through you in the hopes that 
a deal will end the sabotage. 
 
Offer 
Mr.  Jones says that he will create a new company position with the title “Shift Team Leader”, 
and that all 50 members of the BFA will be promoted into these positions.  Along with the title 
come a pay increase and a better benefits package.  The other miners, however, will receive no 
increase in pay or benefits.  Also, the Shift Team Leaders must disband the BFA and are no 
longer allowed to participate in any protest groups as part of their management positions. 
 
Questions 
1. Would you tell Mr. Jones who is sabotaging the mine? 
   [  ] Yes        [  ] No 
2. Why? 
3. How do you choose to respond to Mr. Jones’ offer? 
   [  ] Take the offer        [  ] Decline the offer 
4. Why did you make this decision?  
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2. Collectivist setting in the U.S. 
This section gives you a fictional scenario with a character that faces a decision.  Please read the 
story and the offer that has been made to the character, then answer the four questions. 
 
 
 
You are a miner who lives in a small town of about 4,000 people where you have lived your 
entire life.   You like living in this rural town where the people are friendly and everyone knows 
everyone else.  Polymetal Mining, Inc. has been the primary employer in the town for years, and 
you along with most of your family, friends, and neighbors work as miners for the company.  Life 
as a miner is hard, with long hours, very low pay, and numerous health risks, but it is the only 
option you have for supporting your family. 
 
Mr. Jones is the local president of Polymetal Mining, Inc., and is by far the most influential man 
in town.  Mr. Jones and the mine engineers are the local elite, living in large mansions and 
reaping in all the material benefits of their position and pay.  You have watched as Mr. Jones has 
grown the company to triple its size, providing a sound base for employment in the area.  While 
you appreciate the value the company’s success brings to the town, you don’t understand why 
you and your family and friends have seen no benefits personally.  You all struggle to provide for 
the basic needs of your families just as much as you did when you first started working here at 
the mines.   
 
You and about 50 of your miner friends and family have formed a protest group dedicated to 
gaining better pay and benefits for all 1000 miners who work at the company.  You call 
yourselves the BFA (Benefits for All), and you are the leader of the group.  The BFA’s primary 
objectives are to gain better pay, better working conditions, and job opportunities for miners to 
gain promotions. 
 
Peaceful demonstrations, petitions, and attempts at negotiating by the BFA have all failed to 
capture any attention from Mr. Jones and the management team.  The protesting miners are 
frustrated and angry.  Recently, a series of “accidents” have occurred in the mine, which appear 
to be some form of sabotage.  At first, one of the mine shaft elevators broke down.  Then the 
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blower stopped working.  And now it has been determined that the support beams on the third 
level are insecure making that level inaccessible for safety reasons.   
 
Although nobody has been able to prove that these break-downs are being caused on purpose, 
you know that they are, because you have seen a couple of the BFA members going into the 
mine at odd hours.  When you confronted these two people, they admitted that they have been 
sabotaging the mine, because the other efforts of the BFA have not been working.  These two 
miners are in a more desperate situation than most, because one is in debt due to his sick 
mother and the other has huge medical bills to pay for his daughter.  You have spoken to them 
privately at length trying to convince them to stop the sabotage because they could end up 
endangering the lives of the other miners, but they refuse to listen. 
 
Mr. Jones is concerned about the series of break-downs and suspects sabotage, but rather than 
pursue an investigation, he has decided to negotiate with the BFA through you in the hopes that 
a deal will end the sabotage. 
 
Offer 
Mr.  Jones says that he will create a new company position with the title “Shift Team Leader”, 
and that all 50 members of the BFA will be promoted into these positions.  Along with the title 
come a pay increase and a better benefits package.  The other miners, however, will receive no 
increase in pay or benefits.  Also, the Shift Team Leaders must disband the BFA and are no 
longer allowed to participate in any protest groups as part of their management positions. 
 
Questions 
1. Would you tell Mr. Jones who is sabotaging the mine? 
   [  ] Yes        [  ] No 
2. Why?  
3. How do you choose to respond to Mr. Jones’ offer? 
   [  ] Take the offer        [  ] Decline the offer 
4. Why did you make this decision? 
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3. Individualist setting in Ghana 
This section gives you a fictional scenario with a character that faces a decision.  Please read the 
story and the offer that has been made to the character, then answer the four questions. 
 
 
You are a miner who lives in a small town of about 4,000 people.   You don’t know many of your 
neighbors and you don’t have any family nearby, but you enjoy living in this quiet rural town 
where people keep mostly to themselves.  Polymetal Mining, Inc. has been the primary 
employer in the town for years, and you along with many of the townspeople work as miners for 
the company.  Life as a miner is hard, with long hours, very low pay, and numerous health risks, 
but it is the only option you have for making a living around here. 
 
Mr. Owusu is the local president of Polymetal Mining, Inc., and is by far the most influential man 
in town.  Mr. Owusu and the mine engineers are the local elite, living in large mansions and 
reaping in all the material benefits of their position and pay.  You have watched as Mr. Owusu 
has grown the company to triple its size, providing a sound base for employment in the area.  
While you appreciate the value the company’s success brings to the town, you don’t understand 
why you have seen no benefits personally.  You struggle to provide for your basic needs just as 
much as you did when you first started working here at the mines.   
 
You and about 50 other miners have formed a protest group dedicated to gaining better pay and 
benefits for all 1000 miners who work at the company.  You call yourselves the BFA (Benefits for 
All), and you are the leader of the group.  The BFA’s primary objectives are to gain better pay, 
better working conditions, and job opportunities for miners to gain promotions. 
 
Peaceful demonstrations, petitions, and attempts at negotiating by the BFA have all failed to 
capture any attention from Mr. Owusu and the management team.  The protesting miners are 
frustrated and angry.  Recently, a series of “accidents” have occurred in the mine, which appear 
to be some form of sabotage.  At first, one of the mine shaft elevators broke down.  Then the 
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blower stopped working.  And now it has been determined that the support beams on the third 
level are insecure making that level inaccessible for safety reasons.   
 
Although nobody has been able to prove that these break-downs are being caused on purpose, 
you know that they are, because you have seen a couple of the BFA members going into the 
mine at odd hours.  When you confronted these two people, they admitted that they have been 
sabotaging the mine, because the other efforts of the BFA have not been working.  These two 
miners are in a more desperate situation than most, because one is in debt due to his sick 
mother and the other has huge medical bills to pay for his daughter.  You have spoken to them 
privately at length trying to convince them to stop the sabotage because they could end up 
endangering the lives of the other miners, but they refuse to listen. 
 
Mr. Owusu is concerned about the series of break-downs and suspects sabotage, but rather 
than pursue an investigation, he has decided to negotiate with the BFA through you in the hopes 
that a deal will end the sabotage. 
 
Offer 
Mr.  Owusu says that he will create a new company position with the title “Shift Team Leader”, 
and that all 50 members of the BFA will be promoted into these positions.  Along with the title 
come a pay increase and a better benefits package.  The other miners, however, will receive no 
increase in pay or benefits.  Also, the Shift Team Leaders must disband the BFA and are no 
longer allowed to participate in any protest groups as part of their management positions. 
 
Questions 
1. Would you tell Mr. Owusu who is sabotaging the mine? 
   [  ] Yes        [  ] No 
2. Why?  
3. How do you choose to respond to Mr. Owusu’s offer? 
   [  ] Take the offer        [  ] Decline the offer 
4. Why did you make this decision?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
162 
 
4. Collectivist setting in Ghana 
This section gives you a fictional scenario with a character that faces a decision.  Please read the 
story and the offer that has been made to the character, then answer the four questions. 
 
 
 
You are a miner who lives in a small town of about 4,000 people where you have lived your 
entire life.   You like living in this rural town where the people are friendly and everyone knows 
everyone else.  Polymetal Mining, Inc. has been the primary employer in the town for years, and 
you along with most of your family, friends, and neighbors work as miners for the company.  Life 
as a miner is hard, with long hours, very low pay, and numerous health risks, but it is the only 
option you have for supporting your family. 
 
Mr. Owusu is the local president of Polymetal Mining, Inc., and is by far the most influential man 
in town.  Mr. Owusu and the mine engineers are the local elite, living in large mansions and 
reaping in all the material benefits of their position and pay.  You have watched as Mr. Owusu 
has grown the company to triple its size, providing a sound base for employment in the area.  
While you appreciate the value the company’s success brings to the town, you don’t understand 
why you and your family and friends have seen no benefits personally.  You all struggle to 
provide for the basic needs of your families just as much as you did when you first started 
working here at the mines.   
 
You and about 50 of your miner friends and family have formed a protest group dedicated to 
gaining better pay and benefits for all 1000 miners who work at the company.  You call 
yourselves the BFA (Benefits for All), and you are the leader of the group.  The BFA’s primary 
objectives are to gain better pay, better working conditions, and job opportunities for miners to 
gain promotions. 
 
Peaceful demonstrations, petitions, and attempts at negotiating by the BFA have all failed to 
capture any attention from Mr. Owusu and the management team.  The protesting miners are 
frustrated and angry.  Recently, a series of “accidents” have occurred in the mine, which appear 
to be some form of sabotage.  At first, one of the mine shaft elevators broke down.  Then the 
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blower stopped working.  And now it has been determined that the support beams on the third 
level are insecure making that level inaccessible for safety reasons.   
 
Although nobody has been able to prove that these break-downs are being caused on purpose, 
you know that they are, because you have seen a couple of the BFA members going into the 
mine at odd hours.  When you confronted these two people, they admitted that they have been 
sabotaging the mine, because the other efforts of the BFA have not been working.  These two 
miners are in a more desperate situation than most, because one is in debt due to his sick 
mother and the other has huge medical bills to pay for his daughter.  You have spoken to them 
privately at length trying to convince them to stop the sabotage because they could end up 
endangering the lives of the other miners, but they refuse to listen. 
 
Mr. Owusu is concerned about the series of break-downs and suspects sabotage, but rather 
than pursue an investigation, he has decided to negotiate with the BFA through you in the hopes 
that a deal will end the sabotage. 
 
Offer 
Mr.  Owusu says that he will create a new company position with the title “Shift Team Leader”, 
and that all 50 members of the BFA will be promoted into these positions.  Along with the title 
come a pay increase and a better benefits package.  The other miners, however, will receive no 
increase in pay or benefits.  Also, the Shift Team Leaders must disband the BFA and are no 
longer allowed to participate in any protest groups as part of their management positions. 
 
Questions 
1. Would you tell Mr. Owusu who is sabotaging the mine? 
   [  ] Yes        [  ] No 
2. Why?  
3. How do you choose to respond to Mr. Owusu’s offer? 
   [  ] Take the offer        [  ] Decline the offer 
4. Why did you make this decision?  
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APPENDIX B 
REDUCED AUCKLAND INDIVIDUALISM COLLECTIVISM SCALE (AICS)  
 
 
The following questionnaire is used to measure individualist and collectivist traits.   Items 
are indicated with I or C to indicate they are part of the individualist or collectivist index 
respectively.  Each question is implemented on a scale of strongly agree, agree, disagree, 
strongly disagree, or don’t know. 
 
1. I define myself as a competitive person. (I) 
 
2. Before I make a major decision I seek advice from people close to me. (C) 
 
3. I believe that competition is part of human nature. (I) 
 
4. I consider my friends’ opinions before taking important actions. (C) 
 
5. I like to be accurate when I communicate. (I) 
 
6. It is important to consult close friends and get their ideas before making a 
decision. (C) 
 
7. I ask the advice of my friends before making career related decisions. (C) 
 
8. I sacrifice my self-interest for the benefit of my group. (C) 
 
9. I prefer using indirect language rather than upset my friends. (C) 
 
10. I take responsibility for my own actions. (I) 
 
11. My personal identity independent of others is very important to me. (I) 
 
12. Winning is very important to me. (I) 
 
13. I see myself as “my own person.” (I) 
 
14. I consult my family before making an important decision. (C) 
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APPENDIX C 
REDUCED GENERAL DECISION MAKING STYLE (GDMS)  
 
The following questionnaire is used to measure general decision making styles.   Items 
are indicated with an R, I, D, A, or S to indicate they are part of the rational, intuitive, 
dependent, avoidant, or spontaneous index respectively.  Each question is implemented 
on a scale of strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree, or don’t know. 
1. When I make decisions, I tend to rely on my intuition. (I) 
2. I rarely make important decisions without consulting other people. (D) 
3. When I make a decision, it is more important for me to feel the decision is right 
than to have a rational explanation for it. (I) 
4. I double-check my information sources to be sure I have the right facts before 
making decisions. (R) 
5. I make decisions in a logical and systematic way. (R) 
6. When making decisions I do what feels natural at the moment. (S) 
7. I like to have someone steer me in the right direction when I am faced with 
important decisions. (D) 
8. My decision making requires careful thought. (R) 
9. When making a decision, I trust my inner feelings and reactions. (I) 
10. When making a decision, I consider various options in terms of a specified goal. 
(R) 
11. I avoid making important decisions until the pressure is on. (A) 
12. I often make impulsive decisions. (S) 
13. I often need the assistance of other people when making important decisions. (D) 
14. I often put off making important decisions. (A) 
15. If I have the support of others, it is easier for me to make important decisions. (D) 
16. I generally make important decisions at the last minute. (A) 
17. I make quick decisions. (S) 
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APPENDIX D 
CODEBOOKS 
Table D.1   
Codebook for Decision-Making Survey 
Indicator Value 
 
Location 
Location of the respondent 
0=UCC (University of Cape Coast, Ghana) 
1=KSU (Kennesaw State University, GA, US) 
2=KAIPTC (Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping 
Training Center, Accra, Ghana) 
 
All scaled questions Raw data for scaled questions have values as follows: 
1 = Strongly agree 
2 = Agree 
3 = Disagree 
4 = Strongly disagree 
5 = Don't know 
Data is transformed in a binary fashion such that strongly 
agree and agree are changed to a 1, and strongly disagree 
and disagree are changed to 0.  Don't know is changed to 
missing data. 
 
IND Individualism.  Uses a reduced version of the Auckland 
Individualism Collectivism (AICS) questionnaire to score 7 
IND items as 0/1. If a majority of the items are 1, then the 
overall IND score is set to 1, otherwise 0. 
 
HIGHIND High-Individualism.  Uses a reduced version of the 
Auckland Individualism Collectivism (AICS) questionnaire 
to score 7 IND items as 0/1. If ALL of the items are 1, then 
the overall IND score is set to 1, otherwise 0. 
 
COL Collectivism.  Uses a reduced version of the Auckland 
Individualism Collectivism (AICS) questionnaire to score 7 
COL items as 0/1. If a majority of the items are 1, then the 
overall COL score is set to 1, otherwise 0. 
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Table D.1 (cont’d) 
Indicator Value 
  
RAT1 Rational on the GDMS scale before reading scenario. The 
score is a 1 if a majority of the rational items are 1, 
otherwise 0. 
 
INTUIT1 Intuitive on the GDMS scale before reading scenario. The 
score is a 1 if a majority of the intuitive items are 1, 
otherwise 0. 
 
DEP1 Dependent on the GDMS scale before reading scenario. The 
score is a 1 if a majority of the dependent items are 1, 
otherwise 0. 
 
AVOID1 Avoidant on the GDMS scale before reading scenario. The 
score is a 1 if a majority of the avoidant items are 1, 
otherwise 0. 
 
SPONT1 Spontaneous on the GDMS scale before reading scenario. 
The score is a 1 if a majority of the spontaneous items are 1, 
otherwise 0. 
 
Version Setting of the scenario: 
1 = IND (individualist setting) 
0 = COL (collectivist setting) 
 
Tattle First decision made for the scenario: 
1 = Yes, tell who is the saboteur 
0 = No, do not tell  (was 2 in raw data) 
 
Why1 Open-ended response to first decision 
 
Cooperate Second decision made for the scenario: 
1 = Cooperate (take offer) 
0 = Resist (decline offer, was 2 in raw data) 
 
Why2 Open-ended response to second decision 
 
RAT2 Rational on the GDMS scale, after reading the scenario. The 
score is a 1 if a majority of the rational items are 1, 
otherwise 0. 
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Table D.1 (cont’d) 
Indicator Value 
  
INTUIT2 Intuitive on the GDMS scale, after reading the scenario. The 
score is a 1 if a majority of the intuitive items are 1, 
otherwise 0. 
 
DEP2 Dependent on the GDMS scale, after reading the scenario. 
The score is a 1 if a majority of the dependent items are 1, 
otherwise 0. 
 
AVOID2 Avoidant on the GDMS scale, after reading the scenario. 
The score is a 1 if a majority of the avoidant items are 1, 
otherwise 0. 
 
DINTUIT Difference in intuitive score before and after reading 
scenario 
 
DDEP Difference in dependent score before and after reading 
scenario 
 
DAVOID Difference in avoidance score before and after reading 
scenario 
 
DSPONT Difference in spontaneous score before and after reading 
scenario 
 
Realistic Was scenario realistic?   
1= yes (strongly agree or agree) 
0 = no (strongly disagree, or disagree) 
 
SimLoc Was the scenario location similar to where I live?   
1= yes (strongly agree or agree) 
0 = no (strongly disagree, or disagree) 
 
Identify Could I identify with the character that needed to make a 
decision?   
1= yes (strongly agree or agree) 
0 = no (strongly disagree, or disagree) 
 
Familiarity 1=COL setting (Version=0) AND Ghana (Location=0) 
0=COL setting (Version=0) AND US (Location=1) 
0=IND setting (Version=1) AND Ghana (Location=0) 
1=IND setting (Version=1) AND US (Location=1) 
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Table D.2 
Codebook for Demographics at KSU 
Indicator Value 
 
Age 
 
Age in years 
 
Gender 1=Male; 0=Female (was 2 in Raw Data) 
 
CollegeLevel 1=Freshman; 2=Sophomore; 3=Junior; 4=Senior 
5=Graduate 
 
Major 1=Arts; 2=Business; 3=Education; 4=Health 
5=Social Sciences; 6-Science and Math; 7=Undeclared 
 
BornUSA 1=Born in U.S.; 0 = Born in other country (includes Ghana) 
 
EthnicityUSA 1=Asian/Pacific Islander; 2=Black/African American 
3=Hispanic; 4=Native American; 5=White/Caucasian 
0=Other 
 
ReligionUSA 1=Buddhist; 2=Christian; 3=Hindu; 4=Jewish; 5=Muslim 
7=None (was 6 in raw data, changed to match UCC) 
0=Other 
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Table D.3 
Codebook for Demographics at UCC 
Indicator Value 
 
Age 
 
Age in years 
 
Gender 1=Male; 0=Female (was 2 in Raw Data) 
 
CollegeLevel 1=Freshman (100); 2=Sophomore (200); 3=Junior (300) 
4=Senior (400); 5=Graduate 
 
Major 1=Arts; 2=Business; 3=Education; 4=Health 
5=Social Sciences; 6-Science and Math; 7=Undeclared 
 
BornGhana 1=Born in Ghana; 0 = Born in other country (includes US) 
  
EthnicityGhana 1=Akan; 2=Ewe; 3=Mole-Dagbane; 4=Ga; 0=other 
 
ReligionGhana 1=Buddhist; 2=Christian; 3=Hindu; 4=Jewish 
5=Muslim; 6=Traditional; 7=None; 0=Other 
 
RegionGhana 1=Ashanti; 2=Brong-Ahafo; 3=Central; 4=Eastern 
5=Greater Accra; 6=Northern; 7=Upper East 
8=Upper West; 9=Volta; 10=Western; 11=None of these 
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Table D.4 
Codebook for Demographics at KAIPTC 
Indicator Value 
 
Age 
 
Age in years 
 
Gender 1=Male; 0=Female (was 2 in Raw Data) 
 
BornGhana 1=Born in Ghana; 0 = Born in other country (includes US) 
 
RegionGhana 1=Ashanti; 2=Brong-Ahafo; 3=Central; 4=Eastern 
5=Greater Accra; 6=Northern; 7=Upper East 
8=Upper West; 9=Volta; 10=Western; 11=None of these 
 
EthnicityGhana 1=Akan; 2=Ewe; 3=Mole-Dagbane; 4=Ga; 0=other 
 
ReligionGhana 1=Buddhist; 2=Christian; 3=Hindu; 4=Jewish 
5=Muslim; 6=Traditional; 7=None; 0=Other 
 
Education 1=High school; 2=Bachelors; 3=Masters 
4=Doctorate; 5=Other 
 
Mlitary Any military experience? 
1 = yes; 0 = no (was 2 in raw data) 
 
Police Any police experience? 
1 = yes; 0 = no (was 2 in raw data) 
 
PKO Number of peacekeeping missions they've been on (+1 in 
raw data).  Capped at 4, i.e. "4" means 4 or more missions. 
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APPENDIX E 
CROSSTAB RESULTS FOR COMPLETE MATRIX OF HYPOTHESES 
 
This Appendix lists out the results of crosstab comparisons for each of the dependent and 
independent variables in each of the operationalized forms for all nine cells of the grid 
shown in Table 5.2. 
 
Table E.1 
Cell 1: Decision-Making Style by Collectivism Trait 
Decision-Making 
Style 
Not Collectivist 
(N=69) 
Collectivist 
(N=400) 
X
2  
(p-value) 
Rational 88% 95% 3.7 
(0.056)* 
Dependent 26% 73% 59.0 
(0.001)*** 
***=significant at .01; **=significant at .05; *=significant at .1 
 
 
Table E.2 
Cell 1: Decision-Making Style by Individualism Trait 
Decision-Making 
Style 
Not Highly 
Individualist 
(N=212) 
Highly 
Individualist 
(N=257) 
X
2  
(p-value) 
Rational 50% 94% 6.4 
(0.092)* 
Dependent 62% 70% 3.5 
(0.06)* 
***=significant at .01; **=significant at .05; *=significant at .1 
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Table E.3 
Cell 2: Justification Factors for Telling or Not by Individualism Trait 
Factor Not Highly 
Individualist 
(N=198) 
Highly 
Individualist 
(N=236) 
X
2  
(p-value) 
Miner Safety 22% 19% 0.7 
(0.418) 
Saboteurs May 
Lose Jobs 
21% 16% 1.9 
(0.171) 
Moral Reasons 12% 9% 0.6 
(0.435) 
Sabotage Was 
Justified 
10% 8% 0.5 
(0.464) 
President 
Responsible 
10% 12% 0.3 
(0.560) 
Not My Business 5% 4% 0.2 
(0.687) 
Solve In Group 7% 6% 0.1 
(0.766) 
Betrays Group 8% 11% 1.2 
(0.279) 
For Company 
Benefit 
5% 8% 1.6 
(0.212) 
Protect Self 5% 3% 1.2 
(0.265) 
***=significant at .01; **=significant at .05; *=significant at .1 
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Table E.4 
Cell 2: Justification Factors for Taking Deal or Not by Individualism Trait 
Factor Not Highly 
Individualist 
(N=195) 
Highly 
Individualist 
(N=235) 
X
2  
(p-value) 
Self Benefit 13% 11% 0.3 
(0.575) 
Protest Group 
Benefit 
15% 11% 2.2 
(0.142) 
Miner Benefit 54% 54% 0.002 
(0.968) 
Company Benefit 0.5% 1.3% N/R 
Achieve Peace 7% 8% 0.04 
(0.850) 
Follow Principles 5% 3% 0.8 
(0.374) 
View of President 4% 4% 0.12 
(0.724) 
Keep Protest Rights 1% 1% 0.1 
(0.809) 
Avoid Confusion 0% 1% N/R 
***=significant at .01; **=significant at .05; *=significant at .1 
N/R:Not reported because Chi-squared may be distorted due to less than 5 cases in a cell 
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Table E.5 
Cell 2: Justification Factors for Telling or Not by Collectivism Trait 
Factor Not Collectivist 
(N=62) 
Collectivist 
(N=372) 
X
2  
(p-value) 
Miner Safety 24% 20% 0.6 
(0.437) 
Saboteurs May 
Lose Jobs 
13% 19% 1.5 
(0.225) 
Moral Reasons 10% 11% 0.04 
(0.847) 
Sabotage Was 
Justified 
10% 8% 0.1 
(0.726) 
President 
Responsible 
11% 11% 0.004 
(0.950) 
Not My Business 2% 5% N/R 
Solve In Group 7% 7% N/R 
Betrays Group 2% 11% 5.0 
(0.025)** 
For Company 
Benefit 
8% 7% N/R 
Protect Self 5% 4% N/R 
***=significant at .01; **=significant at .05; *=significant at .1 
N/R:Not reported because Chi-squared may be distorted due to less than 5 cases in a cell 
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Table E.6 
Cell 2: Justification Factors for Taking Deal or Not by Collectivism Trait 
Factor Not Collectivist 
(N=69) 
Collectivist 
(N=400) 
X
2  
(p-value) 
Self Benefit 18% 11% 2.6 
(0.108) 
Protest Group 
Benefit 
12% 13% 0.1 
(0.740) 
Miner Benefit 53% 54% 0.1 
(0.800) 
Company Benefit 0% 1% N/R 
Achieve Peace 7% 8% N/R 
Follow Principles 6% 4% N/R 
View of President 3% 4% N/R 
Keep Protest Rights 0% 1% N/R 
Avoid Confusion 0% 1% N/R 
***=significant at .01; **=significant at .05; *=significant at .1 
N/R:Not reported because Chi-squared may be distorted due to less than 5 cases in a cell 
 
Table E.7 
Cell 3: Decision to Tell or Not by Individualism Trait 
Decision Not Highly 
Individualist 
(N=198) 
Highly 
Individualist 
(N=248) 
X
2  
(p-value) 
Tell 42% 39% 0.6 
(0.427) 
***=significant at .01; **=significant at .05; *=significant at .1 
 
Table E.8 
Cell 3: Decision to Deal or Not by Individualism Trait 
Decision Not Highly 
Individualist 
(N=198) 
Highly 
Individualist 
(N=244) 
X
2  
(p-value) 
Take Deal 35% 32% 0.4 
(0.523) 
***=significant at .01; **=significant at .05; *=significant at .1 
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Table E.9 
Cell 3: Decision to Tell or Not by Collectivism Trait 
Decision Not Collectivist 
(N=64) 
Collectivist 
(N=382) 
X
2  
(p-value) 
Tell 50% 39% 2.9 
(0.089)* 
***=significant at .01; **=significant at .05; *=significant at .1 
 
 
Table E.10 
Cell 3: Decision to Deal or Not by Collectivism Trait 
Decision Not Collectivist 
(N=64) 
Collectivist 
(N=378) 
X
2  
(p-value) 
Take Deal 38% 33% 0.6 
(0.436) 
***=significant at .01; **=significant at .05; *=significant at .1 
 
 
Table E.11 
Cell 4: Decision-Making Style by Location 
Decision-Making 
Style 
Ghana 
(N=179) 
U.S. 
(N=255) 
X
2  
(p-value) 
Rational    
Dependent    
***=significant at .01; **=significant at .05; *=significant at .1 
Note: Even though significant p-values, the differences in likelihood are small. 
Ghanaians are only 1.07 times as likely to be rational, and only 1.2 times as likely to be 
dependent. 
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Table E.12 
Cell 5: Justification Factors for Telling or Not by Location 
Factor Ghana 
(N=179) 
U.S. 
(N=255) 
X
2  
(p-value) 
Miner Safety 13% 26% 11.0 
(0.001)*** 
Saboteurs May 
Lose Jobs 
18% 19% 0.1 
(0.802) 
Moral Reasons 7% 13% 3.2 
(0.075)* 
Sabotage Was 
Justified 
5% 11% 4.8 
(0.029)** 
President 
Responsible 
15% 9% 3.7 
(0.054)* 
Not My Business 2% 7% 6.0 
(0.015)** 
Solve In Group 6% 8% 0.6 
(0.444) 
Betrays Group 14% 6% 8.2 
(0.004)*** 
For Company 
Benefit 
8% 6% 0.6 
(0.426) 
Protect Self 3% 5% 1.0 
(0.312) 
***=significant at .01; **=significant at .05; *=significant at .1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
179 
 
Table E.13 
Cell 5: Justification Factors for Taking Deal or Not by Location 
Factor Ghana 
(N=175) 
U.S. 
(N=255) 
X
2  
(p-value) 
Self Benefit 9% 14% 3.1 
(0.081)* 
Protest Group 
Benefit 
9% 16% 4.7 
(0.030)** 
Miner Benefit 51% 56% 0.8 
(0.384) 
Company Benefit 2% 0% N/R 
Achieve Peace 8% 7% 0.1 
(0.715) 
Follow Principles 4% 4% 0.1 
(0.873) 
View of President 5% 3% 1.1 
(0.294) 
Keep Protest Rights 1% 2% N/R 
Avoid Confusion 1% 0% N/R 
***=significant at .01; **=significant at .05; *=significant at .1 
N/R:Not reported because Chi-squared may be distorted due to less than 5 cases in a cell 
 
 
Table E.14 
Cell 6: Decision to Tell or Not by Location 
Decision Ghana 
(N=191) 
U.S. 
(N=255) 
X
2  
(p-value) 
Tell 36% 44% 2.5 
(0.115) 
***=significant at .01; **=significant at .05; *=significant at .1 
 
 
Table E.15 
Cell 6: Decision to Deal or Not by Location 
Decision Ghana 
(N=187) 
U.S. 
(N=255) 
X
2  
(p-value) 
Take Deal 31% 35% 1.1 
(0.289) 
***=significant at .01; **=significant at .05; *=significant at .1 
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Table E.16 
Cell 7: Decision-Making Style by Unfamiliar Vignette Setting 
Decision-Making 
Style 
Unfamiliar Setting 
(Collectivist setting in 
U.S. or Individualist 
setting in Ghana) 
(N=241) 
Familiar Setting 
(Individualist setting 
in U.S. or Collectivist 
setting in Ghana) 
(N=228) 
X
2  
(p-value) 
Rational 95% 92% 1.7 
(0.197) 
Dependent 64% 69% 1.3 
(0.256) 
***=significant at .01; **=significant at .05; *=significant at .1 
 
 
Table E.17 
Cell 7: Decision-Making Style by Self-Reported Familiarity 
Decision-Making 
Style 
Not familiar 
(N=365) 
Familiar 
(N=70) 
X
2  
(p-value) 
Rational 94% 97% N/R 
Dependent 65% 77% 3.8 
(0.051)* 
***=significant at .01; **=significant at .05; *=significant at .1 
N/R:Not reported because Chi-squared may be distorted due to less than 5 cases in a cell 
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Table E.18 
Cell 8: Justification Factors for Telling or Not by Unfamiliar Vignette Setting 
Factor Unfamiliar Setting 
(Collectivist setting in 
U.S. or Individualist 
setting in Ghana) 
(N=225) 
Familiar Setting 
(Individualist setting in 
U.S. or Collectivist 
setting in Ghana) 
(N=209) 
X
2  
(p-value) 
Miner Safety 22% 19% 0.8 
(0.358) 
Saboteurs May 
Lose Jobs 
20% 16% 1.3 
(0.262) 
Moral Reasons 11% 10% 0.3 
(0.599) 
Sabotage Was 
Justified 
11% 6% 4.0 
(0.045)** 
President 
Responsible 
13% 9% 1.6 
(0.207) 
Not My Business 4% 5% 0.4 
(0.531) 
Solve In Group 6% 7% 0.2 
(0.691) 
Betrays Group 8% 11% 1.5 
(0.215) 
For Company 
Benefit 
5% 8% 1.4 
(0.243) 
Protect Self 4% 4% 0.01 
(0.926) 
***=significant at .01; **=significant at .05; *=significant at .1 
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Table E.19 
Cell 8: Justification Factors for Taking Deal or Not by Unfamiliar Vignette Setting 
Factor Unfamiliar Setting 
(Collectivist setting 
in U.S. or 
Individualist setting 
in Ghana) 
(N=224) 
Familiar Setting 
(Individualist setting in 
U.S. or Collectivist 
setting in Ghana) 
(N=206) 
X
2  
(p-value) 
Self Benefit 10% 14% 1.1 
(0.287) 
Protest Group 
Benefit 
10% 16% 2.7 
(0.102) 
Miner Benefit 54% 54% 0.03 
(0.868) 
Company Benefit 1.3% 0.5% N/R 
Achieve Peace 6% 9% 1.8 
(0.177) 
Follow Principles 5% 3% 1.6 
(0.206) 
View of President 3% 5% 0.8 
(0.358) 
Keep Protest Rights 2% 0% N/R 
Avoid Confusion 0.4% 0.5% N/R 
***=significant at .01; **=significant at .05; *=significant at .1 
N/R:Not reported because Chi-squared may be distorted due to less than 5 cases in a cell 
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Table E.20 
Cell 8: Justification Factors for Telling or Not by Self-Reported Familiarity 
Factor Not familiar 
(N=356) 
Familiar 
(N=68) 
X
2  
(p-value) 
Miner Safety 21% 15% 1.6 
(0.212) 
Saboteurs May 
Lose Jobs 
21% 6% 8.9 
(0.003)*** 
Moral Reasons 11% 6% 1.8 
(0.184) 
Sabotage Was 
Justified 
10% 4% 1.9 
(0.169) 
President 
Responsible 
11% 12% 0.1 
(0.791) 
Not My Business 5% 3% N/R 
Solve In Group 7% 4% N/R 
Betrays Group 10% 6% 1.1 
(0.302) 
For Company 
Benefit 
5% 13% N/R 
Protect Self 4% 4% N/R 
***=significant at .01; **=significant at .05; *=significant at .1 
N/R:Not reported because Chi-squared may be distorted due to less than 5 cases in a cell 
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Table E.21 
Cell 8: Justification Factors for Taking Deal or Not by Self-Reported Familiarity 
Factor Not familiar 
(N=355) 
Familiar 
(N=65) 
X
2  
(p-value) 
Self Benefit 11% 15% 1.0 
(0.310) 
Protest Group 
Benefit 
13% 12% 0.04 
(0.838) 
Miner Benefit 57% 65% 15.3 
(0.001)*** 
Company Benefit 0.3% 3.1% N/R 
Achieve Peace 7% 6% N/R 
Follow Principles 5% 3% N/R 
View of President 3% 9% N/R 
Keep Protest Rights 1% 2% N/R 
Avoid Confusion 1% 0% N/R 
***=significant at .01; **=significant at .05; *=significant at .1 
N/R:Not reported because Chi-squared may be distorted due to less than 5 cases in a cell 
 
 
Table E.22 
Cell 9: Decision to Tell or Not by Unfamiliar Vignette Setting 
Decision Unfamiliar Setting 
(Collectivist setting in 
U.S. or Individualist 
setting in Ghana) 
(N=232) 
Familiar Setting 
(Individualist setting in 
U.S. or Collectivist 
setting in Ghana) 
(N=214) 
X
2  
(p-value) 
Tell 41% 39% 0.2 
(0.647) 
***=significant at .01; **=significant at .05; *=significant at .1 
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Table E.23 
Cell 9: Decision to Deal or Not by Unfamiliar Vignette Setting 
Decision Unfamiliar Setting 
(Collectivist setting in 
U.S. or Individualist 
setting in Ghana) 
(N=231) 
Familiar Setting 
(Individualist setting in 
U.S. or Collectivist 
setting in Ghana) 
(N=211) 
X
2  
(p-value) 
Take Deal 32% 35% 0.6 
(0.439) 
***=significant at .01; **=significant at .05; *=significant at .1 
 
 
Table E.24 
Cell 9: Decision to Tell or Not by Self-Reported Familiarity 
Decision Not familiar 
(N=365) 
Familiar 
(N=70) 
X
2  
(p-value) 
Tell 38% 53% 5.5 
(0.019)** 
***=significant at .01; **=significant at .05; *=significant at .1 
 
 
Table E.25 
Cell 9: Decision to Deal or Not by Self-Reported Familiarity 
Decision Not familiar 
(N=364) 
Familiar 
(N=68) 
X
2  
(p-value) 
Take Deal 31% 44% 4.4 
(0.035)** 
***=significant at .01; **=significant at .05; *=significant at .1 
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APPENDIX F 
TEN RULES: CODE OF PERSONAL CONDUCT FOR BLUE HELMETS 
 
 
1. Dress, think, talk, act and behave in a manner befitting the dignity of a disciplined, 
caring, considerate, mature, respected and trusted soldier, displaying the highest 
integrity and impartiality. Have pride in your position as a peace-keeper and do not 
abuse or misuse your authority. 
2. Respect the law of the land of the host country, their local culture, traditions, customs 
and practices. 
3. Treat the inhabitants of the host country with respect, courtesy and consideration. 
You are there as a guest to help them and in so doing will be welcomed with 
admiration. Neither solicit nor accept any material reward, honor or gift. 
4. Do not indulge in immoral acts of sexual, physical or psychological abuse or 
exploitation of the local population or United Nations staff, especially women and 
children. 
5. Respect and regard the human rights of all. Support and aid the infirm, sick and weak. 
Do not act in revenge or with malice, in particular when dealing with prisoners, 
detainees or people in your custody. 
6. Properly care for and account for all United Nations money, vehicles, equipment and 
property assigned to you and do not trade or barter with them to seek personal 
benefits. 
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7. Show military courtesy and pay appropriate compliments to all members of the 
mission, including other United Nations contingents regardless of their creed, gender, 
rank or origin. 
8. Show respect for and promote the environment, including the flora and fauna, of the 
host country. 
9. Do not engage in excessive consumption of alcohol or any consumption or trafficking 
of drugs. 
10. Exercise the utmost discretion in handling confidential information and matters of 
official business which can put lives into danger or soil the image of the United 
Nations. 
 
  
 
